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Abstract 
Despite efforts by scholars and policymakers, gender and family responsibilities 
discrimination in the workplace continue to be significant problems in the United States. 
Social psychologists have established that when men and women engage in gender non-
conforming behavior, with women pursuing career success and men contributing to 
domestic labor, they face backlash and economic penalties. Little is known, however, 
about the types of individuals who are most likely to engage in these forms of 
discrimination and the types of situations in which this is most likely to occur. The result 
is that current research in social psychology is not particularly amenable to the 
identification and elimination of institutional risk factors for gender discrimination in the 
workplace. 
In previous research, I developed the Separate Spheres Model of gendered 
inequality, which examines the antecedents and consequences of the separate spheres 
ideology (SSI). The SSI is a belief system that claims that: 1) gender differences in 
society are innate, 2) men and women freely choose to participate in different spheres of 
society, and 3) separate gendered spheres are normatively desirable. The SSI has existed 
as a cultural idea for many years but has not been operationalized or modeled in social 
psychology. The Separate Spheres Model presents the SSI as a new psychological 
construct characterized by individual differences and a motivated system-justifying 
function, operationalizes the ideology with a new scale measure, and models the ideology 
as a predictor of important gendered outcomes in society.  
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This dissertation builds on my previous work by examining how workplace 
supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI operates under varying conditions of supervisor 
discretion. I develop a Separate Spheres Model of family responsibilities discrimination 
in which supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI leads them to endorse flexibility stigma 
attitudes and engage in discriminatory conduct against employees with family 
responsibilities, but only under conditions of high supervisor discretion. This conduct 
then translates to negative experiences for employees in the form of work-life conflict 
and gendered coping strategies for managing work-life conflict. I discuss the implications 
of these findings for the social-psychological study of gendered inequality, for 
employment policy, and for employment discrimination law. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Despite decades of effort by scholars and policymakers, gender and family 
responsibilities discrimination in the workplace continue to be significant problems in the 
United States (e.g., Williams, Blair-Loy, & Berdahl, 2013). Legal remedies for those 
harmed by employment discrimination are insufficient. For example, courts hearing 
gender and family responsibilities discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) frequently fail to recognize family responsibilities 
discrimination as discrimination based on sex, despite decades of social-psychological 
evidence establishing that caregiver discrimination is rooted in gender stereotypes 
(Miller, 2014). Judges sometimes rely on decision-making shortcuts like the same-actor 
inference, a heuristic that courts use to determine whether an actor had discriminatory 
intent, even though social-psychological evidence makes clear that the same-actor 
inference is empirically invalid (Krieger & Fiske, 2006; Miller, 2015).  
The Supreme Court has also stated that an employer’s policy of leaving 
employment decisions “to the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should 
itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct” (Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 
1988, at 990). The Watson holding is more nuanced and plaintiff-friendly than this 
quotation suggests, but subsequent courts have taken this quotation out of context and 
used it to justify disposing of claims that may have merit (see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 2011, at 2554). The courts that do this sometimes express a general skepticism 
about the existence of employment discrimination. For example, the Dukes majority cited 
the above passage from Watson and went on to state, “left to their own devices most 
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managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex 
discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and 
promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all” (Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 2011, at 
2554). The result of this judicial perspective is that it is fairly easy for employers to 
escape liability for sex and family responsibilities discrimination by giving their 
supervisors nearly unchecked decision-making discretion and by failing to implement 
procedures that could prevent discrimination. 
Contrary to the Dukes perspective, research in social psychology suggests that 
supervisor discretion creates conditions that allow discriminatory decision-making to 
occur in the workplace (Heilman & Haynes, 2008). Specifically, subjectivity in 
workplace appraisal processes allows individuals’ stereotypes to manifest as 
discriminatory conduct. Because our expectations in any given situation are driven by 
stereotypes and prejudices, decisions that involve ambiguity and require inference are 
more susceptible to gender bias. Specific forms of ambiguity in the employment context 
include “an absence of relevant, specific information; poorly defined evaluative criteria; 
lack of clarity about what performance actually is; and confusion about the source of 
performance outcomes” (Heilman & Haynes, 2008, p. 135). This basic research finding 
has received scientific support for decades (see, e.g., Nieva & Gutek, 1980). 
There are several psychological mechanisms by which subjectivity in the 
workplace leads to discriminatory decision-making. First, subjectivity allows individuals 
to selectively attend to information that is consistent with their gender stereotypes 
(Heilman & Haynes, 2008). For example, one study found that when it was easier to 
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identify the social category that a subordinate belonged to, participants spent less time 
actually observing the performance of the subordinate; participants’ ratings of these 
subordinates were less accurate than the ratings of subordinates who were less easily 
stereotyped (Favero & Ilgen, 1989). Other studies found that because women are 
expected to perform less competently in certain employment domains, women must 
perform better than men in order to be perceived as equally competent (Biernat & 
Kobrynowicz, 1997; Foschi, 1996; Foschi, 2000). Second, subjectivity allows individuals 
to encode and interpret information in stereotype-consistent ways (Heilman & Haynes, 
2008). For example, several studies have demonstrated that whereas men are rated as 
strong and assertive in performance evaluations, equally competent women are rated as 
abrasive, pushy, and unlikeable (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & 
Tamkins, 2004). Third, subjectivity allows individuals to recall information in stereotype-
consistent ways (Heilman & Haynes, 2008). For example, one study found that without 
clear information about individuals’ contributions to a group task, women in the group 
were rated as less competent, less influential, and less likely to have played a leadership 
role (Heilman & Haynes, 2005). Taken together, this research makes clear that 
subjectivity and ambiguity in workplace decision-making open the door for cognitive 
biases and gender stereotypes to influence outcomes. 
One form of workplace ambiguity that is most relevant for this discussion is the 
decision-making discretion that employers give to individual supervisors. Research in 
social psychology suggests that supervisor discretion creates contextual conditions that 
allow discriminatory decision-making to occur. For example, one study showed that 
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supervisors with discretion applied available disciplinary actions differently to men and 
women (Bobbitt-Zeher, 2011). Research indicates that supervisors with high discretion 
may also allow men to make more mistakes than women before the mistakes begin to 
have consequences. For example, one study found that it took men engaging in more acts 
of incompetence on the job before supervisors begin to perceive them as less competent 
(Biernat, Fuegen, & Kobrynowicz, 2010). Another study found that supervisors 
selectively investigated allegations of wrongdoing against female employees more than 
against male employees (Bobbitt-Zeher, 2011). Supervisors may also be more likely to 
record men’s acts of incompetence in informal logs and women’s acts of incompetence in 
formal personnel files (Biernat, Fuegen, & Kobrynowicz, 2010). Research in social 
psychology also suggests that supervisors with high levels of discretion are more likely to 
change their decision-making standards as they go, emphasizing whichever evaluation 
criteria will favor male employees at the time. For example, managers may change their 
evaluation criteria to emphasize social and personality factors for women whom they 
have already deemed unlikeable (Heilman, et al., 2004; Phelan, Moss-Racusin, & 
Rudman, 2008). One study also found that participants were more likely to hire a man 
than a woman when the man had better educational credentials, but were not more likely 
to hire the woman when she had better educational credentials (Foschi, Lai, & Sigerson, 
1994; for more in-depth reviews of workplace subjectivity and gender bias, see Heilman 
& Haynes, 2008; Nieva & Gutek, 1980). 
Taken together, these research studies suggest that when employers enact policies 
that fail to limit supervisors’ decision-making discretion, supervisors are free to apply 
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existing policies differently to men and women, engage in different record-keeping 
procedures for men and women, and evaluate men and women on different standards. 
However, only three of the studies described here tested the effects of supervisor 
discretion directly (see Biernat & Fuegen, 2001; Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Biernat, 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, although all of the results described here are consistent with 
the notion that supervisor discretion opens the door for individuals’ personal stereotypes 
and biases to influence decisions, none of these studies directly examined the moderating 
role of supervisor discretion on individuals’ personal endorsement of gendered ideologies 
or stereotypes. 
This dissertation examines the role of the separate spheres ideology in flexibility 
stigma, family responsibilities discrimination, and work-life conflict, and it investigates 
the extent to which this role is moderated by supervisor discretion in the workplace. I 
develop a Separate Spheres Model of family responsibilities discrimination in which 
supervisors’ endorsement of the separate spheres ideology leads them to endorse 
flexibility stigma attitudes and engage in family responsibilities discrimination (see 
Figure 1, paths A and B), but only under conditions of high supervisor discretion (see 
Figure 1, path C). This conduct on the part of supervisors then translates to negative 
work-life conflict experiences for employees and stereotypically gendered strategies for 
coping with work-life conflicts (see Figure 1, paths D, E, F, and G; note also that in this 
research, work-life conflicts include any number of family caregiving responsibilities, 
including childcare, caring for older adults or adults with disabilities, or caring for a 
spouse during medical treatment). The remainder of this Chapter will review existing 
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social-psychological approaches to the study of gendered discrimination in the 
workplace, explain the Separate Spheres Model, and outline the hypotheses that drive the 
research presented in this dissertation. 
Social-psychological Research on Gendered Discrimination in the Workplace1 
For more than a decade, the dominant social-psychological approach to studying 
gendered workplace inequality and discrimination has been to investigate the role of 
descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes. Descriptive stereotypes describe how 
men and women are thought to be (e.g., Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Heilman, 2001). In 
particular, men are thought to be agentic and competent and women are thought to be 
communal and warm (these stereotypes also map onto gender stereotypes in the 
Stereotype Content Model; see Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). When a woman has a 
child, announces that she is going to have a child, or activates maternal concepts in some 
other way in the workplace, people tend to see her as having more attributes typical of 
women (warmth) and fewer attributes typical of men (competence). People who hold 
these stereotypes about men and women tend to assume that mothers are less competent 
and less committed than non-mothers (Fuegen, Biernat, Haines, & Deaux, 2004). These 
perceptions can lead to fewer recommendations for a promotion (Heilman & Okimoto, 
2008), lower rates of hiring, and lower willingness to educate mothers compared to other 
employees (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004). Women are also penalized by the assumption 
that they may become caregivers, even when they have not had children. In one study, 
women who were married were rated as less employable than unmarried women, whereas 
married men were rated as more employable than unmarried men (Jordan & Zitek, 2012). 
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Recent research suggests that women may be able to temper the effects of their caregiver 
status on perceptions of their low commitment to work by explicitly and unambiguously 
stating their commitment to the job over the family (Aranda & Glick, 2014; Benard & 
Correll, 2010). However, neither women nor men should be required to put a low priority 
on family to have a successful career, and this strategy may put women at risk of penalty 
for not acting appropriately feminine (see discussion of prescriptive stereotypes below). 
In contrast with descriptive stereotypes, prescriptive stereotypes describe how 
men and women should be (Heilman, 2001). Specifically, people who hold prescriptive 
stereotypes believe that men should be agentic and competent and that women should be 
communal and warm. In the context of the motherhood penalty, this means that people 
tend to prescribe that women should engage in caregiving rather than trying to be 
competent in the workplace. For example, one study demonstrated that visibly pregnant 
women who were shopping at a mall received benevolent reactions (e.g., 
overfriendliness, touching) from store managers; in contrast, pregnant women applying 
for jobs at the mall were treated with hostility (Hebl, King, Glick, Singletary, & Kazama, 
2007). Further research has established that when women appear too masculine, agentic, 
or competent, they are penalized for violating gender norms of femininity (e.g., Bowles, 
Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & 
Tamkins, 2004; Phelan, Moss-Racusin, & Rudman, 2008; Rudman & Glick, 2001; 
Williams, Blair-Loy, & Berdahl, 2013). 
One of the consequences of descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about women 
is flexibility stigma. In many organizations, there is a stigma against employees who 
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make use of their companies’ flexibility policies (e.g., part-time hours, parental leave, 
tele-commuting). Some companies that appear to offer flexibility benefits to their 
employees do so for public relations value, while sending employees the tacit message 
that they use these benefits “at their peril” (Williams, Blair-Loy, & Berdahl, 2013). The 
use of flexibility benefits can result in wage penalties, lower performance evaluations, 
and fewer promotions (Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2004; Cohen & Single, 2001; Glass, 2004; 
Wharton, Chivers, & Blair-Loy, 2008). It can also result in marginalization and lower-
status assignments (Stone, 2007). For women, this stigma originates in prescriptive 
stereotypes that expect women to prioritize childrearing over their careers (thus making 
them ideal parents but bad employees; Williams, Blair-Loy, & Berdahl, 2013). Women 
who are mothers or who use flexibility benefits at work are seen as fulfilling their proper 
gender role, but deviating from proper workplace performance. In many workplaces, 
women are actually praised for opting out of the workplace entirely to care for their 
children, but are punished if they stay at work and make use of flexibility policies (Stone 
& Hernandez, 2013). 
Researchers also recognize that gender equality in the workplace is not only a 
matter of women’s work-life conflict and how women are treated at work; if gender 
equality is to be achieved, men must also be given the freedom to participate fully in their 
family lives (Williams, 2012). Men, like women, experience flexibility stigma at work; 
flexibility stigma toward men, however, originates in different prescriptive stereotypes 
(Williams, Blair-Loy, & Berdahl, 2013). Because earning a living is seen as the central 
role of fatherhood, fathers are heavily penalized for using flexibility benefits at work 
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(Berdahl & Moon, 2013; Coltrane, Miller, DeHaan, & Stewart, 2013; Rudman & 
Mescher, 2013; Vandello, Hettinger, Bosson, & Siddiqi, 2013). Fathers are expected to 
contribute to their families by playing the role of the provider and by being vigilant about 
their careers. In other words, flexibility stigma for men who attempt to contribute at home 
results from men’s gender-nonconforming behavior (Williams, Blair-Loy, & Berdahl, 
2013). This is in contrast to flexibility stigma against women, which, as described above, 
results from women’s supposedly gender-conforming behavior of prioritizing children 
over work. Thus, while both men and women experience flexibility stigma, this stigma is 
highly gendered and may be experienced in distinct ways. Although the body of research 
on flexibility stigma toward men is newer, there is evidence that men anticipate the 
stigma they will face at work if they try to make flexible arrangements and take care of 
things at home (Reddick, Rochlen, Grasso, Reilly, & Spikes, 2012). Men sometimes 
avoid using their flexibility benefits or lie about the reasons they use them in order to 
avoid this stigma (Williams, 2010). 
The Separate Spheres Model of Gendered Discrimination 
A common theme in the study of gender is the idea that men and women belong 
in distinct spheres of society, with men being particularly fit for the workplace and 
women being particularly fit for the domestic domain. As described above, research on 
descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes in the workplace has firmly established that when 
men and women violate gender stereotypes by crossing spheres, with women pursuing 
career success and men contributing to domestic labor, they face backlash and economic 
penalties (I will refer to this research approach as the backlash approach). Less is known, 
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however, about the types of individuals who are most likely to engage in these forms of 
backlash and discrimination and the types of situations in which this is most likely to 
occur. In other words, the current state of the research in social psychology is not 
particularly amenable to identifying and eliminating individual and institutional risk 
factors for gender discrimination in the workplace. In contrast, a theoretical approach that 
regards the endorsement of separate spheres as an individual difference to be measured 
and modeled in relation to gendered outcomes in society would allow for the 
identification of individual and institutional risk factors for discrimination. Although the 
idea of separate-but-equal spheres for men and women has existed for a long time in 
American culture and in other fields such as sociology and feminist studies (see, e.g., 
Coontz, 2011; Hochschild & Machung, 1989), it has not been operationalized or modeled 
in social psychology until recently (see Miller & Borgida, under review).  
In previous research, I developed the Separate Spheres Model in order to address 
this gap in the research (Miller & Borgida, under review). The Separate Spheres Model 
examines the antecedents and consequences of the separate spheres ideology (SSI), a 
belief system that claims that: 1) gender differences in society are innate, 2) men and 
women freely choose to participate in different spheres of society, and 3) separate 
gendered spheres are normatively desirable. The Separate Spheres Model presents the 
SSI as a psychological construct characterized by individual differences, operationalizes 
the SSI with a new scale measure, models the SSI as a predictor of important gendered 
outcomes in society, and shows that the SSI is a motivated belief system—individuals 
who endorse the SSI use these beliefs to justify injustices in society.  
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My previous research developed a reliable and valid measure of support for the 
SSI that exhibited discriminant validity relative to existing measures of gendered 
attitudes (see Miller & Borgida, under review; for a description of the scale development 
process, see Chapter 2, Study 1a Method). Specifically, the SSI scale significantly 
predicted attitudes regarding workplace flexibility policies, income distribution within 
families between male and female partners, and distribution of labor between work and 
family spheres. These relationships survived even when controlling for existing measures 
such as benevolent and hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), gender system justification 
(Jost & Kay, 2005), modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), single-item 
sociological and political science measures of gender ideology (Davis & Greenstein, 
2009), and political conservatism. Furthermore, these other measures failed to survive as 
predictors when the SSI scale was included in the models. The research also established 
that the SSI is an ideology that not only guides individuals’ beliefs about the appropriate 
roles for men and women, but is also actively used by individuals to help justify and 
perpetuate those roles. Specifically, in two different experimentally controlled studies, 
participants strengthened their endorsement of the SSI in response to system threat (see 
Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005; Wakslak, Jost, & Bauer, 2011), suggesting that the SSI serves 
a system-justifying function (see Jost, Liviatan, van der Toorn, Ledgerwood, 
Mandisodza, & Nosek, 2011). Finally, the research suggested that the SSI is 
approximately normally distributed in the U.S. population. Thus, this research provided 
support for the Separate Spheres Model by demonstrating that the SSI is characterized by 
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individual differences, predicts important indices of gender inequality in society, and is a 
motivated, system-justifying belief system.  
This research began to address a major gap in the social-psychological literature 
on gender inequality by providing an empirical approach that complements the existing 
backlash approach. By conceptualizing and measuring the SSI as an individual 
difference, researchers can identify individual and situational factors of discrimination 
and isolate these factors for scientific study. Furthermore, this approach is consistent with 
the broader social-psychological literature on strong and weak situations. Social 
psychologists make a distinction between strong situations, which provide clear and 
powerful scripts for behavior, and weak situations, which provide relatively few 
constraints on behavior (see, e.g., Monson, Hesley, & Chernick, 1982). In weak 
situations, individuals’ dispositional characteristics exert a stronger influence on behavior 
because there are few situational constraints. In the context of this dissertation, I propose 
that supervisor discretion creates weak situations in which individual supervisors’ 
personal gender ideologies are more able to influence their workplace conduct. I propose 
that employment policies that limit supervisor discretion provide stronger situational 
constraints that limit the extent to which supervisors are able to act in accordance with 
their own ideologies and prejudices.  
My previous research on the SSI demonstrated widespread support for the 
ideology in the population, including support for the notion that men and women freely 
choose to participate in different spheres of society. In contrast to this common belief, 
social psychologists have demonstrated that men and women can be led with relative ease 
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to enter into stereotypically and non-stereotypically gendered domains. For example, 
women who watched ads that featured stereotypical gender roles, compared to women 
who watched non-stereotypical ads, were less likely to volunteer for a leadership role in a 
subsequent task (Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005), expressed less interest in careers that 
involved quantitative skills and more interest in careers that involved verbal skills 
(Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002), and deemphasized achievement relative 
to homemaking in their plans for the future (Geis, Brown, Jennings, & Porter, 1984). In 
another study, priming women with traditional gender roles led to more gender stereotype 
activation, which led to reduced interest in masculine career domains (Rudman & Phelan, 
2010). Implicit academic self-identification was also weaker in college women when 
motherhood cues were present (Devos, Viera, Diaz, & Dunn, 2007). In one study, women 
engineers who interacted with sexist men went on to perform worse on an engineering 
test than the women who were paired with non-sexist men (Logel, Walton, Spencer, 
Iserman, von Hippel & Bell, 2009). Finally, participants in one study were led to believe 
that their interaction partners were either male or female, irrespective of the targets’ 
actual sex; the participants then unknowingly induced the targets to choose jobs that were 
stereotypically masculine or feminine, respectively (Skrypnek & Snyder, 1982). Taken 
together, this body of research calls into question the lay belief that participation in 
gendered spheres is a matter of completely free and individual choice; situational factors 
and the expectations of other people can play a powerful role in influencing gendered 
behavior. 
The Current Project 
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This dissertation builds on my previous work by examining the roles of the SSI 
and supervisor discretion policies in the workplace. The development of the SSI scale 
makes it possible to examine the role of the SSI in the workplace context and examine 
how various situational factors of the workplace influence the operation of the SSI in 
employment decision-making. This dissertation investigates how supervisors’ 
endorsement of the SSI leads to flexibility stigma, family responsibilities discrimination, 
and work-life conflict under varying levels of supervisor discretion. I develop a Separate 
Spheres Model of family responsibilities discrimination in which supervisors’ 
endorsement of the SSI leads them to endorse flexibility stigma attitudes and engage in 
family responsibilities discrimination (see Figure 1, paths A and B), but only under 
conditions of high supervisor discretion (see Figure 1, path C). This conduct on the part 
of supervisors then translates to negative work-life conflict experiences for employees 
and stereotypically gendered strategies for coping with work-life conflicts (see Figure 1, 
paths D, E, F, and G). This work extends my prior contributions to the social-
psychological literature on gender discrimination and inequality by: 1) further validating 
the SSI scale, 2) developing a new theoretical model of workplace discrimination beyond 
the existing backlash approach, 3) examining the contours of the Separate Spheres Model 
in the workplace context, 4) investigating an institutional workplace factor that may 
moderate the role of the SSI in employment outcomes, 5) examining the downstream 
harms of supervisors’ ideologies in their employees’ work-life experiences, and 6) 
developing a program of research that can inform and shape employment discrimination 
law by allowing for the identification of individual and institutional risk factors for 
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gender and family responsibilities discrimination. Not only is the workplace context 
relevant to the real-world problem of gender inequality, but it also provides an 
opportunity to adopt a particularly social-psychological approach to the study of the SSI. 
I investigate important person-by-situation interactions in the context of workplace 
inequality by examining both individual supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI (a person-
level variable) and supervisor discretion in the workplace (a situation-level variable). 
Individual supervisors play an important role in workplace outcomes; direct 
supervisors play a large role in the evaluation of employees in many workplaces, and 
their evaluations often play an important role in the career paths of their employees. I 
conducted a pilot study in preparation for this project in which I recruited 161 supervisors 
and 146 employees from across the United States on Mechanical Turk (see Table 1 for 
sample characteristics). I asked the supervisors to report the features of their employee 
evaluation process and the types of employment outcomes that depend on their 
evaluations. The majority of participants reported that promotions (77.6%), raises 
(73.3%), and terminations (66.5%) are made on the basis of their evaluations of their 
employees, and a significant portion of them said that their evaluations determined 
demotions (45.3%) and access to better clients or projects (29.8%). 
Supervisor discretion is also a potentially important factor in workplace 
outcomes; to the extent that individual supervisors are allowed to make employment 
decisions without constraint, their perceptual biases and stereotypes can have a larger 
impact on their actions. In my pilot study, I found that there is a wide variety of 
evaluation procedures that employers use, with widely varying levels of discretion given 
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to individual supervisors. There was substantial variation in the extent to which 
supervisors’ evaluations have written (70%) or oral (61%) components, use standardized 
criteria (65%) or are open-ended (53%), use objective (63%) or subjective criteria (75%), 
use numbers (47%) or descriptive words (71%), are conducted at pre-determined times 
(75%) or spontaneously (48%), and are audited by the supervisors’ superiors (26% no 
review, 50% some review, 24% thorough review). 
Hypotheses 
As summarized above, previous research revealed significant relationships 
between individual endorsement of the SSI and the extent to which individuals opposed 
workplace policies that provide employees with flexibility to navigate work-life conflicts 
(see Miller & Borgida, under review). The SSI scale also predicted the likelihood of 
individuals living in a household in which the man had a higher income than the woman 
(among cisgender, heterosexual partners). Finally, the SSI scale predicted individuals’ 
own distribution of labor between work and family spheres. Based on these findings, I 
predict that supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI will play a significant role in their 
decisions, attitudes, and conduct in the workplace toward employees with family 
responsibilities. The Separate Spheres Model posits that individual endorsement of the 
SSI leads to various forms of gendered harms in society. This dissertation focuses on 
three particular types of gendered harms: flexibility stigma, family responsibilities 
discrimination, and work-life conflict.  Thus, Hypotheses 1-3 (below) examine the 
relationships between supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI and their own prejudice and 
acts of discrimination against employees with family responsibilities. Hypotheses 4-5 
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(below) examine the downstream effects of supervisors’ prejudice and discrimination on 
the work-life conflicts that employees with family responsibilities experience. 
Previous research has identified a significant role of supervisor discretion in 
adverse employment outcomes. As discussed above, supervisors with high levels of 
discretion apply available disciplinary actions differently to men and women (Bobbitt-
Zeher, 2011), allow men to make more mistakes than women before the mistakes begin 
to have consequences (Biernat, Fuegen, & Kobrynowicz, 2010), and change their 
decision-making standards as they go, emphasizing whichever evaluation criteria will 
favor male employees at the time (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001; Bobbitt-Zeher, 2011; Foschi, 
Lai, & Sigerson, 1994; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Phelan, Moss-
Racusin, & Rudman, 2008). Based on these findings, I predict that supervisor discretion 
will moderate the role of supervisor SSI in employment outcomes, so that endorsement of 
the SSI plays a greater role in the conduct of supervisors that have more discretion (see 
Figure 1, path C). Specifically, I expect to find that supervisor discretion moderates the 
relationship between supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI and their workplace behaviors, 
but not the relationship between supervisor SSI and their workplace attitudes; workplace 
policies like supervisor discretion should not play a role in the flexibility stigma attitudes 
that supervisors privately hold, but may play a role in the extent to which supervisors can 
express these attitudes in the form of outward discriminatory conduct (see Hypotheses 1-
3 below).  
As described above, although men and women are both subject to gender 
stereotyping and family responsibilities discrimination in the workplace, these outcomes 
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sometimes take distinctly gendered forms. Research suggests that family responsibilities 
discrimination against women stems from expectations that women engage in caregiving 
and behave in communal, maternal ways; in contrast, family responsibilities 
discrimination against men stems from expectations that men engage in breadwinning 
roles and not in caregiving. As a result of these distinct gendered sources of 
discrimination, it may be the case that certain forms of discrimination affect women more 
and certain forms affect men more. Previous research does not provide a basis by which I 
can predict which employment outcomes will disproportionately affect men or women, 
and which employment outcomes will affect both men and women equally. Therefore, 
examinations of these differences across different employment outcomes will be largely 
exploratory. 
Finally, social-psychological research calls into question the lay belief that 
participation in gendered spheres is a matter of completely free and individual choice. 
Research findings demonstrate that situational factors and the expectations of other 
people can play a powerful role in influencing how much interest individuals express in 
stereotypically gendered domains (Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005; Davies, Spencer, 
Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002; Geis, Brown, Jennings, & Porter, 1984; Rudman & Phelan, 
2010), self-identification with certain gendered domains (Devos, Viera, Diaz, & Dunn, 
2007), and actual participation in stereotypically gendered domains (Skrypnek & Snyder, 
1982). Therefore, I predict that in workplaces with higher flexibility stigma, employees 
will adopt strategies for coping with work-life conflicts that align with prescriptive 
gender stereotypes (see Hypotheses 4-5 below; Figure 1, paths D, E, F, and G). 
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Taken together, these predictions lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Supervisors’ SSI scores will predict stigmatizing attitudes regarding 
employees with family responsibilities. This relationship will not be moderated by 
supervisor discretion (see Figure 1, path A). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Supervisors’ SSI scores will predict their self-reported frequency of 
discriminatory conduct toward their employees with family responsibilities (see 
Figure 1, path B). This relationship will be moderated by supervisor discretion, such 
that: 
a) supervisors who work in settings with higher decision-making discretion will 
report engaging in more discriminatory behaviors toward employees with family 
responsibilities; 
b) supervisor SSI will play a greater role in discriminatory behavior among 
supervisors who work in settings with higher decision-making discretion (see 
Figure 1, path C). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Supervisors’ SSI scores will predict decision-making regarding 
hypothetical employees that discriminates on the basis of gender and family 
responsibilities (see Figure 1, path B). This relationship will be moderated by 
supervisor discretion, such that SSI scores only predict discrimination under 
experimental conditions of high supervisor discretion (see Figure 1, path C).  
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Hypothesis 4: Employees’ perceptions of flexibility stigma will predict an increased 
reliance on strategies to manage work-life conflicts (see Figure 1, path D). Employees 
who perceive higher levels of flexibility stigma in their workplaces will more 
frequently adopt strategies for managing work-life conflicts that align with 
prescriptive gender stereotypes; under these circumstances, women will become more 
likely to prioritize family over work and men will become more likely to prioritize 
work over family (see Figure 1, path E). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Employees’ experiences with family responsibilities discrimination from 
their supervisors will predict an increased reliance on strategies to manage work-life 
conflicts (see Figure 1, path F). Employees who experience family responsibilities 
discrimination more often will more frequently adopt strategies for managing work-
life conflicts that align with prescriptive gender stereotypes; under these 
circumstances, women will become more likely to prioritize family over work and 
men will become more likely to prioritize work over family (see Figure 1, path G). 
Research Overview 
In three studies, I examined the role of supervisors’ support for the SSI in 
flexibility stigma, family responsibilities discrimination, and work-life conflict. I also 
examined the extent to which this relationship was moderated by supervisor discretion. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents Study 1a, which investigated the role of the SSI in 
supervisors’ workplace attitudes (Hypothesis 1) and Study 1b, which examined the role 
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of supervisor SSI and supervisor discretion in participants’ real workplace discriminatory 
conduct (Hypothesis 2). Study 1 used correlational methods to examine the role of the 
SSI in supervisors’ attitudes and behaviors in their real jobs (as opposed to the 
experimental context in Study 2), particularly behaviors that create hostile working 
environments for employees with work-life conflicts. Chapter 3 presents Study 2, which 
examined the role of supervisor SSI and supervisor discretion in an experimental 
decision-making setting (Hypothesis 3). Study 2 investigated the influence of 
supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI, as moderated by supervisor discretion, on 
workplace gender discrimination. Chapter 4 presents Study 3a, which assessed 
employees’ experiences with flexibility stigma and strategies for coping with work-life 
conflicts (Hypothesis 4), and Study 3b, which examined employees’ experiences with 
supervisor’s discriminatory conduct in the workplace (Hypothesis 5). Chapter 5 discusses 
the empirical findings and proposes directions for future research. Chapter 6 examines 
the implications of these findings for employment discrimination law.  
This dissertation thus combines controlled experiments, which required the 
participants to make hypothetical decisions, with survey questions, in which I 
investigated participants’ real workplace experiences and decision-making. Each study in 
this dissertation used Mechanical Turk to recruit participants. Participants in Studies 1 
and 2 were adults from across the United States who held supervisory positions in their 
jobs at the time of the study. For the purposes of this research, I define supervisors as 
people for whom a major part of their job is managing and overseeing the work of other 
employees (for example, if they hire, fire, or promote employees, or if they have the 
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power to approve employees' time off). Participants in Study 3 were adults from across 
the United States who were employed at the time of the study. Although Mechanical 
Turk does not produce nationally representative samples, it does produce samples with a 
large amount of variation and diversity, particularly in comparison to the student samples 
often used in social psychology (see Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Furthermore, because the studies described in this dissertation 
are meant to capture workplace processes, the relevant populations of interest are 
supervisors and employees, rather than the American population as a whole (see Searles 
& Ryan, 2015, pointing out that “the right question is not whether to use MTurk but when 
to use MTurk”). 
Table 2 provides data regarding the demographics and descriptive characteristics 
of each sample. Because the samples tap participants with a broad range of demographic 
characteristics and backgrounds (which an undergraduate participant pool could not do), 
the findings are more generalizable to actual American workplaces than data from a 
student sample would be. This is particularly important given criticisms of lab-based 
research on employment discrimination as not being realistic enough to generalize (e.g., 
Tetlock & Mitchell, 2009).  
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF THE SEPARATE SPHERES IDEOLOGY IN FLEXIBILITY 
STIGMA ATTITUDES AND FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
 
Study 1 examined the role of supervisors’ endorsement of the separate spheres 
ideology in their flexibility stigma attitudes and discriminatory workplace conduct. The 
study also examined the moderating role of supervisor discretion.  
Study 1a 
Study 1a investigated the relationship between supervisors’ endorsement of the 
SSI and their attitudes related to flexibility stigma. In this study, I measured supervisors’ 
personal endorsement of the SSI, the supervisors’ flexibility stigma attitudes, and the 
extent to which the supervisors had decision-making discretion at work. Study 1a 
examined Hypothesis 1, in which I predicted that supervisors’ SSI scores would 
correspond to their stigmatizing attitudes regarding employees with family 
responsibilities. I also predicted that the relationship between SSI scores and flexibility 
stigma attitudes would not be moderated by supervisor discretion, because I expected that 
workplace policies would not affect the adoption of supervisors’ private beliefs (as 
opposed to overt conduct) toward employees who use flexibility accommodations. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in Study 1a were 149 adults residing across the United States who 
were recruited on Mechanical Turk in September and October, 2014 (see Table 2 for 
sample demographic information and descriptive characteristics). Participants completed 
the study for $2.00 in compensation. 
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Design 
Study 1a employed a between-subjects design with two conditions (man target 
and woman target).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants in Study 1a volunteered for the study on Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were allowed to participate in the study if they were currently employed in a 
job and held a supervisory position at work. The study took place in two sessions. In the 
first session, participants provided information about the characteristics of their 
workplaces (employer size, whether the employer is covered by the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), whether the employer operates for profit or not for profit, whether 
the employer is private or public, and the employer’s industry) and the characteristics of 
the employees they supervised in their jobs (union status, salary or hourly pay, schedule 
flexibility, educational credentials, and gender composition). Participants then completed 
the SSI scale (see Appendix A), and provided demographic information (years at current 
job, years supervising at current job, age, education, race, gender, sexual orientation, 
income). 
The SSI scale is a reliable and valid measure of individuals’ support for the SSI 
(see Miller & Borgida, under review). I created the SSI by compiling 73 potential scale 
items that expressed support for the idea that women belong in the domestic sphere and 
men belong in the public sphere. Among the 73 items were statements that captured each 
tenet of the SSI (gender differences are innate, men and women freely divide themselves 
into separate spheres, and gendered spheres are desirable). The full set of 73 items 
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included equal numbers of items that focused on men and women. The full set of items 
also included 31 that were reverse-scored. After administering the 73 items to a sample of 
292 participants, I found that the 73 items were highly reliable. After removing items 
with low variability and item-total correlations in the wrong direction, I conducted 
exploratory factor analysis with iterated principal factors, forcing the remaining items 
into one factor. I then narrowed the set of items down to a final scale of 15 items by 
selecting the 10 standard-scored items with the highest loadings and the 5 reverse-scored 
items with the highest loadings (see Appendix A). The resulting reliability of this 15-item 
scale was α = .88, and the scale has since continued to exhibit high reliability in each 
sample in which it is measured. Specifically, the SSI scale significantly predicts attitudes 
regarding workplace flexibility policies, income distribution within families between 
male and female partners, and distribution of labor between work and family spheres. 
These relationships survived in previous research even when controlling for benevolent 
and hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), gender system justification (Jost & Kay, 2005), 
modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), single-item sociological and 
political science measures of gender ideology (Davis & Greenstein, 2009), and political 
conservatism (see Miller & Borgida, under review). Furthermore, these other measures 
failed to survive as predictors when the SSI scale was included in the models. 
In the second study session, which took place at least five days later for each 
participant, participants first responded to ten flexibility attitude items on a 7-point Likert 
scale (see Appendix B). Participants were randomly assigned to answer these questions 
with regard to either their male employees only or their female employees only. They 
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were specifically instructed to think about their own (either male or female) employees 
when answering the questions. I developed the ten items from observing examples from a 
combination of sources: stories about flexibility stigma in the news, discrimination cases, 
and data from the pilot study described in Chapter 1, which used an employee sample. 
The pilot study asked employees to describe the work-life conflicts they had experienced 
at work, and in their open-ended responses, some participants described experiencing 
stigma at work.  
After providing their flexibility attitudes, the participants responded to a number 
of questions designed to assess supervisor discretion (see Appendix C). These items 
asked participants to describe their employee evaluation procedures on a number of 
dimensions (written/oral, pre-determined criteria/spontaneous criteria, objective 
criteria/subjective criteria, numerical scores/verbal descriptors, pre-determined 
times/spontaneous times, extent to which supervisors’ evaluations are reviewed by 
others). These six dimensions were identified in the supervisor pilot study described in 
Chapter 1 as being the primary dimensions by which employee evaluations differ in 
American workplaces.  
Results 
Attrition 
Attrition was not a significant problem in Study 1a. There was a 72% retention 
rate from the first study session to the second session. Participants who completed the 
study did not differ in their endorsement of the SSI (M = 3.07, SD = 1.02) relative to 
those who did not complete the study (M = 3.21, SD = 1.04, t(403) = 1.28, p = ns). 
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Participants who completed the study were slightly older (M = 35.08, SD = 10.50) than 
those who did not complete the study (M = 31.98, SD = 9.47, t(401) = 3.05, p < .01). 
Those who completed the study were educated similarly (M = 4.59, SD = 0.85) to those 
who did not complete the study (M = 4.46, SD = 0.94, t(402) = 1.37, p = ns). 
Properties of the SSI scale 
The SSI scale was highly reliable in this sample (α = .88), replicating my previous 
research using the measure (see Miller & Borgida, under review). The mean score on the 
SSI scale was 3.07, and the standard deviation was 1.02. Men scored significantly higher 
on the SSI scale (M = 3.35, SD = 0.94) than women (M = 2.72, SD = 1.00, t(146) = 3.93, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = .65). This finding is consistent with my previous research and 
suggests that although men consistently score higher on the SSI scale than women, the 
magnitude of the difference between the groups (a little over half of one standard 
deviation) is smaller than the magnitudes of the within-group differences. 
Factor Analysis 
I predicted that supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI would correspond to hostile 
attitudes toward workers who have work-family conflicts or use flexibility 
accommodations. In order to test this prediction, I first examined whether the ten attitude 
statements measured in Study 1a could be combined into one index measure of flexibility 
stigma attitudes. I used exploratory factor analysis with iterated principal factors and 
oblimin rotation, leaving the ten items free to load on any number of factors. The results 
revealed two factors with eigenvalues over 1.00 (factor 1: eigenvalue = 3.85, factor 2: 
eigenvalue = 1.64; inter-factor correlation = -.45; see Figure 2 for Scree plot). The first 
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factor contained items relating to the belief that employees with work-family conflicts 
should not get accommodations at work, and the second factor contained items relating to 
the belief that employees with work-family conflicts perform poorly at work (See Table 3 
for factor loadings). The reliability of the total set of items was high (α = .81), as was the 
reliability of each factor (factor 1: α =.79, factor 2: α = .75). Based on these findings, it 
seems that the full set of ten items can be considered a coherent measure of flexibility 
stigma attitudes, with two relevant subtypes of stigma. Therefore, I present the findings 
below with both the full set of items and the two subsets; I refer to factor 1 as the 
accommodations factor and factor 2 as the performance factor.  
Participant Gender Differences 
There were no differences between male and female participants in expressions of 
flexibility attitudes in the full set of flexibility stigma items (men: M = 3.21, SD = 1.03; 
women: M = 3.09, SD = 0.95; t(146) = 0.74, p = ns), in the accommodations factor (men: 
M = 3.39, SD = 1.16; women: M = 3.19, SD = 1.12; t(146) = 1.05, p = ns), or in the 
performance factor (men: M = 3.04, SD = 1.27; women: M = 3.00, SD = 1.14; t(146) = 
0.22, p = ns). This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that both men 
and women can endorse sexist attitudes and beliefs (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001; Heilman, 
et al., 2004; Jost & Kay, 2005; Miller & Borgida, under review).  
Hypothesis 1 
 First, I investigated the prediction that supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI 
would correspond to their flexibility stigma attitudes. Three bivariate linear regressions 
confirmed this prediction (although measures of age and education were available, they 
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were uncorrelated to SSI scores and flexibility stigma attitudes; therefore, I did not 
include age and education in the models). Supervisors’ SSI scores significantly predicted 
scores on the full set of flexibility stigma items (β = 0.49, p < .001), the accommodations 
factor (β = 0.37, p < .001), and the performance factor (β = 0.46, p < .001). It seems that 
supervisors’ beliefs about the proper social roles of men and women translate to hostile 
workplace attitudes regarding employees with work-life conflicts. 
Next, as mentioned in Chapter 1, flexibility stigma and family responsibilities 
discrimination in the workplace sometimes take distinctly gendered forms. Therefore, I 
conducted an independent-samples t-test in order to examine whether participants in 
Study 1a expressed more flexibility stigma toward men or women. This analysis was 
largely exploratory. The results revealed that participants expressed more hostility toward 
female employees than male employees on the full set of flexibility stigma items 
(women: M = 3.46, SD = 1.05; men: M = 2.84, SD = 0.83; t(147) = 3.99, p < .001), the 
accommodations factor (women: M = 3.49, SD = 1.19; men: M = 3.09, SD = 1.06; t(147) 
= 2.18, p < .04), and the performance factor (women: M = 3.43, SD = 1.21; men: M = 
2.60, SD = 1.05; t(147) = 4.48, p < .001).  
In order to further explore this gender difference, I conducted a linear regression 
to examine the interaction between employee gender and supervisor SSI on expressions 
of flexibility stigma. There was a significant interaction (β = 0.69, p < .04), such that 
supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI played a significantly greater role in their flexibility 
stigma attitudes regarding women than in their flexibility stigma attitudes regarding men 
(t(147) = 3.03, p < .01).  
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Breaking apart this finding into the two subtypes of flexibility stigma revealed 
that the interaction was mainly driven by the performance factor. In a series of linear 
regressions, supervisor SSI was a significant predictor of hostile attitudes regarding 
accommodations toward both men (β = .31, p < .01) and women (β = .41, p < .001). The 
interaction between employee gender and supervisor SSI on the accommodations factor 
was not significant (β = 0.41, p = ns). In contrast, although supervisor SSI was a 
significant predictor of negative attitudes regarding performance toward both men (β = 
.33, p < .01) and women (β = .56, p < .001), the interaction between employee gender and 
supervisor SSI on the performance factor was significant (β = 0.75, p < .03). Supervisors’ 
endorsement of the SSI played a significantly greater role in their flexibility stigma 
attitudes on the performance factor regarding women than in those regarding men (t(147) 
= 3.31, p < .01; see Figure 3). Future research is needed in order to determine why there 
was a gender difference in the role of the SSI on the performance factor but not on the 
accommodations factor.  
Finally, I predicted that supervisor discretion would not moderate the relationship 
between supervisor SSI and flexibility stigma attitudes. The results of a linear regression 
support this prediction. The interaction between supervisor SSI and supervisor discretion 
was not a significant predictor of flexibility stigma attitudes (β = -0.18, p = ns). A three-
way interaction between supervisor SSI, employee gender, and supervisor discretion was 
similarly not a significant predictor of flexibility stigma attitudes (β = 0.53, p = ns). 
Taken together, the results of Study 1a support my predictions. Supervisors’ 
endorsement of the SSI was a significant predictor of stigmatizing attitudes toward 
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employees with work-life conflicts, and supervisor discretion did not moderate this 
relationship. The findings also suggest that flexibility stigma attitudes disproportionately 
target women with family responsibilities, although supervisor SSI was a significant 
predictor of hostile attitudes toward men with family responsibilities as well.  
Study 1b expanded on these findings by examining the role of supervisor SSI and 
supervisor discretion in real workplace discriminatory conduct against employees with 
family responsibilities. Unlike in Study 1a, which examined the relationship between 
supervisor SSI and their attitudes regarding employees with family responsibilities, Study 
1b examined the relationship between supervisor SSI and their behaviors regarding 
employees with family responsibilities. For this reason, I expected that Study 1b would 
reveal a moderating role of supervisor discretion that Study 1a did not reveal. While I did 
not expect supervisor discretion to alter the attitudes that supervisors privately held, I did 
expect supervisor discretion to alter the extent to which supervisors could express their 
beliefs with overt conduct. 
Study 1b 
Study 1b investigated the relationship between supervisors’ endorsement of the 
SSI and their discriminatory conduct in the workplace.2 In this study, I measured 
supervisors’ personal endorsement of the SSI, the supervisors’ self-reported 
discriminatory conduct, and the extent to which the supervisors had decision-making 
discretion at work. Study 1b examined Hypothesis 2, in which I predicted that 
supervisors’ SSI scores would correspond to the self-reported frequency of 
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discriminatory conduct toward employees with family responsibilities. I also predicted 
that this relationship would be moderated by supervisor discretion. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in Study 1b were 153 adults residing across the United States who 
were recruited on Mechanical Turk in September and October, 2014 (see Table 2 for 
sample demographic information and descriptive characteristics). Participants completed 
the study for $2.00 in compensation. 
Design 
Study 1b employed a between-subjects design with two conditions (target 
gender).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants in Study 1b volunteered for the study on Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were allowed to participate in the study if they were currently employed in a 
job and held a supervisory position at work. As in Study 1a, the study took place in two 
sessions. In the first session, participants answered the same questionnaire used in Study 
1a, which included characteristics of their workplaces (employer size, whether the 
employer is covered by the FMLA, whether the employer operates for profit or not for 
profit, whether the employer is private or public, and the employer’s industry) and the 
characteristics of the employees they supervised in their jobs (union status, salary or 
hourly pay, schedule flexibility, educational credentials, and gender composition). 
Participants then completed the SSI scale (see Appendix A), and provided demographic 
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information (years at current job, years supervising at current job, age, education, race, 
gender, sexual orientation, income). 
In the second study session, which took place at least five days later for each 
participant, participants first responded to a set of fourteen questions that asked them to 
report on a 9-point scale how frequently they engage in various types of conduct toward 
their employees (“I fired an employee after it became clear that [her/his] family was 
interfering with [her/his] work too much; “I called an employee rude names because I felt 
that [her/his] family responsibilities were interfering with [her/his] job;” see Appendix D 
for full set of items). Participants were randomly assigned to answer these questions with 
regard to either their male employees only or their female employees only. They were 
specifically instructed to think about their own (either male or female) employees who 
have family responsibilities when answering the questions. I developed the fourteen items 
from observing examples from a combination of sources: stories about flexibility stigma 
in the news, discrimination cases, and data from the pilot study described in Chapter 1, 
which used an employee sample. The pilot study asked employees to describe the work-
life conflicts they had experienced at work, and in their open-ended responses, some 
participants described experiencing discrimination at work. 
After reporting the frequency of their discriminatory workplace conduct, the 
participants responded to the same questions used in Study 1a to assess supervisor 
discretion (see Appendix C). These items asked participants to describe their employee 
evaluation procedures on a number of dimensions (written/oral, pre-determined 
criteria/spontaneous criteria, objective criteria/subjective criteria, numerical scores/verbal 
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descriptors, pre-determined times/spontaneous times, extent to which supervisors’ 
evaluations are reviewed by others). 
Results 
Attrition 
Attrition was not a significant problem in Study 1b. There was a 72% retention 
rate from the first study session to the second session. Participants who completed the 
study did not differ in their endorsement of the SSI (M = 3.03, SD = 1.10) relative to 
those who did not complete the study (M = 3.21, SD = 1.04, t(406) = 1.57, p = ns). 
Participants who completed the study did not differ in age (M = 33.73, SD = 8.41) from 
those who did not complete the study (M = 31.98, SD = 9.47, t(404) = 1.88, p = ns). 
Those who completed the study were slightly more educated (M = 4.74, SD = 0.95) than 
those who did not complete the study (M = 4.46, SD = 0.94, t(405) = 2.90, p < .01). 
Properties of the SSI scale 
As in Study 1a, the SSI scale was highly reliable in this sample (α = .91). The 
mean score on the SSI scale was 3.03, and the standard deviation was 1.10. As in Study 
1a, men scored significantly higher on the SSI scale (M = 3.31, SD = 1.10) than women 
(M = 2.76, SD = 1.04, t(151) = 3.18, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .51).  
Participant Gender Differences 
There were no differences between male and female participants in the frequency 
of engaging in thirteen of the fourteen types of discriminatory conduct. Women reported 
a higher frequency (M = 2.18, SD = 1.56) than men (M = 1.68, SD = 1.17; t(151) = 2.27, 
p < .03) of checking up on their employees with family responsibilities to verify the 
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reasons for their absences. This finding is consistent with my previous contention that the 
separate spheres ideology is not a form of prejudice solely used by men to the detriment 
of women, but rather an ideology that both men and women can adopt (see Miller & 
Borgida, under review).  
Factor Analysis 
In order to examine participants’ workplace discriminatory conduct, I first 
examined whether the fourteen types of discriminatory behaviors measured in Study 1b 
could be combined into one index measure of discriminatory conduct. I used exploratory 
factor analysis with iterated principal factors and oblimin rotation, leaving the fourteen 
items free to load on any number of factors. The results revealed four factors with 
eigenvalues over 1.00 (eigenvalues = 5.65, 1.32, 1.06, 1.00; see Figure 4 for the Scree 
plot). However, an examination of the factor loadings revealed no discernable pattern 
regarding which types of behaviors belonged to which factors (see Table 4 for factor 
loadings and Table 5 for inter-factor correlations). Based on these findings, it is not clear 
that the various types of discriminatory conduct can be combined into a scale or 
subscales; therefore, I present results below for both the combined set of items and for 
individual items. 
Hypothesis 2 
I predicted that supervisors’ SSI scores would correspond to their reported 
frequency of discriminatory conduct toward employees with family responsibilities. I 
also predicted that this relationship would be moderated by supervisor discretion, such 
that: a) supervisors who work in settings with higher decision-making discretion will 
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report engaging in more discriminatory behaviors toward employees with family 
responsibilities; and b) supervisor SSI will play a greater role in discriminatory behavior 
among supervisors who work in settings with higher decision-making discretion. I note 
that this study presents an extremely conservative test of the hypothesis, as the ability to 
detect the hypothesized relationships depends on supervisors’ willingness to report their 
own workplace discrimination. The actual frequency of the behaviors measured here is 
likely higher than the data suggest. 
First, I investigated the prediction that supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI would 
correspond to the frequency with which they engaged in discriminatory conduct against 
employees with family responsibilities. The results largely support this prediction; a 
bivariate linear regression revealed that supervisor SSI significantly predicted the 
combined index of discriminatory behaviors (β = .26, p < .01). Examining the individual 
behaviors in a series of bivariate linear regressions, supervisor SSI was a significant 
predictor of nine of the fourteen behaviors examined in the study (see Table 6). A tenth 
behavior, demoting employees on the basis of their family responsibilities, did not show a 
main effect of supervisor SSI (see Table 6), but did show an effect of supervisor SSI 
under conditions of high discretion (see results below and Figure 5). As in Study 1a, 
although measures of age and education were available, they were uncorrelated to SSI 
scores and nearly all of the discriminatory behaviors (education was weakly correlated 
with two of the fourteen behaviors). Therefore, I did not include age and education in 
these models. 
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Next, I examined the prediction that supervisors with greater levels of discretion 
in the workplace would report a higher frequency of discriminatory conduct on the basis 
of their employees’ family responsibilities. In a bivariate linear regression, supervisor 
discretion was a marginal, but not significant, predictor of the combined index of 
discriminatory behavior (β = .14, p < .09). This prediction was supported among five 
individual discriminatory behaviors. In a series of bivariate linear regressions, supervisor 
discretion predicted the frequency of terminating employees (β = .21, p < .02), 
terminating employees or asking them to quit while on leave (β = .19, p < .02), calling 
employees rude names in the workplace (β = .25, p < .01), demoting employees (β = .20, 
p < .02), and acting cold and distant with employees (β = .25, p < .01) because of the 
employees’ family responsibilities. 
Next, I investigated the prediction that supervisor discretion would moderate the 
role of the SSI in discriminatory workplace conduct. When examining the combined set 
of discriminatory behaviors in a linear regression, the interaction between supervisor SSI 
and supervisor discretion was not significant (β = .57, p = ns). However, this prediction 
was supported in three individual types of discriminatory behaviors. The interaction 
between supervisor SSI and supervisor discretion was a significant predictor of 
terminating employees because of their family responsibilities (β = .81, p < .05), such 
that supervisor SSI played a significantly greater role for supervisors who have greater 
discretion at work (see Figure 5). Supervisor discretion similarly moderated the role of 
supervisor SSI in the reported frequency of calling employees rude names in the 
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workplace (β = .84, p < .05) and demoting employees (β = .94, p < .05) because of their 
family responsibilities (see Figure 5).  
It is also possible to qualitatively examine the impact of supervisor discretion 
using heatmaps (see Figure 6; for a description of heatmaps and their uses, see Yau, 
2011, pp. 228-237). As the colors on the heatmaps progress from green to red, the 
predicted frequency of supervisors’ self-reported family responsibilities discrimination 
increases. These predicted values were generated from a linear regression in which the 
frequency of family responsibilities discrimination was regressed on supervisor SSI and 
supervisor discretion. These images suggest that the risk of family responsibilities 
discrimination becomes substantial where approximately the upper half of the distribution 
of supervisor SSI scores meets the upper half of the distribution of supervisor discretion 
(see Figure 6). Specifically, yellow corresponds to a predicted value of 1.25–1.50, which 
lies halfway between a response of “never” and a response admitting to engaging in 
discrimination “less than once per year.” Red corresponds to a predicted value greater 
than 2.00, which corresponds to a response admitting to engaging in discrimination 
between “less than once per year” and “about once per year.”  
Finally, as mentioned in Chapter 1, flexibility stigma and family responsibilities 
discrimination in the workplace sometimes take distinctly gendered forms. Therefore, I 
conducted a series of independent-samples t-tests in order to examine whether 
participants in Study 1b reported engaging in some forms of family responsibilities 
discrimination more frequently toward men or toward women. This analysis was 
exploratory in nature, which is why employee gender was not included in the primary 
   39 
 
regression analyses described above. The results revealed that supervisors reported 
engaging in more discrimination toward men on three different types of behaviors. 
Specifically, supervisors talked to men (M = 2.03, SD = 1.27) more frequently than 
women (M = 1.63, SD = 1.12; t(151) = 2.04, p < .05) about the inadequacy of their 
performance because of their family responsibilities, tried to convince men (M = 2.08, SD 
= 1.48) more often than women (M = 1.58, SD = 1.04; t(151) = 2.42, p < .05) not to take 
time off or change their schedules to accommodate their families, and checked in on men 
(M = 2.17, SD = 1.45) more often than women (M = 1.70, SD = 1.27; t(151) = 2.14, p < 
.05) to verify that they were telling the truth about the reasons for their absences. Finally, 
supervisors reported a marginally higher frequency of rearranging work assignments to 
prevent certain assignments going to women with family responsibilities (M = 1.95, SD = 
1.74), relative to men with family responsibilities (M = 1.49, SD = 1.12; t(151) = 1.93, p 
< .06).  Finally, in a series of linear regressions, the two-way interaction between 
supervisor SSI and employee gender was not a significant predictor of any of the fourteen 
forms of family responsibilities discrimination. The three-way interaction between 
supervisor SSI, employee gender, and supervisor discretion similarly failed to predict any 
of the fourteen types of family responsibilities discrimination.  
Taken together, the results of Study 1b support my predictions. Supervisors’ 
endorsement of the SSI was a significant predictor of nearly every type of discriminatory 
conduct measured in the study, despite using a conservative self-report measure of 
discrimination. Supervisors also reported engaging in several forms of discrimination 
more often under conditions of high supervisor discretion, and the role of the SSI in 
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several forms of discrimination was stronger under conditions of high supervisor 
discretion. Building on the results of Study 1a, these data further refine the moderating 
role of supervisor discretion. As depicted in Figure 1 (path C), these studies suggest that 
supervisor discretion does not come into play at the stage in which the SSI translates into 
flexibility stigma attitudes, but rather at the stage in which attitudes are expressed as 
overt discriminatory behaviors.   
Finally, the results provide preliminary evidence of the selective use of certain 
forms of family responsibilities discrimination against employees of certain genders. This 
finding is largely exploratory, but it calls for further research on the ways in which family 
responsibilities discrimination is perpetrated in gendered ways. It may be the case that 
individuals are more willing to report engaging in certain behaviors against men or 
women because of social desirability concerns, or it may be the case that certain forms of 
discrimination are carried out more often against men or women with family 
responsibilities. 
While the results of Study 1 overwhelmingly provide support for the Separate 
Spheres Model of family responsibilities discrimination (see Figure 1, paths A, B, and C), 
they are largely correlational in nature. Without a controlled experiment, it is not possible 
to verify the causal order of the relationships between employee gender, supervisor 
discretion, and discriminatory conduct on the part of supervisors. Therefore, Study 2 
expanded on these findings by examining the role of supervisor SSI, supervisor 
discrimination, and employee gender in a controlled experiment.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE CAUSAL ROLE OF THE SEPARATE SPHERES IDEOLOGY IN 
DISCRIMINATORY SUPERVISOR DECISION-MAKING 
 
Study 2 examined the role of supervisors’ endorsement of the separate spheres 
ideology in a decision-making task that experimentally manipulated supervisor 
discretion. The purpose of this study was to examine whether supervisors’ endorsement 
of the SSI plays a role in their decisions regarding employees with family responsibilities. 
The study also investigated whether supervisor discretion conditions this relationship by 
creating conditions under which supervisors were freer to base their decisions on their 
own personal endorsement of the SSI.  
In Study 2, supervisors made employment decisions about a hypothetical 
employee under experimentally manipulated conditions of supervisor discretion. I 
predicted that supervisors’ SSI scores would correspond to discriminatory decision-
making regarding the hypothetical employee, and that this relationship would be 
moderated by supervisor discretion. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in Study 2 were 480 adults residing across the United States who 
were recruited on Mechanical Turk in August 2014 (see Table 2 for sample demographic 
information and descriptive characteristics). Participants completed the study for $2.00 in 
compensation. 
Design 
Study 2 employed a 2 (employee gender) x 2 (employee parental status) x 2 
(supervisor discretion) between-subjects design.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Participants in Study 2 volunteered for the study on Mechanical Turk. Participants 
were allowed to participate in the study if they were currently employed in a job and held 
a supervisory position at work. The study took place in two sessions. In the first session, 
participants answered the same questions as those used in Studies 1a and 1b, which 
included the characteristics of their workplaces (employer size, whether the employer is 
covered by the FMLA, whether the employer operates for profit or not for profit, whether 
the employer is private or public, and the employer’s industry) and the characteristics of 
the employees they supervised in their jobs (union status, salary or hourly pay, schedule 
flexibility, educational credentials, and gender composition). Participants then completed 
the SSI scale (see Appendix A), and provided demographic information (years at current 
job, years supervising at current job, age, education, race, gender, sexual orientation, 
income). 
In the second study session, which took place at least five days later for each 
participant, participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in the 2 x 2 x 
2 design. Participants first read a hypothetical personnel file. The hypothetical employee 
was either a man (Robert) or a woman (Karen), and either had two children or no 
children. Besides these experimental variations, the personnel files were identical across 
conditions (see Appendix E for an example personnel file). The personnel file portrayed 
the employee in a primarily positive light, but there were three distinct mentions of the 
employee’s attendance problems, and participants were free to make their own 
attributions about these issues.  
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After reading the employee’s personnel file, participants were randomly assigned 
to high- and low-discretion conditions (see Appendix F) and were asked to evaluate the 
employee on a number of dimensions. In the high-discretion condition, participants were 
told that their superiors usually did whatever they recommended. In the low-discretion 
condition, participants had to rate the employee on a number of performance-relevant 
criteria before proceeding to make their recommendations; they were also told that their 
ratings would be subject to oversight from their superiors. Participants in both conditions 
indicated on 6-point Likert scales the extent to which they would recommend the 
employee for termination, a demotion, and a raise. Participants then provided the hourly 
wage they felt the employee deserved.   
Results 
Attrition 
Attrition was not a significant problem in Study 2. There was a 78% retention rate 
from the first study session to the second session. Participants who completed the study 
did not differ in their endorsement of the SSI (M = 3.14, SD = 1.14) relative to those who 
did not complete the study (M = 3.21, SD = 1.04, t(734) = 0.81, p = ns). Participants who 
completed the study also did not differ in age (M = 31.80, SD = 8.85) from those who did 
not complete the study (M = 31.98, SD = 9.47, t(728) = 0.25, p = ns). Those who 
completed the study were slightly more educated (M = 4.66, SD = 0.92) than those who 
did not complete the study (M = 4.46, SD = 0.94, t(733) = 2.75, p < .01). 
Properties of the SSI scale 
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As in Studies 1a and 1b, the SSI scale was highly reliable in this sample (α = .91). 
The mean score on the SSI scale was 3.14, and the standard deviation was 1.14. As in 
Studies 1a and 1b, men scored significantly higher on the SSI scale (M = 3.36, SD = 1.13) 
than women (M = 2.78, SD = 1.09, t(475) = 5.52, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .52).  
Hypothesis 3 
I predicted that supervisors’ SSI scores would correspond to discriminatory 
decision-making regarding the hypothetical employee. I also predicted that this 
relationship would be moderated by supervisor discretion, such that SSI scores would 
only predict discrimination in the high-discretion condition. Finally, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, flexibility stigma and family responsibilities discrimination in the workplace 
sometimes take distinctly gendered forms. Therefore, in addition to examining three-way 
interactions between supervisor SSI, supervisor discrimination, and employee parental 
status, I also examined four-way interactions that added employee gender as a predictor. 
This analysis of gender was largely exploratory. 
First, I examined participants’ recommendations to terminate the hypothetical 
employee. Participants overwhelmingly responded that they would not recommend 
terminating the employee; on a Likert scale from 1-6, the mean likelihood of 
recommending termination was 1.46 (SD = .81). There was no significant relationship 
between participants’ endorsement of the SSI and their recommendations for termination, 
most likely because there was simply not enough variation on the dependent variable. 
Termination seems to have been too extreme of a response to the hypothetical employee, 
whose personnel file generally reflected good performance.  
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Next, I examined participants’ recommendations to demote the employee (M = 
2.01, SD = .97). In a linear regression, the three-way interaction between supervisor SSI, 
supervisor discretion, and employee parental status was not a significant predictor of 
recommendations to demote the employee (β = .32, p = ns). However, an examination of 
the simple slopes indicates that the results were trending in the predicted direction (see 
Figure 7). In the low-discretion condition, supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI failed to 
predict demotion recommendations for both employees without children (B = 0.11, SE = 
0.09) and employees with children (B = 0.04, SE = 0.07, t(234) = -0.92, p = ns). In the 
high-discretion condition, in contrast, supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI played a 
significantly greater role in demotion recommendations for employees with children (B = 
0.14, SE = 0.08) than in demotion recommendations for employees without children (B = 
-0.00, SE = 0.07, t(242) = 1.93, p = .05). Adding gender to the model revealed that the 
four-way interaction between supervisor SSI, supervisor discrimination, employee 
parental status, and employee gender was significant (β = -.83, p < .02). However, an 
examination of the simple slopes revealed that this interaction was not theoretically 
interpretable. Therefore, future research should examine the role of gender in demotion 
decisions with a larger sample in order to determine whether this relationship is 
meaningful. 
Next, I examined participants’ recommendations to give the employee a raise (M 
= 3.59, SD = 1.30). In a linear regression, the three-way interaction between supervisor 
SSI, supervisor discretion, and employee parental status was not a significant predictor of 
raise recommendations (β = .16, p = ns). Adding gender to the model revealed that the 
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four-way interaction between supervisor SSI, supervisor discrimination, employee 
parental status, and employee gender was similarly not significant (β = .47, p = ns). 
However, an examination of the simple slopes indicates that the results were trending in 
the predicted direction, and gender seemed to play a role (see Figure 8). Specifically, 
supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI played a significantly greater role in 
recommendations to give the father a raise in the high-discretion condition (B = -0.21, SE 
= 0.15) than in the low-discretion condition (B = 0.08, SE = 0.11, t(114) = 2.14, p < .04). 
It is not clear why this relationship does not exist for women; as described above, the 
extent to which a particular form of discrimination affect men or women more is 
primarily exploratory. Therefore, future research should examine this finding further in a 
larger sample that may be more equipped to produce significant interactions and clarify 
the role of gender.  
Finally, I examined participants’ hourly wage recommendations for the employee 
(M = $17.60, SD = 1.08). In a linear regression, the three-way interaction between 
supervisor SSI, supervisor discretion, and employee parental status was a significant 
predictor of wage recommendations (β = -.47, p < .04). Adding gender to the model 
revealed that the four-way interaction between supervisor SSI, supervisor discrimination, 
employee parental status, and employee gender was not significant (β = .13, p = ns). 
However, an examination of the simple slopes indicates that the results were trending in 
the predicted direction, and gender seemed to play a role. Specifically, the results trended 
in the predicted directions among participants who evaluated the female employee (see 
Figure 9), as well as among participants who evaluated the male employee with children 
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(see Figure 10). First, in the low-discretion condition, supervisors’ endorsement of the 
SSI failed to predict wage recommendations for both women without children (B = -0.05, 
SE = 0.14) and women with children (B = -0.10, SE = 0.07, t(122) = -0.45, p = ns). In the 
high-discretion condition, in contrast, supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI played a 
significantly greater role in wage recommendations for women with children (B = -0.32, 
SE = 0.17) than in wage recommendations for women without children (B = -0.00, SE = 
0.06, t(118) = -2.49, p < .02). Second, supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI played a 
significantly greater role in recommendations for the father’s wage in the high-discretion 
condition (B = -0.24, SE = 0.19) than in the low-discretion condition (B = 0.06, SE = 
0.08, t(114) = 2.05, p < .05). As with recommendations for raises, it is not clear why this 
relationship exists specifically among women and among men with children. As 
described above, the role of gender in this process is still largely an exploratory 
investigation. Future research should examine this finding further in a larger sample that 
may be more equipped to produce significant interactions and clarify the role of gender. 
Taken together, the findings from Study 2 generally support the predictions of 
Hypothesis 3, although future research is needed to determine whether the interactions in 
question reach statistical significance. Supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI predicted 
gender and family responsibilities discrimination in demotions, raises, and hourly wages, 
but only under conditions of high decision-making discretion. Building on the findings 
from Studies 1a and 1b, these data provide further support for the Separate Spheres 
Model of family responsibilities discrimination (see Figure 1, paths B and C) by 
demonstrating the relationship between the SSI and employment discrimination. They 
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also suggest, similar to the results of Study 1a, that some discriminatory outcomes affect 
men and women to different degrees; future research is needed to examine these 
gendered effects more systematically. More immediately, these findings offer 
experimental support for the causal impact of the separate spheres ideology on 
discriminatory decision-making against employees with family responsibilities, and they 
provide experimental support for the moderating role of supervisor discretion in this 
process.  
Having established the role of the separate spheres ideology in flexibility stigma 
and family responsibilities discrimination, the next step is to examine the effects of 
flexibility stigma and family responsibilities discrimination on employees’ workplace 
experiences and outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 4: EMPLOYEES’ EXPERIENCES WITH FLEXIBILITY STIGMA, FAMILY 
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION, AND WORK-LIFE CONFLICT  
 
Study 3 investigated employees’ experiences with flexibility stigma and family 
responsibilities discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, this set of studies examined 
the extent to which flexibility stigma and family responsibilities discrimination play a 
role in employees’ strategies for coping with work-life conflict.  
Study 3a 
Study 3a investigated the relationship between employees’ perceptions of 
flexibility stigma in the workplace and their own strategies for managing work-life 
conflicts. In Study 3a, I measured employees’ perceptions of flexibility stigma in the 
workplace and strategies for managing work-life conflicts. I examined Hypothesis 4, 
which predicted that employees’ perceptions of flexibility stigma would correspond to 
both an increased reliance on work-life conflict coping strategies and a more 
stereotypically gendered reliance on work-life conflict coping strategies. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in Study 3a were 210 adults residing across the United States who 
were recruited on Mechanical Turk in March 2015 (see Table 2 for sample demographic 
information and descriptive characteristics). Participants completed the study for $2.00 in 
compensation. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants in Study 3a volunteered for the study on Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were allowed to participate in the study if they were currently employed in a 
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job outside of Mechanical Turk. Participants first answered questions regarding 
characteristics of their workplaces (employer size, whether the employer is covered by 
the FMLA, whether the employer operates for profit or not for profit, whether the 
employer is private or public, gender composition of  the workplace, and the employer’s 
industry), characteristics of their job (union status, salary or hourly pay, schedule 
flexibility), and their own circumstances and outcomes regarding work and family 
responsibilities (parental status, extent of caregiving responsibilities, current income, 
income received when first starting their job, number of promotions and demotions since 
beginning the job). Next, participants provided their perceptions of flexibility stigma at 
work on a 7-point Likert scale (“Next, we’d like to know about the general atmosphere of 
your workplace. Some workplaces want their employees to stick to a standard schedule 
and they look negatively on those who want to use flexibility accommodations. Other 
workplaces encourage their employees to take care of their personal lives and try to 
accommodate their employees as much as they can. Many other workplaces fall 
somewhere in between. How would you rate the general atmosphere at your workplace 
for employees with work-life conflicts?”). Participants then rated the frequency with 
which they use various strategies for managing work-life conflicts (see Appendix G). 
These strategies were identified in the pilot study described in Chapter 1, which used an 
employee sample. Finally, participants provided demographic information (years at 
current job, age, education, race, gender, sexual orientation). 
Results 
Perceptions of Flexibility Stigma 
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Employees’ perceptions of flexibility stigma in the workplace were not correlated 
with the gender composition of the workplace (r = .12, p = ns), the size of the employer 
(r = .11, p = ns), or the extent to which the employer operated privately (r = .05, p = ns). 
There were also no differences in flexibility stigma between for-profit (M = 2.79, SD = 
1.55) and not-for-profit employers (M = 2.42, SD = 1.57; t(201) = 0.72, p = ns). Finally, 
there were no differences in flexibility stigma between employers who were covered by 
the FMLA (M = 2.78, SD = 1.58) and those who were not covered (M = 2.67, SD = 1.54; 
t(208) = 0.48, p = ns).  
Perceptions of flexibility stigma did not differ between men (M = 2.85, SD = 
1.60) and women (M = 2.58, SD = 1.51; t(208) = 1.25, p = ns). Perceptions of flexibility 
stigma also did not differ between participants who had dependents to care for (M = 2.79, 
SD = 1.73) and those who had no dependents (M = 2.71, SD = 1.46; t(208) = 0.35, p = 
ns). 
Gender Differences in Work-Life Conflict Strategies 
Participants in this study reported how frequently they engaged in a variety of 
strategies to manage work-life conflicts that arise because of family responsibilities. Only 
one of the work-life conflict strategies showed a main effect of gender. Women reported 
a higher frequency (M = 2.70, SD = 1.80) than men (M = 2.02, SD = 1.45; t(208) = 2.99, 
p < .01) of hiding their family situations from people at work in order to avoid being 
judged. 
Hypothesis 4 
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I predicted that employees’ perceptions of workplace flexibility stigma would 
lead to an increased reliance on strategies to cope with work-life conflicts. In a series of 
bivariate linear regressions, perceptions of workplace flexibility stigma predicted the 
frequency of missing work without permission (β = .21, p < .01), hiding family situations 
from people at work to avoid being judged (β = .21, p < .01), and missing family events 
altogether (β = .24, p < .001). There was no main effect of workplace flexibility stigma 
on the frequency of taking leave or sick days to manage a family situation (β = .09, p < 
ns), although when the interaction between flexibility stigma and gender was entered into 
the model (see below), the main effect of flexibility stigma became significant (β = .29, p 
< .01). 
I also predicted that employees’ perceptions of flexibility stigma in their 
workplaces would lead to the stereotypically gendered use of strategies for managing 
work-life conflicts. In order to test these predictions, I examined the roles of flexibility 
stigma, gender, and caregiver status in predicting the frequency of using various 
strategies to manage work-life conflicts. Note that caregiver status refers to caregiving 
responsibilities generally, as opposed to parental status. Employees who take care of their 
parents, adults with disabilities, or partners with medical problems would all count as 
caregivers under this definition. 
Two of the work-life conflict strategies measured in this study involved making 
sacrifices at work: using sick days to take care of a family situation and missing work 
without permission. There was a significant correlation between these two strategies (r = 
.37, p < .01), but they did not exhibit a high reliability (α = .51). Therefore, I did not 
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combine them into an index measure and instead analyzed them using separate regression 
models. In a linear regression predicting the frequency of using leave or sick days to take 
care of a family situation, there was a significant two-way interaction between perceived 
flexibility stigma and gender (β = -.38, p < .05), such that flexibility stigma had a greater 
impact on women’s use of this strategy than on men’s (t(208) = 4.73, p < .001; see Figure 
11). In a linear regression predicting the frequency of missing work without permission, 
there was also a significant two-way interaction between perceived flexibility stigma and 
gender (β = -.39, p < .05), such that flexibility stigma had a greater impact on women’s 
use of this strategy than on men’s (t(208) = 3.34, p < .01; see Figure 11).  This finding 
suggests that when it comes to work-life strategies that involve prioritizing family over 
work, workplace flexibility stigma increases women’s use of these strategies more than 
men’s.  
Next, two of the work-life conflict strategies measured in this study involved 
sacrificing family caregiving time for the job: hiding a family situation from people at 
work and missing family events. There was a significant correlation between these two 
strategies (r = .34, p < .01), but they did not exhibit a high reliability (α = .50). Therefore, 
I did not combine them into an index measure and instead analyzed them using separate 
regression models. In a linear regression predicting the frequency of hiding a family 
situation from people at work, there was a significant three-way interaction between 
perceived flexibility stigma, gender, and caregiver status (β = .93, p < .05), such that 
flexibility stigma increased male caregivers’ use of this strategy and decreased female 
caregivers’ use of this strategy (t(75) = 2.28, p < .05; see Figure 12). In a linear 
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regression predicting the frequency of missing family events, there was also a significant 
three-way interaction between perceived flexibility stigma, gender, and caregiver status 
(β = .74, p < .05), such that flexibility stigma increased male caregivers’ use of this 
strategy and decreased female caregivers’ use of this strategy (t(75) = 2.02, p < .05; see 
Figure 12). This finding suggests that when it comes to work-life strategies that involve 
prioritizing work over family, flexibility stigma increases male caregivers’ use of these 
strategies more than female caregivers’.  
Note that when it came to work-life conflict strategies involving sacrifices at 
work, the two-way interaction between perceived stigma and gender was significant, but 
the three-way interaction that included caregiver status was not significant. The two-way 
result was not simply an artifact of women having more caregiver responsibilities overall; 
when I included caregiver status in the model as a control, the two-way interaction 
between flexibility stigma and gender remained significant for both taking sick days (β = 
-.41, p < .01) and missing work without permission (β = -.39, p < .02). For strategies 
involving sacrifices at home, the three-way interaction that included caregiver status was 
significant. It is not clear why caregiver status would play this role in one class of work-
life conflict strategies but not the other. Future research should examine this question. 
Taken together, the results of Study 3a support Hypothesis 4 by demonstrating 
that workplace flexibility stigma increases men’s and women’s use of work-life conflict 
strategies that conform to prescriptive gender stereotypes about the proper social roles for 
men and women. Flexibility stigma led women to increase the extent to which they 
prioritized family over work and led men to increase the extent to which they prioritized 
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work over family. This finding is consistent with previous research, discussed in Chapter 
1, showing that men and women can be induced to conform to gender stereotypes by 
situational and interpersonal forces. Study 3b expanded on these findings by examining 
whether discrimination in the workplace had the same effects on employees’ work-life 
conflict experiences as perceived stigma did. 
Study 3b 
Study 3b investigated the extent to which employees experience family 
responsibilities discrimination, as well as the relationship between employees’ 
experiences with family responsibilities discrimination and their own strategies for 
managing work-life conflicts. In Study 3b, I measured employees’ experiences of family 
responsibilities discrimination in the workplace and strategies for managing work-life 
conflicts. I examined Hypothesis 5, which predicted that employees’ experiences of 
family responsibilities discrimination would correspond to both an increased reliance on 
work-life conflict coping strategies and a more stereotypically gendered reliance on 
work-life conflict coping strategies. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in Study 3b were 193 adults residing across the United States who 
were recruited on Mechanical Turk in March 2015 (see Table 2 for sample demographic 
information and descriptive characteristics). Participants completed the study for $2.00 in 
compensation. 
Materials and Procedure 
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Participants in Study 3b volunteered for the study on Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were allowed to participate in the study if they were currently employed in a 
job outside of Mechanical Turk. Participants first answered questions regarding 
characteristics of their workplaces (employer size, whether the employer is covered by 
the FMLA, whether the employer operates for profit or not for profit, whether the 
employer is private or public, gender composition of the workplace, and the employer’s 
industry), characteristics of their job (union status, salary or hourly pay, schedule 
flexibility), and their own circumstances and outcomes regarding work and family 
responsibilities (parental status, extent of caregiving responsibilities, current income, 
income received when first starting their job, number of promotions and demotions since 
beginning the job). Next, participants rated the frequency with which their supervisors 
had engaged in a variety of discriminatory actions toward them on the basis of their 
family responsibilities. These items were the same as the ones used in Study 1b (see 
Appendix D), except the wording was altered so that the participants were answering the 
questions regarding their supervisors’ behavior toward them (e.g., “My supervisor called 
me rude names because he or she felt that my family responsibilities were interfering 
with my job.”). One item used in Study 1b was removed (the item measuring 
termination), because it did not apply in this study (all participants were still employed at 
their current jobs). Participants then rated the frequency with which they used various 
strategies for managing work-life conflicts, using the same items as those in Study 3a 
(see Appendix G). Finally, participants provided demographic information (years at 
current job, age, education, race, gender, sexual orientation). 
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Results 
Experiences with Family Responsibilities Discrimination 
The participants in this sample reported experiencing family responsibilities 
discrimination at considerable rates. Taking the mean of the 13 different types of 
discriminatory behavior (α = .89), 55.4% of the sample reported experiencing family 
responsibilities discrimination at least once.  
Employees’ experiences with family responsibilities discrimination were not 
correlated with the gender composition of the workplace (r = -.05, p = ns), the size of the 
employer (r = -.05, p = ns), or the extent to which the employer operated privately (r = -
.02, p = ns). There were also no differences in discrimination experiences between for-
profit (M = 1.27, SD = 0.52) and not-for-profit employers (M = 1.46, SD = 0.99; t(183) = 
1.49, p = ns). Finally, there were no differences in discrimination experiences between 
employers who were covered by the FMLA (M = 1.30, SD = 0.66) and those who were 
not covered (M = 1.29, SD = 0.49; t(191) = .09, p = ns).  
The mean level of family responsibilities discrimination did not differ between 
men (M = 1.32, SD = 0.61) and women (M = 1.27, SD = 0.61; t(190) = 0.62, p = ns). This 
finding is consistent with previous research showing that both men and women 
experience discrimination on the basis of their family caregiving responsibilities (see 
Chapter 1). Participants who had dependents to care for experienced significantly more 
family responsibilities discrimination (M = 1.41, SD = 0.81) than participants who had no 
dependents (M = 1.22, SD = 0.43; t(191) = 2.05, p < .05).  
Gender Differences in Work-Life Conflict Strategies 
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Participants in this study reported how frequently they engaged in a variety of 
strategies to manage work-life conflicts that arise because of family responsibilities. 
None of the work-life conflict strategies showed a main effect of gender.  
Hypothesis 5 
I predicted that employees’ experiences with family responsibilities 
discrimination from their supervisors would lead to an increased reliance on strategies to 
cope with work-life conflicts. I also predicted that the use of these strategies would align 
with prescriptive gender stereotypes.  
In a series of linear regressions, experiences with family responsibilities 
discrimination predicted the frequency of taking leave or sick days to manage a family 
situation (β = .15, p < .05), missing work without permission (β = .35, p < .001), hiding 
family situations from people at work to avoid being judged (β = .30, p < .001), and 
missing family events altogether (β = .38, p < .001). These findings suggest that 
supervisors who engage in family responsibilities discrimination against their employees 
lead their employees to adopt coping strategies that detract from their quality of life. 
Perhaps ironically, some of these strategies involve missing work, suggesting that these 
forms of discriminatory conduct are not particularly effective at increasing employees’ 
devotion to the workplace. 
Unlike flexibility stigma in Study 3a, the role of discriminatory conduct in this 
study did not interact with gender and caregiver status to produce stereotypically 
gendered use of work-life conflict coping strategies. Thus, these data did not support the 
latter part of Hypothesis 5. There was not enough power and variation in the data to 
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detect these gendered patterns. On the measure of flexibility stigma used in Study 3a, 
approximately 25% of participants selected the lowest value, indicating a lack of 
flexibility stigma in their workplaces. In comparison, approximately 45% of this sample 
scored the lowest possible value on the measure of family responsibilities discrimination, 
indicating that they had never experienced any form of discrimination. Therefore, it 
seems that a larger sample is needed to detect the gendered patterns of behavior found in 
Study 3a.  
Taken together, the results of Study 3 largely support my predictions. Study 3a 
demonstrated that flexibility stigma in the workplace not only leads to greater use of 
work-life conflict coping strategies, many of which involve sacrifices to either the job or 
the family, but flexibility stigma also induces men and women to adopt these strategies in 
stereotypically gendered ways. Study 3b demonstrated that employees’ experiences with 
family responsibilities discrimination in the workplace increase the frequency with which 
they use strategies to manage work-life conflicts. Although future research is needed to 
examine whether discrimination creates stereotypically gendered reliance on these 
strategies, as flexibility stigma did in Study 3a, these findings provide some initial 
insights into the problem of family responsibilities discrimination. They suggest that it is 
not the mere fact of having a family that leads individuals to take actions that involve 
sacrifices to either their work or family lives; the more supervisors engage in harmful and 
discriminatory conduct toward employees in the workplace, the more employees adopt 
these coping strategies. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The findings presented in this dissertation provide significant support for the 
Separate Spheres Model of family responsibilities discrimination in the workplace. The 
Separate Spheres Model posits that individual supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI 
interacts with supervisor discretion to create flexibility stigma, family responsibilities 
discrimination, and work-life conflict. Specifically, Study 1a demonstrated that 
supervisors’ endorsement of the separate spheres ideology predicts their own hostile 
attitudes regarding their employees who use flexibility accommodations in the workplace 
(see Figure 1, path A). Study 1b demonstrated that supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI 
predicted their acts of family responsibilities discrimination against their own employees, 
using a conservative self-report measure (see Figure 1, path B). Study 1b also showed 
that supervisor discretion in the workplace increased the rate of family responsibilities 
discrimination and moderated the role of supervisor SSI in the frequency of 
discriminatory conduct (see Figure 1, path C). The risk of family responsibilities 
discrimination became substantial where participants in the upper half of the distribution 
of SSI scores worked for employers in the upper half of the distribution of supervisor 
discretion. Study 2 suggested that in a controlled setting, experimentally manipulated 
supervisor discretion may moderate the role of supervisor SSI in discriminatory 
employment decisions regarding demotions, raises, and hourly wages (see Figure 1, path 
C).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that both individual endorsement of the 
SSI and the institutional factor of supervisor discretion play important roles in workplace 
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attitudes and discriminatory conduct. These findings are significant for social 
psychologists, because they identify a situational employment factor that leads to 
discrimination. Supervisor discretion can be studied systematically by social 
psychologists and can be controlled by employers who wish to implement evidence-
based interventions. Furthermore, this research identifies an individual difference factor, 
endorsement of the SSI, that leads to discrimination. Not only does this approach 
complement existing social-psychological research on gendered backlash in the 
workplace by identifying individuals who are more likely to engage in discrimination, 
this approach also complements existing research in sociology that tends to examine 
employment policies in the absence of individual psychological differences. Williams, 
Blair-Loy, and Berdahl (2013) suggested that the mere presence of flexibility policies in 
the workplace was no guarantee of a family-friendly environment, and that flexibility 
stigma could lead to workplace cultures in which employees make use of flexibility 
policies “at their peril.” This dissertation provides support for that proposition and shows 
that flexibility policies in the absence of efforts to curb individual supervisors’ prejudices 
and biases are not sufficient. Therefore, a social-psychological approach to the study of 
flexibility stigma that takes into account both institutional factors like employment 
policies and individual ideology is needed. Finally, the findings of this dissertation are 
consistent with the broader social-psychological understanding of strong and weak 
situations. The data suggest that supervisor discretion creates weak situations in which 
individual supervisors’ personal gender ideologies exert a larger influence over their 
workplace conduct. Employment policies that limit supervisor discretion provide stronger 
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situational constraints that limit the extent to which supervisors are able to act in 
accordance with their own ideologies and prejudices. 
This dissertation contributes to the social-psychological study of supervisor 
discretion by developing a useful measure of supervisor discretion (in the form of 
employee evaluation subjectivity) in Study 1. Future research on supervisor discretion 
should aim to tease apart different types of discretion. While Studies 1a and 1b measured 
the extent to which supervisors had discretion in their employee evaluation procedures, 
Study 2 manipulated the extent to which supervisors anticipated employer oversight over 
their evaluations. These represent two distinct forms of discretion that each played a 
significant role in discriminatory outcomes. Other forms of discretion not studied here 
include discretion in when to take disciplinary action, discretion in record-keeping 
practices regarding employees’ personnel files, discretion in whom to consider for 
promotions, discretion in selecting employees for management training programs, 
discretion in weighting different factors during the hiring process, and many more. 
Studying these different forms of discretion will help psychologists to better understand 
the psychological mechanisms underlying the effect of workplace discretion. Because all 
of these policies are under the control of employers, this research will also provide more 
policy options for employers who want to implement discretion-reducing interventions in 
the workplace. 
Study 3 examined the downstream impact of supervisor SSI (via flexibility stigma 
and family responsibilities discrimination) on employees’ experiences and conduct (see 
the bottom portion of the Model depicted in Figure 1). Study 3a and 3b showed that, 
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consistent with predictions, employees’ perceptions of flexibility stigma in the workplace 
predicted the use of more work-life conflict strategies that often required them to 
sacrifice either time at work or time with their families (see Figure 1, paths D and F). 
This finding suggests that although supervisors who create flexibility stigma in the 
workplace may view family responsibilities as improperly interfering with work, their 
attitudes may actually interfere with workplace productivity by causing employees to 
resort to work-life conflict coping strategies. This finding is consistent with some 
researchers’ observations that employers who do not introduce worker flexibility into 
their policies are left with over-worked employees, increased employee turnover, and 
inefficient systems that break down when employees cannot be present (Williams, 2010).  
Not only did flexibility stigma lead to an increased reliance on work-life conflict 
coping strategies, flexibility stigma in Study 3a also led employees to conform to 
prescriptive gender stereotypes, so that women became more likely to prioritize family 
over work and men became more likely to prioritize work over family. In addition to 
providing support for the Model (see Figure 1, path E), this finding is remarkable, 
because it suggests that men and women may not engage in the gendered use of work-life 
conflict coping strategies unless placed in a difficult position by their employers. In Study 
3a, the only work-life conflict strategy that showed a main effect of gender was that 
women were more likely to hide family situations from people at work (a strategy that 
more closely aligns with prescriptive norms of masculinity because it involves making 
family sacrifices for the sake of the job). In Study 3b, none of the work-life conflict 
strategies showed a main effect of gender. When exposed to high flexibility stigma, 
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however, women in Study 3a became more likely to sacrifice work time for their 
families, and men became more likely to sacrifice family time for work (see the bottom 
portion of the Model in Figure 1). Future research should examine the psychological 
mechanisms underlying this effect. It could be the case that supervisors who endorse the 
SSI create subtle pressures or give subtle cues in ways that create behavioral 
confirmation among their employees, who then adopt work-life conflict strategies in 
gender-stereotypical ways (see, e.g., Skrypnek & Snyder, 1982). It may also be the case 
that stereotype threat leads men and women to confirm gender stereotypes in workplaces 
with high flexibility stigma, because they anticipate being stereotyped (see, e.g., Logel, et 
al., 2009). Future research should focus on this portion of the Model and clarify the 
precise psychological mechanism underlying the effect. Future research should also 
examine the extent to which supervisors are aware of the influence they have on their 
employees or the extent to which these processes occur outside of awareness. 
As described in Chapter 1, previous research in social psychology reveals that 
both men and women experience family responsibilities discrimination, and that this form 
of discrimination is based on gendered stereotypes and norms. It is not clear from 
previous research whether certain forms of family responsibilities discrimination 
disproportionately affect men or women. In Study 1a, supervisors’ flexibility stigma 
against women was more extreme than flexibility stigma against men, although the role 
of supervisor SSI in flexibility stigma was significant against both men and women. In 
Study 1b, supervisors reported talking to men more frequently than to women about their 
inadequate performance because of their family responsibilities, tried to convince men 
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more often not to take time off or change their schedules, and checked in on men more 
often to verify that they were telling the truth about the reasons for their absences. 
Finally, Study 2 showed that discrimination in raises disproportionately affected men 
with children, while demotions and wage discrimination affected both men and women 
with children. Thus, the results of these studies are consistent with previous research 
showing that family responsibilities discrimination affects both men and women, albeit 
not in identical ways. Future meta-analytic research is needed to determine whether there 
are some discriminatory outcomes that disproportionately affect men or women in a 
systematic manner.  
One interesting and unforeseen finding from these studies was that flexibility 
stigma and family responsibilities discrimination were present at the same level among 
employers who were covered by the FMLA and employers who were not covered. This 
finding suggests that the FMLA itself has not been particularly effective at reducing 
work-life conflict and family responsibilities discrimination. Future research is needed to 
more systematically examine this finding, as the data presented here do not speak to the 
reasons for this result.  
There has been increasing attention in psychology to the prevalence of implicit 
bias in employment contexts and the significant role that implicit bias likely plays in 
employment discrimination (see, e.g., Jost, Rudman, Blair, Carney, Dasgupta, Glaser, 
Hardin, 2009; Nosek & Riskind, 2012). Many scholars have pointed out that as 
expressions of prejudice become more subtle and implicit over time, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to detect and prove discrimination in court (Hart, 2005; Jolls & 
   66 
 
Sunstein, 2006). One valuable aspect of the findings presented in this dissertation is that 
they side-step this extra challenge; the results make clear that supervisors endorse the SSI 
and engage in FRD at conscious, explicit levels of processing (these processes may also 
occur implicitly, but this possibility has not yet been tested). Supervisors in this set of 
studies were consciously aware of—and willing to report—both their endorsement of 
sexist ideological beliefs and concrete acts of sex discrimination. This finding serves as a 
reminder to psychological and legal scholars that although subtle and implicit forms of 
bias are prevalent and harmful, explicit forms of sex discrimination are still relatively 
common and highly problematic. 
Finally, the results of this dissertation strongly contradict the belief of many U.S. 
courts, as expressed by the Supreme Court in the Dukes majority opinion (Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 2011), that supervisors do not engage in sex discrimination when 
left to their own devices. These findings make clear that under conditions of high 
supervisor discretion, supervisors engage in gendered discrimination on many dimensions 
on the basis of their employees’ family responsibilities. One potential alternative 
explanation for the discriminatory outcomes revealed in Study 1 is that supervisors may 
have merely reported reasonable actions that they took against employees who caused 
real difficulties in the workplace with their family conflicts. One could similarly argue 
that the results of Study 3a simply reflect that employees’ use of stereotypically gendered 
strategies for managing work-life conflicts leads to the experience of flexibility stigma 
because these employees don’t perform as well at work. It is intuitively appealing, after 
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all, to believe that employees with family responsibilities may be late to work more often, 
experience more distractions at work, or face other performance issues.  
If these alternative explanations were true, however, supervisors’ SSI scores 
would not correspond to their self-reported discriminatory conduct, as their actions would 
be based on rational responses to poor employee performance, rather than the 
supervisors’ own gendered ideology. Additionally, supervisors engaged in discriminatory 
decision-making in Study 2, in which the performance and credentials of the hypothetical 
employee were experimentally controlled across conditions. Furthermore, some of the 
work-life conflict strategies adopted in Study 3a involved prioritizing work over the 
family, which would not cause increased hostility from a supervisor at work if this 
hostility were merely a rational reaction to poor workplace performance. Finally, if 
supervisors were responding rationally to the poor performance of employees with family 
conflicts, they would likely not reduce their levels of discrimination under conditions of 
low supervisor discretion, when they were told that their evaluations would be monitored 
for bias.  
In sum, both the correlational evidence from Study 1 and the experimental 
evidence from Study 2 suggest that hostile attitudes and behaviors directed at employees 
with family responsibilities are discriminatory in nature and do not represent proportional 
responses to poor employee performance. This discrimination is rooted in supervisors’ 
own endorsement of traditional gendered norms that aim to restrict women from fully 
participating in the workplace and restrict men from fully participating in the domestic 
sphere. Providing supervisors with high discretion is a deliberate policy choice that 
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employers make, and these findings suggest that this policy choice increases the risk of 
family responsibilities discrimination based on gender. Chapter 6 of this dissertation (see 
Appendix H; this chapter is formatted as an Appendix only for the sake of satisfying 
University formatting requirements—it should be regarded as the final chapter of this 
dissertation) uses the empirical findings presented here, in combination with previous 
social-psychological research, to examine the courts’ treatment of supervisor discretion in 
family responsibilities discrimination cases under Title VII. Chapter 6 argues that 
employers should be expected to actively prevent discrimination by limiting supervisor 
discretion and should be held liable under Title VII for failing to do so. The Chapter also 
discusses potential solutions to the problem of supervisor discretion given the reality of 
the difficult situation created by the Supreme Court in Dukes. Chapter 6 argues that by 
recognizing supervisor discretion as an employment policy that can lead to 
discrimination, courts could adopt an empirically grounded, social-psychological 
understanding of family responsibilities discrimination, develop evidence-based practices 
that reflect the realities of gender roles in modern society, and provide the kind of justice 
to American employees that Title VII was intended to provide.  
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Footnotes 
1 This section borrows language that I originally developed for another manuscript 
(see Miller & Borgida, under review). 
2 Some of these results were included in another research manuscript (see Miller 
& Borgida, under review). 
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Table 1.  
Sample demographics and descriptive characteristics (pilot studies). 
 Supervisors Employees 
N 161 146 
Age   
Range 18–61 19–68 
Mean 31.54 32.62 
Race   
African American   5.0% 10.3% 
Asian 11.8%   8.9% 
Caucasian 72.7% 69.2% 
Chicano(a)/Latino(a)   5.6%   8.2% 
Native American   1.2%   0.7% 
Multiracial   3.7%   2.7% 
Gender   
Man 56.5% 50.7% 
Woman 43.5% 49.3% 
Education   
High School/GED or less   9.9% 14.4% 
Some College 28.6% 32.2% 
Bachelor’s Degree 44.1% 41.1% 
Master’s Degree 14.3% 10.3% 
PhD, JD, or MD   3.1%   2.1% 
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Table 2.  
Sample demographics and descriptive characteristics (Studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3a, 3b). 
 Study 1a Study 1b Study 2 Study 3a Study 3b 
N 149 153 480 210 193 
Age      
Range 21–64 19–60 18–71 19–68 18–72 
Mean 35.08 33.75 31.80 32.81 33.56 
Race      
African American 7.4% 7.2% 6.9% 3.8% 2.1% 
Asian 1.3% 4.6% 9.6% 11.4% 6.3% 
Caucasian 82.6% 78.4% 77.3% 77.1% 80.2% 
Chicano(a)/Latino(a) 4.0%   2.6% 2.9% 3.8% 7.3% 
Native American 0.7%  1.3% 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 
Multiracial 4.0%   4.6% 2.5% 2.9% 1.6% 
Other 0.0%   1.3% 0.4% 0.5% 1.6% 
Gender      
Man 54.4% 49.0% 61.7% 59.0% 53.4% 
Woman 45.0% 51.0% 37.7% 41.0% 46.1% 
Genderqueer 0.7% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.5% 
Sexual Orientation      
Heterosexual 91.3% 90.2% 91.9% 90.5% 89.6% 
Gay or Lesbian 2.7% 2.0% 2.9% 3.3% 3.6% 
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Bisexual/Pansexual 5.4% 5.9% 5.0% 5.2% 5.7% 
Other 0.7% 2.0% 0.2% 1.0% 1.0% 
Education      
Some High School 0.0%   0.0%   0.4% 2.9% 0.5% 
High School/ GED 8.1% 7.2%   10.4% 10.0% 10.4% 
Some College 39.6% 34.6% 29.0% 30.5% 32.1% 
Bachelor’s Degree 38.3% 37.9% 45.6% 45.7% 45.6% 
Master’s Degree 13.4% 16.3% 12.1% 9.5% 10.4% 
PhD, JD, or MD 0.7%  3.9%   2.5% 1.4% 1.0% 
Years in Current Job      
Range 0.0–32.0 0.3–30.0 0.5–32.0 0.2–28.5 0.25–27.0 
Mean 6.33 6.24 5.39 4.91 5.42 
Median Income $60,000 $65,000 $60,000 $32,000 $35,000 
Size of Employer      
Self-employed 2.7% 2.6% 1.9% 7.6% 3.1% 
Fewer than 50 37.6% 30.7% 28.3% 20.5% 28.0% 
50–100 8.1% 12.4% 16.0% 12.9% 11.9% 
100–500 12.8% 15.0% 16.0% 18.1% 16.1% 
500–1000 9.4% 9.8% 8.8% 12.9% 15.0% 
More than 1000 29.5% 29.4% 29.0% 28.1% 25.9% 
Covered by FMLA      
Yes 57.0% 64.7% 68.5% 68.6% 67.9% 
No 43.0% 35.3% 31.5% 31.4% 32.1% 
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Table 3. 
Factor loadings for items measuring flexibility stigma attitudes (Study 1a). 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
It’s unfair for women/men who have kids to ask for scheduling 
accommodations at work and infringe on other people. 
.70 -.13 
It’s a good idea to be flexible with women/men who have kids, 
because it allows them to be more productive. [reverse scored] 
.68 .05 
It’s not my job to make sure women’s/men’s jobs 
accommodate their families—it’s their job to make sure their 
families don’t interfere with work. 
.68 -.02 
When I accommodate women/men who have kids by letting 
them be more flexible with their schedule, I can reduce 
employee burnout and turnover. [reverse scored] 
.62 .13 
It’s not fair to let some women/men work from home, take time 
off, or trade shifts around when other employees are doing 
their jobs the way they’re supposed to. 
.59 -.17 
I usually see women’s/men’s motivation and effort drop after 
they have kids. 
-.09 -.86 
When women/men try to be both mothers/fathers and workers, 
their work tends to suffer. 
-.06 -.70 
Once women/men have kids, they are less committed to the 
job. 
.17 -.66 
When women/men employees have kids, they usually don’t 
want to travel for work anymore. 
-.01 -.54 
It’s irresponsible for women/men to have kids when they need 
to keep their job to survive. 
.22 -.26 
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Table 4. 
Factor loadings for items measuring discriminatory conduct (Study 1b). 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
I demoted an employee who had 
allowed her/his family responsibilities 
to interfere with work too much. 
.76 -.11 -.05 .01 
I called an employee rude names 
because I felt that her/his family 
responsibilities were interfering 
with her/his job. 
.66 -.02 .17 -.56 
I knew that an employee was planning 
to try to take some time off or change 
her/his schedule, so I made 
arrangements that prevented her/him 
from doing so. 
.47 .03 -.25 -.14 
I became angry with an employee who 
had family responsibilities, because I 
felt that they were interfering 
with her/his job. 
.33 .26 -.16 .06 
I knew that an employee was planning 
to try to take some time off or 
change her/his schedule, so I talked to 
her/him and convinced her/him not to. 
.26 -.03 -.25 -.18 
I reconsidered giving a promotion to an 
employee after she/he announced that 
she/he was having a child, because I 
wasn’t sure if she/he would be fully 
committed to the new job. 
.22 .03 .00 .00 
I felt that certain work assignments 
would not be appropriate for a 
female/male employee who had family 
responsibilities, so I rearranged which 
assignments I gave to which employees. 
-.02 .89 .10 -.01 
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I felt that an employee’s performance 
was suffering because of her/his family, 
so I talked to her/him about making 
improvements. 
.05 -.12 -.95 .05 
I felt that an employee wasn’t 
committing to the job enough because 
of her/his family, so I talked to her/him 
about making improvements. 
-.03 .02 -.72 -.12 
I reduced an employee’s hours, 
because her/his family responsibilities 
were interfering with work too much. 
.04 .25 -.32 -.06 
I acted more cold and distant with an 
employee after she/he had a child, 
because I felt that she/he had 
disappointed me. 
-.03 -.04 .01 -.85 
I fired an employee after it became clear 
that her/his family was interfering 
with her/his work too much. 
.40 -.04 -.04 -.65 
While an employee was on leave, I 
fired her/him or asked her/him to quit, 
because I knew that she/he would not be 
committed to her/his job anymore. 
.21 .05 -.09 -.39 
I checked in on an employee who was 
away from work, in order to verify that 
she/he was telling the truth about why 
she/he was absent. 
-.09 .10 -.16 -.36 
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Table 5. 
Inter-factor correlations for items measuring discriminatory conduct (Study 1b). 
Factor 1 2 3 4 
1 1.00    
2 .21 1.00   
3 -.49 -.33 1.00  
4 -.57 -.21 .59 1.00 
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Table 6. 
Supervisor SSI predicts the frequency of engaging in discriminatory conduct on the basis 
of employees’ family responsibilities (Study 1b). 
Item β t 
Reconsidered a promotion that employee was going to receive .13 1.65 
Talked to employee about inadequate commitment .21 2.62* 
Talked to employee about inadequate performance .18 2.25* 
Rearranged employees’ work assignments .12 1.51 
Terminated employee .20 2.52* 
Terminated employee or asked employee to quit while on leave .19 2.42* 
Convinced employee not to take time off or change schedule .12 1.44 
Prevented employee from taking time off or changing schedule .19 2.38* 
Became angry with employee .19 2.33* 
Checked on employee to verify reasons for absence -.03 -0.31 
Called employee rude names .21 2.65* 
Demoted employee .10 1.26† 
Reduced employee’s hours .21 2.64* 
Acted cold and distant with employee .25 3.11* 
 
Note. See Appendix D for item wording and scoring scale. *p < .05. †Although 
supervisor SSI did not have a main effect on the frequency of demoting employees 
because of their family responsibilities, it did have a significant effect under high levels 
of supervisor discretion (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 1. The Separate Spheres Model of family responsibilities discrimination in the 
workplace. 
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Figure 2. Scree plot for items measuring flexibility stigma attitudes (Study 1a).  
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Figure 3. SSI scores played an equally significant role in hostile attitudes toward men 
and women who use flexibility accommodations in the workplace. SSI scores played a 
significantly greater role in hostile attitudes regarding mothers’ performance in the 
workplace than those regarding fathers’ performance (Study 1a). 
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Figure 4. Scree plot for items measuring discriminatory conduct (Study 1b).  
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Figure 5. Supervisor discretion moderates the role of supervisor SSI in the frequency of 
discriminatory workplace conduct (Study 1b). 
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Figure 6. The risk of family responsibilities discrimination becomes substantial where 
approximately the upper half of the distribution of supervisor SSI scores meets the upper 
half of the distribution of supervisor discretion (Study 1b).  
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Figure 7. Under high discretion, but not low discretion, SSI scores played a significantly 
greater role in demotion recommendations for employees with children than for 
employees without children (Study 2). 
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Figure 8. SSI scores played a greater role in recommendations to give a father a raise 
under high discretion than under low discretion (Study 2). 
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Figure 9. Under high discretion, but not low discretion, SSI scores played a significantly 
greater role in wage recommendations for women with children than for women without 
children (Study 2). 
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Figure 10. SSI scores played a greater role in wage recommendations for the father under 
high discretion than under low discretion (Study 2). 
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Figure 11. Flexibility stigma in the workplace had a greater impact on women’s use of 
work-life conflict strategies that prioritize family over work than on men’s use of these 
strategies (Study 3a). 
  
   89 
 
 
Figure 12. Flexibility stigma in the workplace had a greater impact on fathers’ use of 
work-life conflict strategies that prioritize work over family than on mothers’ use of these 
strategies (Study 3a). 
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Appendix A: The Separate Spheres Ideology Scale 
1. Women can learn technical skills, but it doesn’t come as naturally as it does for most 
men.  
2. If one person in a heterosexual marriage needs to quit working, it usually makes more 
sense for the husband to keep his job. 
*3. Children with single parents can be just as well off as children with both a mom and a 
dad. 
4. When it comes to voting for president, I’m more comfortable trusting a man to make 
tough political decisions than a woman. 
*5. When a married couple divorces, judges shouldn’t assume that the mother is the more 
“natural” parent. 
6. Most men naturally enjoy a tough and competitive career more than women do. 
7. I would feel more comfortable if my auto mechanic was a man, rather than a woman.  
*8. If we got rid of stereotyping and discrimination, differences between men and women 
would mostly disappear. 
9. Women can learn how to be good leaders in the workplace, but it doesn’t come as 
naturally as it does for most men.  
10. It’s natural for a woman to be fulfilled by taking care of her children, but most men 
feel better when they have a good career, too. 
11. There are certain caregiving jobs, like nursing, that just naturally fit with women’s 
skills better than men’s skills.  
12. Most kids are better off if their dad is the primary provider for the whole family. 
*13. I would feel equally comfortable with a repair-man or a repair-woman to fix 
something in my house. 
*14. It’s just as important to most women as it is to men to have a successful career. 
15. When it comes to making tough business decisions, men tend to have special abilities 
that most women don’t have. 
 
Response scale: 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Moderately Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
4 = Neither 
5 = Slightly Agree 
6 = Moderately Agree 
7 = Strongly Agree 
 
Items marked with an asterisk are reverse-scored. 
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Appendix B: Flexibility Stigma Attitudes (Study 1a) 
(differences between the conditions are indicated in italics) 
 
1. When women/men try to be both mothers/fathers and workers, their work tends to 
suffer. 
2. I usually see women’s/men’s motivation and effort drop after they have kids. 
3. It’s not fair to let some women/men work from home, take time off, or trade shifts 
around when other employees are doing their jobs the way they’re supposed to. 
*4. When I accommodate women/men who have kids by letting them be more flexible 
with their schedule, I can reduce employee burnout and turnover. 
5. It’s not my job to make sure women’s/men’s jobs accommodate their families—it’s 
their job to make sure their families don’t interfere with work. 
6. When women/men employees have kids, they usually don’t want to travel for work 
anymore. 
*7. It’s a good idea to be flexible with women/men who have kids, because it allows them 
to be more productive. 
8. It’s unfair for women/men who have kids to ask for scheduling accommodations at 
work and infringe on other people. 
9. It’s irresponsible for women/men to have kids when they need to keep their job to 
survive. 
10. Once women/men have kids, they are less committed to the job. 
 
 
Response scale: 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Moderately Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
4 = Neither 
5 = Slightly Agree 
6 = Moderately Agree 
7 = Strongly Agree 
 
Items marked with an asterisk are reverse-scored. 
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Appendix C: Measure of Supervisor Discretion (Studies 1a and 1b) 
 
Do you keep a written record of your employees’ evaluations, or do you evaluate them 
orally to another member of the workplace?  
Scoring Scale: 3 = Neither, 2 = Oral, 1 = Written, 0 = Both 
 
When evaluating your employees, do you use a set of pre-determined criteria that have 
been chosen by the company (for example, a form that you fill out), or do you evaluate 
the employee using spontaneous criteria (for example, describing the employee’s 
strengths and weaknesses in an open-ended way)?  
Scoring Scale: 3 = Neither, 2 = Spontaneous, 1 = Pre-determined, 0 = Both 
 
Are your employees evaluated on objective criteria (for example, number of sales, 
number of days late) or subjective criteria (for example, leadership, initiative, 
promptness)?  
Scoring Scale: 3 = Neither, 2 = Subjective, 1 = Objective, 0 = Both 
 
Do you evaluate your employees by rating them with numbers/ scores, or do you evaluate 
them using verbal descriptions of their work? 
Scoring Scale: 3 = Neither, 2 = Verbal descriptions, 1 = Numbers, 0 = Both 
 
Do you evaluate your employees at pre-determined times (for example, once per year), or 
do you evaluate them only spontaneously when asked to do so by someone in the 
company (for example, your boss asks you to recommend an employee for a new job 
opening)?  
Scoring Scale: 3 = Neither, 2 = Spontaneous, 1 = Pre-determined, 0 = Both 
 
Are your ratings reviewed by anyone above you in the company, or do you have 
complete freedom in writing your evaluations? 
Scoring Scale: 
2 = My evaluations of my employees are not reviewed by anyone 
1 = My evaluations of my employees are reviewed somewhat by my superiors 
0 = My evaluations of my employees are thoroughly reviewed by my superiors 
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Appendix D: Frequency of Discriminatory Conduct (Study 1b) 
(differences between the conditions are indicated in italics) 
 
1. I reconsidered giving a promotion to an employee after she/he announced that she/he 
was having a child, because I wasn’t sure if she/he would be fully committed to the 
new job. 
2. I felt that an employee wasn’t committing to the job enough because of her/his family, 
so I talked to her/him about making improvements. 
3. I felt that an employee’s performance was suffering because of her/his family, so I 
talked to her/him about making improvements. 
4. I felt that certain work assignments would not be appropriate for a female/male 
employee who had family responsibilities, so I rearranged which assignments I gave 
to which employees. 
5. I fired an employee after it became clear that her/his family was interfering 
with her/his work too much. 
6. While an employee was on leave, I fired her/him or asked her/him to quit, because I 
knew that she/he would not be committed to her/his job anymore. 
7. I knew that an employee was planning to try to take some time off or change her/his 
schedule, so I talked to her/him and convinced her/him not to. 
8. I knew that an employee was planning to try to take some time off or change her/his 
schedule, so I made arrangements that prevented her/him from doing so. 
9. I became angry with an employee who had family responsibilities, because I felt that 
they were interfering with her/his job. 
10. I checked in on an employee who was away from work, in order to verify that she/he 
was telling the truth about why she/he was absent. 
11. I called an employee rude names because I felt that her/his family responsibilities 
were interfering with her/his job. 
12. I demoted an employee who had allowed her/his family responsibilities to interfere 
with work too much. 
13. I reduced an employee’s hours, because her/his family responsibilities were 
interfering with work too much. 
14. I acted more cold and distant with an employee after she/he had a child, because I felt 
that she/he had disappointed me. 
 
Scoring scale: 
1 = Never 
2 = Less than once per year 
3 = About once per year 
4 = A few times per year 
5 = About once per month 
6 = A few times per month 
7 = About once per week 
8 = A few times per week 
9 = Almost daily 
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Appendix E: Example Personnel File (Study 2) 
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Appendix F: Supervisor Discretion Manipulation (Study 2) 
(differences between the conditions are indicated in italics) 
 
 
Low-discretion condition: 
 
Now that you have familiarized yourself with the employee, you'll answer a few 
questions about him or her. Remember that there are no right or wrong answers-- all that 
matters is your opinion. 
  
First, pretend that it is your job to evaluate this employee as part of an annual review. 
You will provide recommendations about the employee to your company. The higher-ups 
in the company will use your ratings to determine whether the employee should receive a 
promotion, demotion or probation, be fired, or get access to better assignments or shifts. 
  
The higher-ups will take your ratings into account, along with various company policies 
and ratings and recommendations from other people. They may ask you to explain some 
of your ratings if they need more information. They also keep an eye on supervisors' 
ratings to make sure that they are generally fair, accurate, and unbiased. 
 
 
[Participants in the low-discretion condition rated the employee on a number of 
performance-relevant criteria before providing their final recommendations. These 
included competence, attitude, time management, responsibility, work ethic, commitment 
to the company, motivation, attendance and punctuality, initiative, enthusiasm for the job, 
and people skills.] 
 
 
High-discretion condition: 
 
Now that you have familiarized yourself with the employee, you'll answer a few 
questions about him or her. Remember that there are no right or wrong answers-- all that 
matters is your opinion. 
  
First, pretend that it is your job to evaluate this employee as part of an annual review. 
You will provide recommendations about the employee to your company. The higher-ups 
in the company will use your ratings to determine whether the employee should receive a 
promotion, demotion or probation, be fired, or get access to better assignments or shifts. 
  
The higher-ups have the final say, but they usually do whatever you recommend. 
 
 
[Participants in the high-discretion condition did not rate the employee on any 
performance-relevant criteria before providing their final recommendations.] 
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Appendix G: Frequency of Work-Life Conflict Strategies (Studies 3a and 3b) 
 
1. I took leave, vacation days, or sick days to deal with the family situation. 
2. I tried to hide the situation from people at work because I didn’t want to be judged. 
3. I missed work without permission or didn’t show up because I was dealing with my 
family situation. 
4. I missed family events because I had to work. 
 
Scoring scale: 
1 = I have never used this strategy 
2 = I have used this strategy at least once 
3 = I use this strategy about once per year 
4 = I use this strategy a few times per year 
5 = I use this strategy at least once per month 
6 = I use this strategy at least once per week 
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Appendix H 
 
CHAPTER 6: THE SEPARATE SPHERES MODEL OF FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 
DISCRIMINATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
Andrea L. Miller* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Kim Matthews worked as an office clerk for Consolidated Freightways 
Corporation, a transportation company.1 She received consistently positive evaluations 
and was promoted multiple times within the company.2 Consolidated Freightways had 
virtually no objective standards for making employment decisions, failing to inform 
employees about open positions and relying on individual supervisors’ “gut feelings” to 
hire employees and award promotions.3 Over the course of Matthews’ employment, 
Consolidated Freightways made significant accommodations for various male 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D. Candidate 2015, 
University of Minnesota Department of Psychology. Thank you to Eugene Borgida, 
Christopher Federico, Jill Hasday, Howie Lavine, and Mark Snyder, for serving on my 
dissertation committee and for advice on my broader program of research in this area. 
1 Eldred v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 898 F. Supp. 928, 933 (D. Mass. 
1995). 
2 Id. at 933–34, 937. 
3 Id. at 933–34, 937–38. 
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employees’ health problems.4 One of these employees was given a lateral transfer to a 
different department because of problems with his back,5 one was promoted from a driver 
position to an office position to accommodate his heart attack,6 and one was transferred 
to accommodate problems with his knees.7 However, when Matthews requested 
comparatively minor accommodations during her pregnancy and following the birth of 
her child, her requests were denied.8 When Matthews met with her supervisor to discuss 
her requests, he arrived at the meeting with a resignation form already prepared, and he 
said, “You should stay home with your family because that is where you belong 
anyway.”9 Matthews was forced to resign, and despite the fact that Consolidated 
Freightways regularly re-hired former employees,10 it refused to re-hire Matthews.11 
Consolidated Freightways took an employee who was thriving and, once she became 
pregnant, effectively forced her out.12 Matthews’ experiences are all too common in the 
                                                 
4 Id. at 938. 
5 Id. at 933. 
6 Id. at 937. 
7 Id. at 933 n.3. 
8 Id. at 937–38. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 933–38. 
11 Id. at 938. 
12 Id. 
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United States, and they represent a vivid example of Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination. 
Family responsibilities discrimination (FRD) is discrimination against an 
individual on the basis of his or her real or perceived caregiving responsibilities.13 FRD 
can take many different forms, including denying a father parental leave because his 
employer thinks his wife should be taking care of things at home or denying a mother a 
promotion because her employer assumes that she would not want to travel for the new 
job.14 FRD jurisprudence developed rapidly over the last ten to fifteen years, and cases 
arise under various legal causes of action related to employment discrimination.15 
Plaintiffs’ ability to bring FRD claims often depends on individual lawyers’ and judges’ 
understanding of how stereotyping and discrimination operate; as a result, inconsistent 
and inaccurate lay theories about gender stereotypes can impact case outcomes.16 One 
implication has been the problematic treatment of cases in which FRD occurred under an 
                                                 
13 Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing 
Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 171 (2006). 
14 Id. at 177–78, 181. These examples are drawn from real FRD cases. Id.  
15 Williams & Bornstein, supra note 13, at 172, 181–82. 
16 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of 
Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 835, 835 (2004) (arguing that “[f]lawed intuitive psychological models presently 
limit the law’s effectiveness in dismantling the maternal wall”). 
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employment policy of high decision-making discretion for individual supervisors.17 
Courts that are skeptical about the existence of employment discrimination in the first 
place sometimes justify their decisions using the notion that supervisor discretion is not 
itself an employment policy that could lead to discrimination.18 This argument is 
grounded in lay theories of psychology that have been contradicted by empirical 
psychological research. 
This Article argues that although social psychological research demonstrates the 
powerful role of supervisor discretion in discriminatory employment outcomes, some 
courts dispose of FRD cases based on the flawed logic that supervisor discretion is not an 
employment policy that can lead to discrimination. Part I of this Article describes existing 
social psychological research on FRD in the workplace and research on the effects of 
supervisor discretion in the workplace.19 Research in psychology, including the findings 
of this dissertation, has established that FRD is discrimination based on sex and that 
supervisor discretion leads to employment discrimination.20 Part II analyzes the role of 
supervisor discretion in discrimination cases under Title VII and in class certification in 
                                                 
17 See infra Part II.C. 
18 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011) (“left to their 
own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a 
corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based 
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all”). 
19 See infra Part I. 
20 Id. 
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Title VII cases.21 Although various federal courts demonstrated throughout the 1990s that 
Title VII is equipped to handle the conceptualization of supervisor discretion as an 
employment policy that can cause discrimination, the Supreme Court erected major 
barriers to this approach in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.22 Part III argues that 
employers should be expected to actively prevent discrimination by limiting supervisor 
discretion and should be held liable under Title VII for failing to do so.23 Part III also 
discusses potential solutions to the problem of supervisor discretion given the reality of 
the difficult situation created by Dukes.24 This Article argues that by recognizing 
supervisor discretion as an employment policy that can lead to discrimination, courts 
could adopt an empirically grounded social-psychological understanding of FRD, 
develop evidence-based practices that reflect the realities of gender roles in modern 
society, and provide the kind of justice to American employees that Title VII was 
intended to provide. 
                                                 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 Id.; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
23 See infra Part III. Note that the solutions I propose in this paper likely apply to other 
forms of discrimination under Title VII, not only family responsibilities discrimination. 
However, because the empirical data in this dissertation do not speak to other forms of 
discrimination, I limit my legal and policy analyses to the problem of family 
responsibilities discrimination. 
24 Id. 
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I. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ON SUPERVISOR DISCRETION IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
A significant body of research in social psychology examines the psychological 
processes underlying stereotyping and discrimination in the workplace. This section 
synthesizes the relevant research and provides background information regarding the 
status of gendered discrimination and inequality in the United States. 
A. FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION IS SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Gendered wage inequality in the U.S. persists despite decades of effort to narrow 
the income gap.25 Recent scholarship indicates that much of the remaining gender 
disparity is tied to women’s parental status.26 The motherhood penalty, or the “maternal 
wall,” has severe economic consequences for women.27 As of 2010, for example, mothers 
earned sixty-seven cents for every dollar earned by fathers,28 suggesting that 
“motherhood may in fact have replaced gender as the primary factor constraining 
                                                 
25 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2013, at 1 
(2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cps/highlights-of-womens-earnings-
in-2013.pdf. 
26 JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 15 (2010).  
27 Id. 
28 JOAN WILLIAMS ET AL., CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: 
HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT 17 (2006), available at 
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf. 
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women’s choices.”29 It is clear that gender inequality cannot simply be reduced to sex or 
gender; it is often driven by the intersection between gender and caregiving 
responsibilities.30 Legal scholarship and social-science research on FRD recognize this 
complexity and attempt to address gendered inequality in the workplace as it relates to 
caregiving responsibilities.31  
                                                 
29 STEPHANIE COONTZ, A STRANGE STIRRING: THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE AND AMERICAN 
WOMEN AT THE DAWN OF THE 1960S, at 177–78 (2011). 
30 Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Ladder, 
19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 25–28, 34–39 (2012). Gender inequality is also 
characterized by intersections with race, class, sexuality, immigrant status, disability, and 
many other sources of inequality. See, e.g., id. at 30–40; Joan C. Williams et al., Cultural 
Schemas, Social Class, and the Flexibility Stigma, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 209, 227 (2013). 
Although these intersecting identities are important parts of gender inequality and FRD, 
they are outside the scope of this paper. 
31 See, e.g., Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should Be: 
Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 665 (1999); Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a 
Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 387 (2004); Williams et al., supra note 30; 
Joan C. Williams & Holly Cohen Cooper, The Public Policy of Motherhood, 60 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 849, 858–62 (2004); Joan C. Williams & Allison Tait, “Mancession” or 
“Momcession”?: Good Providers, a Bad Economy, and Gender Discrimination, 86 CHI.-
KENT L. REV 857, 865 (2011). 
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1. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Against Gender-Conforming 
Women 
Descriptive stereotypes describe how society views typical men and women to 
be.32 According to traditional gender stereotypes, men are more agentic and competent 
and women are more communal and warm.33 When a woman announces that she is 
pregnant, has a child, or activates caregiving concepts in some way in the workplace, 
people tend to see her as having more feminine attributes (i.e., warmth) and fewer 
masculine attributes (i.e., competence).34 People who endorse these descriptive 
stereotypes tend to assume that mothers are less agentic, competent, and committed to the 
workplace than non-mothers, because mothers appear to fit the descriptive stereotypes of 
                                                 
32 Burgess & Borgida, supra note 31; Madeline E. Heilman, Description and 
Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational 
Ladder, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 657, 658–59 (2001). 
33 Id. at 658. 
34Amy Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 711 (2004); see also Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often 
Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from 
Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 887 (2002) 
(finding that housewives are consistently perceived as high in warmth and low in 
competence). See generally Heilman, supra note 32, at 666–69. 
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women.35 One of the consequences of these descriptive stereotypes about women is FRD. 
The perception that women caregivers are less competent can lead to lower salary,36 
fewer promotions,37 lower hiring rates,38 and less willingness to educate mothers 
compared to other employees.39 Women are also penalized by the assumption that they 
may become caregivers, even when they have not had children.40 
In contrast to descriptive stereotypes, prescriptive stereotypes describe how men 
and women should be.41 People who endorse prescriptive gender stereotypes believe that 
men should be agentic and competent and that women should be communal and warm.42 
                                                 
35 Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and 
Parental Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 737, 
748 (2004). 
36 Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Choice-Based Discrimination: Labor-Force-Type 
Discrimination Against Gay Men, the Obese, and Mothers, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 670, 682 (2013). 
37 Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Motherhood: A Potential Source of Bias in 
Employment Decisions, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 189, 196 (2008). 
38 Cuddy et al., supra note 34, at 711; Kricheli-Katz, supra note 36, at 681. 
39 Cuddy et al., supra note 34, at 711. 
40 See Alexander H. Jordan & Emily M. Zitek, Marital Status Bias in Perceptions of 
Employees, 34 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 474, 474–75, 479 (2012). 
41 Heilman, supra note 32, at 659. 
42 Id. 
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In employment, this means that people tend to believe that women should engage in 
caregiving rather than pursuing career achievement.43 Like descriptive stereotypes, 
prescriptive stereotypes about women can lead to FRD. For example, in many 
workplaces, there is a stigma against women who use their companies’ flexibility policies 
(e.g., part-time hours, parental leave, telecommuting).44 This phenomenon is called 
“flexibility stigma.”45 Flexibility stigma can result in lower wages, poorer performance 
evaluations, fewer promotions, and lower-status assignments.46 For women, this stigma 
                                                 
43 Michelle Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women: 
Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards that Maintain Traditional 
Roles, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1499 (2007); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, 
Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 
743 (2001). 
44 Williams et al., supra note 30, at 209–10. 
45 Id. 
46 Jeffrey R. Cohen & Louise E. Single, An Examination of the Perceived Impact of 
Flexible Work Arrangements on Professional Opportunities in Public Accounting, 32 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 317, 324–25 (2001); Jennifer Glass, Blessing or Curse?: Work-Family 
Policies and Mother’s Wage Growth Over Time, 31 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 367, 387 
(2004); Pamela Stone & Lisa Ackerly Hernandez, The All-or-Nothing Workplace: 
Flexibility Stigma and “Opting Out” Among Professional-Managerial Women, 69 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 235 (2013); see generally PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY 
QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME (2007). 
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stems from prescriptive stereotypes that expect women to prioritize childrearing over 
their careers, which makes them ideal parents but bad employees.47 Women who are 
mothers or who use flexibility benefits at work are seen as fulfilling their proper gender 
role by engaging in caregiving but deviating from appropriate workplace performance.48 
In some workplaces, women are praised for opting out of the workplace entirely to care 
for their children but are punished if they stay at work and use flexibility policies.49 
Accordingly, while FRD against women is based on their actual or perceived caregiving 
duties, it is also based on descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about women belonging 
in the home rather than the workplace. In other words, although FRD occurs against a 
specific sub-group of women, it is discrimination based on sex and gender. 
2. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Against Gender-
Nonconforming Men 
Social psychologists and legal scholars also recognize that gender equality in the 
workplace is not simply a matter of women’s work-life conflict and the treatment of 
women at work.50 In order for society to achieve gender equality, men must be able to 
                                                 
47 Williams et al., supra note 30, at 221–22. 
48 Id.  
49 Stone & Hernandez, supra note 46, at 252; for a real-world example, see supra notes 
1–12 and accompanying text. 
50 See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family 
Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1299–1300 (2012); Joan C. Williams, 
Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Justice Ginsburg and Reconstructive 
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participate fully in their family lives. Men experience FRD at work, but FRD against men 
stems from different prescriptive stereotypes than those that affect women. Prescriptive 
stereotypes of men dictate that they devote themselves to the workplace, displaying 
agency, competence, and commitment.51 Because traditional gender roles regard earning 
a living as the primary role of fatherhood, fathers are penalized for using flexibility 
benefits at work; to those who endorse gender stereotypes, using flexibility benefits 
suggests that men are not completely devoted to their careers.52 In sum, FRD for men 
results from men’s gender-nonconforming behavior. This is in contrast to FRD against 
women, which results from the supposedly gender-conforming behavior of prioritizing 
children over work.53 Therefore, although both men and women experience FRD, this 
stigma is gendered and manifests against men and women in distinct ways. Although 
                                                                                                                                                 
Feminism, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267, 1282–86 (2012). See generally Kelli K. Garcia, The 
Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2012). 
51 Williams et al., supra note 30, at 220–21; Williams & Tait, supra note 31, at 865–69. 
52 Jennifer L. Berdahl & Sue H. Moon, Workplace Mistreatment of Middle Class Workers 
Based on Sex, Parenthood, and Caregiving, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 341, 358 (2013); Scott 
Coltrane et al., Fathers and the Flexibility Stigma, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 279 (2013); Laurie 
A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a Family Leave: Is Flexibility 
Stigma a Femininity Stigma?, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 322 (2013); Joseph A. Vandello et al., 
When Equal Isn’t Really Equal: The Masculine Dilemma of Seeking Work Flexibility, 69 
J. SOC. ISSUES 303 (2013). 
53 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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FRD is directed primarily at subsets of men and women, social-psychological evidence 
makes clear that FRD is discrimination based on sex and gender. 
B. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SUPERVISOR DISCRETION AND DISCRIMINATION 
One defining feature of social psychology as a discipline is its focus on the power 
of social situations to influence individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.54 Years of 
research on stereotyping and discrimination have made clear that these processes, like 
any other psychological process, are context-dependent.55 Depending on the social 
context at a given moment, an individual’s stereotypes or prejudices regarding a social 
group are not always expressed or may be expressed in different ways.56 In the 
employment domain, this means that employers may have opportunities to design their 
                                                 
54 See Gordon W. Allport, The Historical Background of Social Psychology, in 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 
1985). 
55 See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 997, 1039–41 (2006) (characterizing situationism as “one of the most important” 
concepts to emerge in social psychology over the last fifty years).   
56 See generally, e.g., Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-
Suppression Model of the Expression and Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
414 (2003).  
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policies and workplace contexts in ways that either increase or decrease the likelihood of 
discrimination.57  
1. Subjectivity in the Employment Context 
The overarching piece of wisdom gained from years of research on gender 
discrimination in the workplace has been the notion that subjectivity in decision-making 
tasks opens the door for discrimination.58 Specifically, subjectivity in workplace appraisal 
processes allows individuals’ stereotypes to manifest as discriminatory conduct.59 In the 
workplace, “ambiguity feeds subjectivity. The more ambiguity there is in a particular 
situation, the more inference is required for evaluation. And, the more inference is 
required, the less guidance there is about the ‘correct’ evaluation, leaving the situation 
ripe for expectations to exert their influence.”60 Because our expectations in any given 
situation are driven by stereotypes and prejudices, “decisions that require inference are 
more susceptible to gender bias than those that do not.”61 In other words, employment 
                                                 
57 See generally Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle C. Haynes, Subjectivity in the 
Appraisal Process: A facilitator of Gender Bias in Work Settings, in BEYOND COMMON 
SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 127 (Eugene Borgida & Susan 
Fiske eds., 2008) (describing research on workplace contexts that create opportunities for 
gender discrimination). 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 127. 
60 Id. at 135. 
61 Id. at 132–35.  
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contexts characterized by ambiguity open the door for individual stereotypes and biases 
to influence outcomes, and contexts that limit ambiguity reduce the extent to which 
individual stereotypes and biases influence outcomes. Specific forms of ambiguity in the 
employment context include “an absence of relevant, specific information; poorly defined 
evaluative criteria; lack of clarity about what performance actually is; and confusion 
about the source of performance outcomes.”62 This basic research finding has received 
scientific support for decades.63  
There are several psychological mechanisms by which subjectivity in the 
workplace leads to discriminatory decision-making. First, subjectivity allows individuals 
to selectively attend to information that is consistent with their gender stereotypes.64 For 
example, one study found that when it was easier to identify the social category that a 
subordinate belonged to, participants spent less time actually observing the performance 
of the subordinate; participants’ ratings of these subordinates were less accurate than the 
ratings of subordinates who were less easily stereotyped.65 Other studies found that 
because women are expected to perform less competently in certain employment 
                                                 
62 Id. at 135. See also id. at 135–40. 
63 Id. at 135. See also Veronica Nieva & Barbara Gutek, Sex Effects on Evaluation, 5 
ACAD. MANAGEMENT REV. 267, 270–71 (1980). 
64 Heilman & Haynes, supra note 57, at 129–30. 
65 Janet L. Favero & Daniel R. Ilgen, The Effects of Ratee Prototypicality on Rater 
Observation and Accuracy, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 932 (1989). 
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domains, women must perform better than men in order to be perceived as equally 
competent.66  
Second, subjectivity allows individuals to encode and interpret information in 
stereotype-consistent ways.67 For example, several studies have demonstrated that 
whereas men are rated as strong and assertive in performance evaluations, equally 
competent women are rated as abrasive, pushy, and unlikeable.68  
Third, subjectivity allows individuals to recall information in stereotype-
consistent ways.69 For example, one study found that without clear information about 
individuals’ contributions to a group task, women in the group were rated as less 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-based Standards 
of Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for Devalued 
Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 544, 554 (1997); Martha Foschi, Double 
Standards in the Evaluation of Men and Women, 59 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 237, 251 (1996); 
see also generally Martha Foschi, Double Standards for Competence: Theory and 
Research, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 21 (2000) (examining double standards for competence 
evaluations in the workplace). 
67 Heilman & Haynes, supra note 57, at 130–31. 
68 See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Why Are Women Penalized for 
Success at Male Tasks?: The Implied Communality Deficit, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 81, 
85–86 (2007); Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women 
Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416, 426 (2004). 
69 Heilman & Haynes, supra note 57, at 131. 
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competent, less influential in the group, and less likely to have played a leadership role in 
the task.70 Taken together, this research indicates that subjectivity and ambiguity in 
workplace decision-making open the door for cognitive biases and gender stereotypes to 
influence outcomes. 
2. Supervisor Discretion in the Employment Context 
The form of workplace ambiguity most relevant for this discussion is the 
decision-making discretion that employers give to individual supervisors. Research in 
social psychology suggests that supervisor discretion creates contextual conditions that 
allow discriminatory decision-making to occur.71 For example, one study showed that 
                                                 
70 Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle C. Haynes, No Credit Where Credit Is Due: 
Attributional Rationalization of Women's Success in Male-Female Teams, 90 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 905, 914 (2005). 
71 See, e.g., Monica Biernat & Kathleen Fuegen, Shifting Standards and the Evaluation of 
Competence: Complexity in Gender-based Judgment and Decision Making, 57 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 707, 721 (2001); Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-based 
Standards of Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for 
Devalued Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 544, 554 (1997); Monica Biernat 
et al., Shifting Standards and the Inference of Incompetence: Effects of Formal and 
Informal Evaluation Tools, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 855, 858, 862 
(2010); Donna Bobbitt-Zeher, Gender Discrimination at Work: Connecting Gender 
Stereotypes, Institutional Policies, and Gender Composition of Workplace, 25 GENDER & 
SOC’Y 764, 778–81 (2011); Martha Foschi et al., Gender and Double Standards in the 
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supervisors with discretion applied available disciplinary actions differently to men and 
women.72  
Research indicates that supervisors with high discretion may also allow men to 
make more mistakes than women before the mistakes begin to have consequences.73 For 
example, one study found that it took men engaging in more acts of incompetence on the 
job before supervisors begin to perceive them as less competent.74 Another study found 
that supervisors selectively investigated allegations of wrongdoing against female 
employees more than against male employees.75 Supervisors may also be more likely to 
record men’s acts of incompetence in informal logs and women’s acts of incompetence in 
formal personnel files.76  
Research in social psychology also suggests that supervisors with high levels of 
discretion are more likely to change their decision-making standards as they go, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Assessment of Job Applicants, 57 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 326, 334–35 (1994); Madeline E. 
Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who Succeed at Male Gender-
Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416, 426 (2004); Julie E. Phelan et al., Competent 
Yet Out in the Cold: Shifting Criteria for Hiring Reflect Backlash Toward Agentic 
Women, 32 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 406, 410 (2008). 
72 Bobbitt-Zeher, supra note 71, at 778. 
73 Biernat et al., supra note 71, at 858, 862; Bobbitt-Zeher, supra note 71, at 778. 
74 Biernat et al., supra note 71, at 858. 
75 Bobbitt-Zeher, supra note 71, at 778. 
76 Biernat et al., supra note 71, at 862. 
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emphasizing whichever evaluation criteria will favor male employees over female 
employees at the time.77 For example, managers may change their evaluation criteria to 
emphasize social and personality factors for women whom they have already deemed 
unlikeable.78 One study also found that participants were more likely to hire a man than a 
woman when the man had better educational credentials, but were not more likely to hire 
the woman when she had better educational credentials.79 
These research studies suggest that when employers enact policies that fail to 
limit supervisors’ decision-making discretion, supervisors are free to apply existing 
policies differently to men and women, hold men and women to different standards, and 
evaluate men and women on different criteria. However, only three of the studies 
described in this section tested the effects of supervisor discretion directly.80 
Furthermore, although all of the results described in this section are consistent with the 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., Biernat & Fuegen, supra note 71, at 721. 
78 Heilman et al., supra note 71, at 426; Phelan et al., supra note 71, at 410. 
79 Foschi et al., supra note 71, at 334–35. 
80 See supra note 71. One study experimentally manipulated the extent to which 
participants were held accountable for their decisions. See Biernat & Fuegen, supra note 
71, at 716. Another study experimentally manipulated whether the rating scale used 
objective or subjective criteria. See Biernat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 71, at 549, 553. 
One study experimentally manipulated whether participants’ perceptions were recorded 
in personal notes or a formal performance log. See Biernat et al., supra note 71, at 859–
60. 
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notion that supervisor discretion opens the door for individuals’ personal stereotypes and 
biases to influence decisions, none of these studies directly examined the moderating role 
of supervisor discretion on individuals’ personal endorsement of gendered ideologies or 
stereotypes.81 This dissertation reports the findings of a set of studies directly examining 
the role of ideology and discretion in employment discrimination.  
C. SUPERVISOR DISCRETION AND THE SEPARATE SPHERES IDEOLOGY 
The research studies presented in this dissertation represent the first direct 
examination of the extent to which supervisor discretion increases FRD in the workplace 
by allowing supervisors to express their personal endorsement of the separate spheres 
ideology. The separate spheres ideology (SSI) is a belief system that claims that: 1) 
gender differences in society are innate, 2) men and women freely choose to participate 
in different spheres of society, and 3) separate gendered spheres are normatively 
desirable.82 
                                                 
81 See supra note 71. 
82 Andrea L. Miller & Eugene Borgida, The Separate Spheres Ideology and Gendered 
Inequality in Society 5 (Feb. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
There is an extensive literature on the separate spheres as a nineteenth-century construct. 
See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The 
Rhetoric of Women’s History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9 passim (1988). In my program of 
research on the separate spheres ideology, I use the term differently. The separate spheres 
ideology as it is referred to here is a measurable psychological construct—an ideological 
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Study 1 of this dissertation demonstrated that supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI 
predicted their own hostile attitudes regarding their employees who use flexibility 
accommodations in the workplace.83 Supervisors’ endorsement of the SSI also predicted 
the frequency with which they engaged in FRD against their own employees.84 
Supervisor discretion in the workplace increased the overall rate of FRD, and 
supervisors’ personal endorsement of the SSI played a bigger role in their discriminatory 
conduct under conditions of high supervisor discretion.85 In particular, the risk of family 
responsibilities discrimination became substantial where supervisors in the upper half of 
the distribution of SSI scores worked for employers in the upper half of the distribution 
of supervisor discretion.86 Study 2 showed that in a controlled setting, experimentally 
manipulated supervisor discretion moderated the role of supervisor SSI in discriminatory 
employment decisions regarding demotions, raises, and hourly wages.87 In other words, 
supervisors’ own endorsement of the SSI had more of an influence on these outcomes 
under conditions of high discretion.88 Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
belief system—that is characterized by individual differences and plays a role in 
individual cognition, attitudes, and behavior. 
83 See supra Chapter 2. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See supra Chapter 3. 
88 Id. 
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institutional factor of supervisor discretion plays an important role in workplace 
discriminatory conduct. These studies examined forms of supervisor discretion that are 
under the control of employers,89 suggesting that employers can enact supervisor 
discretion policies that either increase or decrease rates of FRD. Furthermore, previous 
research has demonstrated that the SSI is approximately normally distributed in the U.S. 
population.90 It can therefore be expected that most workplaces will contain a number of 
decision-makers who personally endorse the SSI. 
One potential alternative explanation for the discriminatory outcomes revealed in 
Study 1 is that supervisors may have merely reported reasonable actions that they took 
against employees who caused real difficulties in the workplace with their family 
conflicts. It is intuitively appealing, after all, to believe that employees with family 
responsibilities may be late to work more often, experience more distractions at work, or 
face other performance issues. If these alternative explanations were true, however, 
supervisors’ SSI scores would not correspond to their self-reported discriminatory 
conduct, as their actions would be based on rational responses to poor employee 
performance, rather than the supervisors’ own gendered ideology. Additionally, 
supervisors engaged in more discriminatory decision-making under conditions of greater 
discretion in Study 2, in which the performance and credentials of the hypothetical 
                                                 
89 Study 1 measured the extent to which supervisors had discretion in their employee 
evaluation procedures (see supra Chapter 2). Study 2 manipulated the extent to which 
supervisors anticipated employer oversight over their evaluations (see supra Chapter 3). 
90 See Miller & Borgida, supra note 82, at Table 2. 
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employee were experimentally controlled across conditions. Finally, if supervisors were 
responding rationally to the poor performance of employees with family conflicts, they 
would likely not reduce their levels of discrimination under conditions of low supervisor 
discretion, when they were told that their evaluations would be monitored for bias.  
One final note about these findings deserves attention. There has been increasing 
attention in both psychology and law to the prevalence of implicit bias in employment 
contexts and the significant role that implicit bias likely plays in employment 
discrimination.91 Many scholars have pointed out that as expressions of prejudice become 
more subtle and implicit over time, it becomes increasingly difficult for employees to 
successfully bring discrimination claims against employers.92 Scholars who are skeptical 
                                                 
91 See generally, e.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and 
Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39 (2009); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral 
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1039–41 (2006); Brian A. Nosek & Rachel G. Riskind, Policy 
Implications of Implicit Social Cognition, 6 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 113 (2012). 
92 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 
56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 743, n.15 (2005) (reviewing scholarly articles that “argue that Title 
VII falls short of its goals and should be revised so that it will explicitly cover instances 
of unconscious discrimination”); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit 
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of the existence and consequences of implicit bias in society93 sometimes argue that 
employers should not be held liable for implicit bias because discrimination that stems 
from implicit bias doesn’t conform to narrow, conventional understandings of legal intent 
and causation.94 One valuable aspect of the findings presented in this dissertation is that 
they avoid this potential counter-argument by those who are motivated to deny the 
existence of implicit bias. The results make clear that supervisors endorse the SSI and 
engage in FRD at conscious, explicit levels of processing (these processes may also occur 
implicitly, but this possibility has not yet been tested). Supervisors in this set of studies 
were consciously aware of—and willing to report—both their endorsement of sexist 
ideological beliefs and concrete acts of sex discrimination. At least in the sub-category of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 978, n.45 (2006) (reviewing scholarly articles that critique 
antidiscrimination law for failing to address implicit bias).  
93 See generally, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and 
the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006); Philip E. Tetlock et al., 
Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias, 42 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (2013) (repeatedly 
referring to implicit bias measurement tools as “mindreading”). 
94 See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1132 (1999). 
For refutations of this flawed logic, see generally Michael Selmi, Response to Professor 
Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 75 IND. L. J. 1233 (1999); 
Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science To 
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401 (2003). 
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discrimination that is based on sex and family responsibilities, therefore, plaintiffs may 
be able to side-step the concerns of scholars and judges who are skeptical of implicit bias 
claims and may have an easier time producing concrete evidence of discrimination. This 
finding also serves as a reminder to psychological and legal scholars that although subtle 
and implicit forms of bias are prevalent and harmful, explicit forms of sex discrimination 
are still relatively common and highly problematic. 
In sum, both the correlational evidence from Study 1 and the experimental 
evidence from Study 2 suggest strongly that hostile attitudes and behaviors directed at 
employees with family responsibilities constitute FRD and do not represent proportional 
responses to poor employee performance. This discrimination is rooted in supervisors’ 
own endorsement of traditional gendered norms that aim to restrict women from fully 
participating in the workplace and restrict men from fully participating in the domestic 
sphere. Providing supervisors with high discretion is a deliberate policy choice that 
employers make, and these findings suggest that this policy choice increases the risk of 
family responsibilities discrimination based on gender. 
II. SUPERVISOR DISCRETION IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Much of what judges (and fact-finders) do in court involves making assertions 
and assumptions about human psychology and behavior.95 When judges’ lay theories 
about human behavior are consistent with empirical reality, judges are in a position to 
make decisions that advance the goals of public policy. When judges’ lay theories about 
                                                 
95 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 55, at 997–98. 
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human behavior are inaccurate, however, they can cause significant harm.96 Because 
human psychology and behavior are so closely intertwined with the law, some scholars 
argue for a “psychological jurisprudence”; psychological jurisprudence seeks to “make 
legal assumptions about human nature as consistent with contemporary psychological 
knowledge as possible, that is, to close the gap between folk and scientific theories of the 
person.”97 It is thus important that judges and fact-finders deciding FRD cases clearly 
understand how gender stereotyping and discrimination really operate.98 
There is currently no federal statute that defines caregivers as a protected class for 
the purposes of discrimination law.99 In other words, there is no FRD cause of action per 
                                                 
96 Krieger, supra note 16, at 835–36 (arguing that “[f]lawed intuitive psychological 
models presently limit the law’s effectiveness in dismantling the maternal wall”); Krieger 
& Fiske, supra note 55, at 998–99. See generally BEYOND COMMON SENSE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 
2008). 
97 Tom R. Tyler & John T. Jost, Psychology and the Law: Reconciling Normative and 
Descriptive Accounts of Social Justice and System Legitimacy, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 807, 808 (A.W. Kruglanski & E.T. Higgins eds., 2d ed. 
2007). 
98 Krieger & Fiske, supra note 55, at 1000. 
99 Steven I. Locke, Family Responsibilities Discrimination and the New York City Model: 
A Map for Future Legislation, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 19, 29 (2009). A few states and several 
dozen local governments recognize parental or caregiver status as a protected class for 
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se. In order to bring a claim under federal law or most states’ laws, a plaintiff must fit an 
FRD claim under another cause of action. At the federal level, successful FRD cases have 
arisen under various statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), the Employment Pay Act (EPA), and the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA).100 Title VII provides plaintiffs the most flexibility in the types of legal 
theories that are available to them.101 Title VII also covers more employers than the 
FMLA and other statutes.102 Therefore, plaintiffs are in the most advantageous position if 
they can make the case that the FRD they experienced was based on sex for the purposes 
                                                                                                                                                 
discrimination purposes. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of 
“FRED”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of 
Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1346 (2008). 
100 Williams & Bornstein, supra note 13, at 181–82. 
101 Id. at 182–85 (stating that cases have been brought under “disparate treatment or 
gender discrimination . . . hostile work environment, harassment, constructive discharge, 
and retaliation”).  
102 The FMLA covers employers with fifty or more employees within seventy-five miles 
of the worksite; furthermore, employees must be employed for at least twelve months by 
the employer and work at least 1250 hours to be covered by the FMLA. Family Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012). In contrast, Title VII covers all 
employers with fifteen or more employees. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
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of Title VII. 
As discussed above in Part I, FRD is rooted in traditional descriptive and 
prescriptive stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women in society.103 As such, 
FRD is sex discrimination for the purposes of Title VII,104 as well as other employment 
discrimination statutes under which sex and gender are protected classes.105 The United 
                                                 
103 See supra Part I. 
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it an unlawful employment practice to “fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex”); id. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (making it an 
unlawful employment practice “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex”).  
105 See, e.g., Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subdiv. 2 (2012) 
(making it an unfair employment practice “for an employer, because of . . . sex . . . to: (1) 
refuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment which unreasonably excludes a 
person seeking employment; or (2) discharge an employee; or (3) discriminate against a 
person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, 
facilities, or privileges of employment”). Sex discrimination claims under the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act utilize the same legal principles as those under Title VII. Saulsberry v. 
St. Mary’s Univ. of Minn., 318 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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States Supreme Court has made clear that employment decisions made on the basis of 
descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about gender constitute violations of Title VII.106 
Because caregiving and career roles are integral parts of descriptive and prescriptive 
stereotypes about men and women,107 individual acts of FRD fall squarely in the category 
of sex discrimination covered by Title VII. Unfortunately, the courts have been less clear 
regarding the role of supervisor discretion in FRD claims under Title VII.108 This section 
outlines the development of supervisor discretion claims under Title VII and examines 
the treatment that this type of claim has received in various federal courts.  
A. WATSON V. FORT WORTH BANK & TRUST 
A prototypical discrimination claim under Title VII is one in which the employer 
has taken a specific, discrete adverse action against the employee. For example, the 
employer may have rejected an employee for a promotion on the assumption that because 
                                                 
106 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (“In the specific context 
of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be 
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender. . . . [W]e are beyond 
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group . . . .”); see also Stephanie Bornstein, 
The Legal and Policy Implications of the “Flexibility Stigma,” 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 389, 
389–91 (2013). 
107 See supra Part I. 
108 See infra Part 2. 
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she had children, she would not want to travel for the job.109 Or the employer may have 
fired an employee after he requested time off to take care of his family member.110 In 
these bread-and-butter FRD claims, in which there is a discrete adverse employment 
action, the employee must prove that the action was taken because of his or her sex.111 
FRD claims like this are not always easy for plaintiffs to prove, particularly when courts 
rely on faulty heuristics and fail to recognize that FRD is discrimination based on sex.112 
And, generally speaking, the federal courts have become increasingly hostile to all types 
of employment discrimination claims.113 However, plaintiffs who bring these more 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004). 
110 See, e.g., See Marchioli v. Garland Co., No. 5:11-CV-124 (MAD/ATB), 2011 WL 
1983350, at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011); Hayden v. Garden Ridge Mgmt., LLC, No. 
CIV.A 4:08CV172, 2009 WL 5196718, at *1–5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009). 
111 See supra note 104. 
112 See generally Andrea L. Miller, The Use (and Misuse) of the Same Actor Inference in 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination Litigation: Lessons from Social Psychology on 
Flexibility Stigma, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1032 (2015); Andrea L. Miller, Note, The 
Separate Spheres Ideology: An Improved Empirical and Litigation Approach to Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination, 99 MINN. L. REV. 343 (2014). 
113 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 103–05 (2009) 
(“Five years ago we surveyed how employment discrimination plaintiffs fared in federal 
court. . . . Compared to other plaintiffs, they manage fewer resolutions early in litigation, 
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traditional forms of FRD claims at least have the benefit of being able to point to the 
particular act, moment, or policy that adversely affected them.  
In contrast, many employers operate under a policy that provides individual 
supervisors with a high level of decision-making discretion and limited oversight. In 
these situations, the employee may not be able to point to a policy in the employee 
                                                                                                                                                 
and so they have to proceed to trial more often. They win a lower proportion of cases 
during pretrial and at trial. Then, more of their successful cases undergo appeal. On 
appeal, they have a harder time both in preserving their successes and in reversing 
adverse outcomes. . . . [T]he federal courts disfavor employment discrimination plaintiffs, 
who are now forswearing use of those courts. Our study of the federal district courts 
shows employment discrimination plaintiffs bring many fewer cases now. Jobs cases 
proceed and terminate less favorably for plaintiffs than other kinds of cases. Plaintiffs 
who appeal their losses or face appeal of their victories again fare remarkably poorly in 
the circuit courts. The fear of judicial bias at both the lower and the appellate court levels 
may be discouraging potential employment discrimination plaintiffs from seeking relief 
in the federal courts.”); Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable 
Inferences: A Short, Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection 
of Employment Discrimination and Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 750 
(2012) (“[F]ederal courts are perceived as having become hostile venues for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs. They tend to chew plaintiffs up and spit them out with rapidity, 
most often before trial. And federal courts have embraced a well-developed gauntlet of 
obstacles to knock employment discrimination plaintiffs off their paths.”). 
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handbook that discriminates on the basis of sex, and there may not be one discrete 
moment of overt discriminatory conduct. In these workplaces, discrimination might 
consist of multiple supervisors implementing dozens of decisions that, over time, amount 
to significant discriminatory outcomes. Because discrimination caused by excessive 
supervisor discretion tends not to produce the same types of evidence as more 
prototypical discrimination claims, supervisor discretion cases are less successful.114 
Consider, for example, a workplace that implements a policy under which 
employees do not apply for promotions, but instead must be “tapped on the shoulder” by 
a supervisor who has noticed their good work. Under this type of policy, supervisors 
might, for example, promote disproportional numbers of men who don’t have children 
and fail to promote women who have children, because a variety of psychological biases 
are at play. As psychology research demonstrates, supervisors operating under these 
conditions might selectively notice the good work of male employees and selectively 
notice the mistakes of employees who are mothers.115 They may also interpret their 
employees’ behavior in stereotype-consistent ways, assuming that a man is late to work 
                                                 
114 Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Walmart for 
Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 
457–58 (2012) (“The success rate [for claims challenging subjective employment 
practices] was between 13% and 25%, which is lower than the average success rate for 
federal employment discrimination cases of 35%.”). 
115 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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because of a traffic jam and a woman is late because of her children.116 When asked who 
might be a good candidate for an open position, the supervisors may selectively recall the 
contributions of male employees and fail to recall the contributions of women with 
caregiving responsibilities.117 In this hypothetical workplace, a woman who has children 
would likely not be able to identify a particular moment when she was considered for a 
promotion and then passed over. Even if she suspected that her status as a mother was a 
factor in her inability to be promoted, it would be difficult to prove this in court, because 
there would be no specific record of her rejection. Yet, over the course of several years 
and across multiple supervisors, there could be staggering aggregate disparities across the 
workforce in income and job status on the basis of gender and family responsibilities.  
The traditional model of employment discrimination, in which an employee must 
prove one person’s discriminatory motive underlying one particular adverse act, does not 
adequately address forms of discrimination that are more systematic and structural.118 
Accordingly, some scholars argue that the courts should 
                                                 
116 Id.  
117 Id. 
118 Tristan K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating 
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 92 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475, 478 (2001). 
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conceptualize discrimination in terms of workplace dynamics rather than 
solely in existing terms of an identifiable actor’s isolated state of mind . . . 
or the jobrelatedness of a neutral employment practice with adverse 
consequences. Conceptualizing a form of discrimination in terms of 
discriminatory bias in workplace dynamics places much-needed emphasis 
on structural factors while making clear that both conscious and 
unconscious bias operate at multiple levels of social interaction, often 
resulting in decreased opportunity for disfavored groups without 
producing a single, identifiable discriminatory decision or a perceptibly 
hostile work environment.119 
The Supreme Court first recognized the need for a more structural approach to 
Title VII adjudication in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.120 Watson was an African-
                                                 
119 Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 118, at 92; see also Green, 
A Structural Approach, supra note 118, at 850; Sturm, Sturm, supra note 118, at, 475, 
478. Some scholars base this conclusion on the fact that subtle, implicit, and unconscious 
forms of prejudice play increasingly important roles in employment discrimination. See, 
e.g., Green, A Structural Approach, supra note 118, at 850; Tippett, supra note 114, at 
438. However, I argue that even relatively overt forms of prejudice and discrimination, 
like those examined in this dissertation, are created by high levels of supervisor discretion 
and require structural solutions. 
120 487 U.S. 977 (1988). See Sturm, supra note 118, at 484–86. Prior to Watson, Circuit 
courts had begun to recognize the important role of supervisor discretion in employment 
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American woman who worked as a bank teller.121 The bank had no formal criteria for 
selecting employees for promotions; the bank “relied instead on the subjective judgment 
of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and with the nature of the jobs to 
be filled.”122 Over the course of about two years working at the bank, Watson was denied 
promotions four times; in each case, a white supervisor selected a white employee for the 
promotion.123  
At the time of the Watson case, a Title VII plaintiff could bring a claim under a 
disparate treatment theory (which required the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent on 
the part of the actor)124 or disparate impact theory (which required the plaintiff to prove 
that a facially neutral employment practice had a discriminatory impact on the protected 
class, without needing to show that employer intended this discriminatory impact).125 
Employment policies typically challenged under disparate impact theory involved 
requirements like aptitude tests or educational criteria that bore little relationship to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
discrimination. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 
1986); Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1976); Muller v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 
F.2d 211, 231 (5th Cir. 1974). 
121 Watson, 487 U.S. at 982. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 986. 
125 Id. at 986–987. 
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job and disproportionately excluded certain protected classes from employment 
opportunities.126 Fort Worth Bank and Trust argued that an employment policy of 
providing high decision-making discretion to supervisors was not like these types of 
policies and must be proved under a disparate treatment theory.127 The Court, however, 
recognized the need for a more structural understanding of how supervisor discretion can 
be discriminatory: 
We are also persuaded that disparate impact analysis is in principle no less 
applicable to subjective employment criteria than to objective or 
standardized tests. In either case, a facially neutral practice, adopted 
without discriminatory intent, may have effects that are indistinguishable 
from intentionally discriminatory practices. It is true, to be sure, that an 
employer’s policy of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked 
discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no inference of 
discriminatory conduct. Especially in relatively small businesses like 
respondent’s, it may be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate 
employment decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the 
jobs to be filled and with the candidates for those jobs. It does not follow, 
however, that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is 
delegated always act without discriminatory intent. . . . If an employer’s 
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
127 Watson, 487 U.S. at 989. 
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effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, 
it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory 
actions should not apply.128 
The Court thus ruled that supervisor discretion could form the basis of a disparate impact 
claim under Title VII.129  
Watson revealed a relatively modern, structural understanding of employment 
discrimination on the part of the Court and opened the door for more plaintiffs to bring 
cases based on excessive supervisor discretion without having to prove an employer’s 
discriminatory intent.130 However, the opinion did not represent unqualified progress in 
this regard. First, the Court emphasized that “an employer’s policy of leaving promotion 
decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no 
inference of discriminatory conduct.”131 Second, the Court elaborated that under a 
disparate impact theory, plaintiffs still must identify “the specific employment practice 
that is challenged. Although this has been relatively easy to do in challenges to 
standardized tests, it may sometimes be more difficult when subjective selection criteria 
are at issue.”132 Third, fearing that it would be so difficult to defend subjective 
employment practices that employers would simply revert to quotas, a plurality of the 
                                                 
128 Id. at 990–91. 
129 Id. at 991. 
130 Sturm, supra note 118, at 484–86. 
131 Watson, 487 U.S. at 990. 
132 Id. at 994. 
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Court shifted the burden of proof regarding the business necessity of the employment 
policy to the plaintiff in disparate impact cases.133 In spite of these qualifications, 
however, Watson represented a step toward a more structural approach to litigating 
discrimination resulting from supervisor discretion.134 
B. SUPERVISOR DISCRETION CASES AFTER WATSON 
Supervisor discretion cases in the years after Watson revealed that the Court was 
incorrect in its fear that employers would be overwhelmed with supervisor discretion 
disparate impact claims. Relatively few plaintiffs have brought supervisor discretion 
cases under a disparate impact theory alone.135 However, although federal courts’ 
deference to the Watson holding has been inconsistent,136 some courts were fairly 
                                                 
133 Id. at 997–99; Sturm, supra note 118, at 486. Congress subsequently shifted the 
burden of proof for business necessity back to the employer. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A) (1994)). 
134 Sturm, supra note 118, at 484–86. 
135 Hart, supra note 92, at 783; Tippett, supra note 114, at 455. 
136 Hart, supra note 92, at 783 (“Another possible explanation for the near absence of 
suits alleging exclusively disparate impact may be that despite Watson’s very explicit 
holding, lower courts have resisted applying impact analysis to claims of excessive 
subjectivity. A number of courts, appearing to disregard Watson, have concluded that 
‘[p]laintiffs do not and cannot allege that subjective decision making itself is a practice 
that discriminates. Rather, they can only allege that it allows a situation to exist in which 
   149 
 
amenable to supervisor discretion claims under Title VII in the decade or so following the 
decision. These courts demonstrated that employment discrimination law under Title VII 
is equipped to handle supervisor discretion as an employment policy. 
One such Title VII claim was Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc.137 Lucky Stores gave 
individual store managers nearly absolute discretion in employment decisions regarding 
hiring,138 job placement,139 promotions,140 training opportunities,141 and the allocation of 
hours.142 Most of Lucky’s promotions were in-house promotions, but the company did 
not post information about new openings, because it believed that individual store 
managers could identify which employees would be interested in promotions.143 Store 
managers received virtually no information or guidance regarding how to evaluate 
employees,144 and family responsibilities were sometimes utilized as a factor on which to 
                                                                                                                                                 
several different managers are able to discriminate intentionally.’ Employing this 
reasoning, courts have berated plaintiffs for bringing ‘disparate treatment claims parading 
under the guise of a disparate impact label.’”). 
137 803 F.Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
138 Id. at 272. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 275. 
141 Id. at 280–81.  
142 Id. at 285. 
143 Id. at 274. 
144 Id. at 272, 275, 280–81, 285. 
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evaluate employees.145 Evidence indicated that Lucky’s management positions were 
disproportionately held by men, and women were disproportionately placed in 
departments that were unlikely to lead to promotions to management.146 At one point 
after litigation commenced, Lucky held a meeting of store managers in order to discuss 
the problem, and the managers were asked to share stereotypes of women that they had 
heard in their stores.147 The list of stereotypes was long, and it included statements 
relating to women’s perceived family responsibilities, such as: “women do not want to 
work late shifts;” “women’s income is the second income in a household;” and “women 
are not the bread winners.”148  
Relying on this evidence of supervisor discretion and gender stereotyping, Nancy 
Stender brought a discrimination claim under Title VII on behalf of a plaintiff class.149 
Two expert witnesses independently concluded that there were significant gender 
                                                 
145 Id. at 272 (“Lucky’s standard procedure manual says that ‘married women who desire 
to work only a few hours a day often make valuable part-time cashiers.’”); id. at 280–81 
(“Store Managers rely on their personal experience to decide who should get training 
. . . . In making these decisions, they might consider appearance, attitude, dress, 
aggressiveness, and the employee’s family responsibility.”) (citations omitted). 
146 Id. at 292. 
147 Id. at 293. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 259, 318. 
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disparities in employment outcomes at Lucky Stores,150 and a third expert concluded that 
these disparities likely came about because the high level of supervisor discretion allowed 
gender stereotypes to influence decision-making and create dramatic job segregation on 
the basis of gender.151 Citing Watson,152 the court found that the extent of supervisor 
discretion at Lucky Stores was high enough to infer discriminatory intent under a theory 
of disparate treatment,153 and that supervisor discretion had a disparate impact on female 
employees.154 Although there was evidence on the record that individual managers and 
employees endorsed stereotypes about women and their family responsibilities,155 the 
court stated that the evidence of subjective decision-making practices combined with 
statistical evidence of gender disparities was sufficient to prove discriminatory intent,156 
and that the level of supervisor discretion meant that “sex discrimination was the standard 
operating procedure at Lucky.”157 In other words, the Stender court understood the 
importance of a structural understanding of FRD in the workplace, and, citing Watson, 
                                                 
150 Id. at 298, 301. 
151 Id. at 301–03. 
152 See, e.g., id at 321. 
153 Id. at 331–32. 
154 Id. at 335. 
155 Id. at 293. 
156 Id. at 332. 
157 Id. at 336. 
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made clear that a policy of supervisor discretion, along with statistical evidence of gender 
disparities, could support a finding of discrimination under Title VII.  
In Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., a plaintiff class sued Home Depot for gender 
discrimination under Title VII.158 Like in Stender, the Butler plaintiffs presented evidence 
that supervisors had broad discretion and minimal guidance in hiring, job placement, 
promotion, and compensation, as well as statistical evidence of gender disparities in 
employment outcomes.159 Citing Watson,160 the court ruled that this evidence of 
discrimination was sufficient to survive summary judgment under both a theory of 
disparate treatment161 and a theory of disparate impact.162  
Taken together, Stender, Butler, and similar cases reflect an era in which some 
federal courts were willing to take a structural view of employment discrimination and 
generally understood the damaging role of supervisor discretion.163 Although class 
                                                 
158 No. C-94-4335 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997). 
159 Id. at *5–7, 8–11, 13. 
160 Id. at *4, 14. 
161 Id. at *7. 
162 Id. at *14. 
163 See also, e.g., EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 727, 738 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 
(“The management of Joe’s—without the benefit of policies or guidelines—delegates 
total and complete discretion to subordinates in hiring food servers. . . . Not only is the 
hiring staff's discretion unguided from above, it also lacks the internal discipline 
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actions have generally been more successful in supervisor discretion claims,164 individual 
plaintiffs also prevailed at times during this period.165 Although these courts often 
mentioned the Watson caveat that supervisor discretion alone would not itself raise an 
inference of discrimination,166 they tended to view supervisor discretion as an affirmative 
policy choice on the part of employers that could lead directly to discrimination. For 
example, the Stender court equated a policy of supervisor discretion with a “standard 
                                                                                                                                                 
necessary to restrain the subjectivity of those charged with this task.”), vacated on the 
basis of insufficient statistical evidence, 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000). 
164 Tippett, supra note 114, at 456.  
165 See, e.g., Eldred v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 898 F. Supp. 928, 939 (D. 
Mass. 1995) (“In sum, the defendant's subjective hiring practices permitted a 
discriminatory animus against women in supervisory roles to fester. All promotion and 
lay-off decisions were made without formal procedures and were based entirely on the 
subjective assessment of male supervisors. As a direct outgrowth of bias in the decision-
making process, plaintiff suffered denial of promotion while less qualified males climbed 
the company ladder, found herself laid off while men with much poorer work histories 
were retained, and was ignored for rehiring while males who were in no respect her 
professional equals were brought back.”). 
166 See, e.g., Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 321 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992). 
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operating procedure” of “sex discrimination.”167 The court in EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab 
cited Watson and stated that supervisor discretion “can constitute an employment practice 
within the meaning of disparate impact theory.”168 In Ascolese v. SEPTA, the plaintiff 
sued her employer for sex discrimination under Title VII, because her supervisor had 
denied her light duty when she was pregnant but granted light duty to other employees 
for other reasons.169 Although the plaintiff did not prevail on that particular claim, the 
court stated, “if Ascolese shows that SEPTA delegated complete discretion to [her 
supervisor] to make light duty decisions, then his conduct would amount to SEPTA’s 
‘policy,’ and would be attributable to SEPTA.”170 
Thus, in the years after Watson, many of the federal courts viewed supervisor 
discretion as an employment policy that could cause discrimination.171 This view is 
consistent with years of psychological evidence documenting the role of supervisor 
                                                 
167 Stender, 803 F. Supp. at 336. 
168 E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 727, 738 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–92 (1988)). 
169 Ascolese v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 537–38 (E.D. Pa. 
1995). 
170 Id. at 548. 
171 I do not claim that this perspective was universal. Some courts were hostile to the 
notion of supervisor discretion as a discriminatory employment policy, seeming to 
disregard “Watson’s very explicit holding.” Hart, supra note 92, at 783. 
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discretion and subjectivity in employment discrimination,172 and particularly with the 
evidence presented in this dissertation of the direct role of supervisor discretion in 
FRD.173 Taken together, the case law in the post-Watson years and the psychological 
research make clear that there is a sufficiently direct link between supervisor discretion 
and employment discrimination for the purposes of legal causation. When courts take a 
structural view of employment discrimination that is grounded in empirical psychological 
knowledge, discrimination law under Title VII is equipped to deal with supervisor 
discretion as an employment policy and to provide plaintiffs with the relief that the 
statute was designed to provide. It was against this legal backdrop that the courts’ 
treatment of supervisor discretion as an employment policy changed drastically with the 
landmark case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 
C. WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES 
In the early 2000s, Betty Dukes and six other named plaintiffs sued Wal-Mart for 
sex discrimination under Title VII and sought to certify a class of similarly situated 
plaintiffs.174 The facts of the case looked remarkably similar to those of Stender, Butler, 
and similar cases of the post-Watson period. With regard to both compensation and 
promotion decisions, Wal-Mart gave significant discretion to individual managers.175 For 
hourly employees, Wal-Mart set minimum wages and allowed store managers to raise 
                                                 
172 See supra Part I.B. 
173 See supra Part I.C. 
174 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
175 Id. at 145. 
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wages for individual employees by up to two dollars per hour—a huge range for an 
employee making approximately $18,000 per year—with no objective criteria to guide 
their decisions and no oversight.176 For salaried employees, district and regional 
managers similarly had significant discretion to adjust pay with “little guidance and 
limited oversight.”177 Promotions were awarded using a “tap on the shoulder” process, in 
which most positions were not posted for employees to see, and individual managers had 
broad discretion to select candidates.178 Wal-Mart provided only minimal objective 
criteria for promotions, did not monitor the promotion decisions that managers made, and 
did not require managers to consider all interested and qualified candidates for 
promotions.179  
Unlike in some supervisor discretion cases, where the lack of objective guidelines 
for supervisors might be characterized as an omission on the part of the employer who 
did not make efforts to create guidelines, Wal-Mart’s grant of broad discretion to 
individual supervisors was highly deliberate.180 Wal-Mart’s headquarters office exercised 
significant control over the training of employees from day to day in its corporate culture, 
over the music and television feeds being played in each store, and even over the 
                                                 
176 Id. at 146–47. 
177 Id. at 147–48. 
178 Id. at 148–49. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 148. 
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temperature set in each store.181 Thus, Wal-Mart’s central office was capable of 
exercising control over the minutia of daily operations in each store throughout the 
country, but deliberately chose not to exercise control over pay and promotion decisions.  
Using statistical evidence, expert testimony at the class certification stage 
revealed that both pay and promotion decisions were characterized by significant gender 
disparities.182 There was also direct evidence of gender and family responsibilities 
discrimination against many members of the potential plaintiff class; for example, one 
store manager told a female employee, “Men are here to make a career and women 
aren’t. Retail is for housewives who just need to earn extra money.”183 Faced with this 
evidence, the District Court certified the class.184 With regard to the particular issue of 
commonality under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a),185 the court found that the 
plaintiffs had exceeded the burden of establishing commonality, and that the evidence 
raised an inference that Wal-Mart had “engage[d] in discriminatory practices in 
compensation and promotion that affect[ed] all plaintiffs in a common manner.”186 
Although Wal-Mart tried to argue that discretion in employment decisions created a level 
                                                 
181 Id. at 151–52. 
182 Id. at 154–56, 160–61. 
183 Id. at 166. 
184 Id. at 143 (certifying the plaintiff class with respect to equal pay, and certifying the 
class with respect to promotions only for liability and injunctive and declaratory relief). 
185 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
186 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166. 
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of variation that necessarily defeated a showing of common questions of law or fact 
among the plaintiffs, the court cited Watson and emphasized that the policy of providing 
excessive supervisor discretion to individual managers was itself an employment policy 
for the purposes of a discrimination claim and for the purposes of commonality under 
Rule 23(a).187  
Besides the fact that this class was much larger than any previous employment 
discrimination plaintiff class,188 the District Court decision was unremarkable given the 
legal landscape at the time.189 The fact pattern and the body of evidence presented at the 
class certification stage looked just like those of Stender, Butler, and similar supervisor 
discretion class actions. All of these cases cited Watson as a source of authority for their 
                                                 
187 Id. at 149–51. 
188 Id. at 142. 
189 Id. (“Defendant emphasizes that the proposed class covers at least 1.5 million women 
. . . . In its view, these numbers alone make this case impossible. . . . Title VII, however, 
contains no special exception for large employers. Enacted in 1964 during the height of 
the civil rights movement, this Act forbids gender and race-based discrimination in the 
American workplace. . . . Insulating our nation's largest employers from allegations that 
they have engaged in a pattern and practice of gender or racial discrimination—simply 
because they are large—would seriously undermine these imperatives.”). 
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findings.190 In each case, evidence of broad supervisor discretion, combined with 
statistical evidence of gender disparities, was enough to meet the standard for sex 
discrimination under Title VII.191 The Dukes parties even relied on many of the same 
expert witnesses as those used in Stender and Butler.192 All things considered, therefore, 
the Dukes decision was consistent with many other supervisor discrimination class 
actions in the post-Watson years. 
                                                 
190 See id. at 149–50; Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F.Supp. 259, 321 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992). 
191 See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (certifying the plaintiff class with regard to most of its 
discrimination claims under Title VII); Butler, 1997 WL 605754, at *7, 14 (finding that 
plaintiffs survived motion for summary judgment under both theories of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact); Stender, 803 F.Supp. at 331–32, 335 (finding sex 
discrimination under both theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact). 
192 Two experts testified for the plaintiffs in all three of these cases: Dr. Bielby (see 
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151–54; Butler, 1997 WL 605754, at *7, 9, 11; Stender, 803 
F.Supp. at 301–03) and Dr. Drogin (see Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154–56; Butler, 1997 WL 
605754, at *5, 7–9; Stender, 803 F.Supp. at 294–98). Dr. Bendick testified for the 
plaintiffs in two of these cases. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154, 164–65; Butler, 1997 WL 
605754, at *5, 9. Dr. Haworth testified for the defendants in two of these cases. See 
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 147, 154, 156–59, 161–62; Stender, 803 F.Supp. at 310–14. 
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When the U.S. Supreme Court heard Dukes on appeal a number of years later,193 
the legal status of supervisor discretion in employment discrimination took a drastic turn. 
Wal-Mart challenged the certification of the plaintiff class, primarily arguing that the 
class lacked commonality under Rule 23(a).194 As in Stender and Butler, the Court once 
again quoted Watson.195 This time, however, the Court martialed Watson to reach the 
exact opposite conclusion; it ruled that the Dukes plaintiff class lacked commonality 
under Rule 23(a) and overturned the class certification. It stated that the  
only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishes 
is Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing discretion by local supervisors over 
employment matters. On its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a 
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed 
for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment 
practices.196 
Although this statement represents a remarkable display of semantic acrobatics, 
this reasoning was problematic for at least three major reasons. First, it directly 
contradicted the lower courts’ interpretations of the evidence in this case without making 
                                                 
193 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
194 Id. at 2550–51. 
195 Id. at 2554 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)). 
196 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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a finding of abuse of discretion.197 Second, this reasoning was inconsistent with how 
federal courts have conceptualized supervisor discretion policies for decades; as 
discussed above, supervisor discretion has long been considered an employment policy 
for the purposes of Title VII.198 The Court attempted to ground its reasoning in precedent 
                                                 
197 Id. at 2562 (“The District Court, recognizing that ‘one significant issue common to the 
class may be sufficient to warrant certification,’ found that the plaintiffs easily met that 
test. Absent an error of law or an abuse of discretion, an appellate tribunal has no warrant 
to upset the District Court’s finding of commonality.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 
2564 (“The District Court’s identification of a common question, whether Wal-Mart’s 
pay and promotions policies gave rise to unlawful discrimination, was hardly infirm. The 
practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion to make personnel decisions, 
uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been known to have the potential to produce 
disparate effects.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166. 
198 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 727, 738 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 
(stating that supervisor discretion “can constitute an employment practice within the 
meaning of disparate impact theory”); Ascolese v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 902 F. 
Supp. 533, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“[I]f Ascolese shows that SEPTA delegated complete 
discretion to [her supervisor] to make light duty decisions, then his conduct would 
amount to SEPTA’s ‘policy,’ and would be attributable to SEPTA.”); Stender v. Lucky 
Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 336 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (equating a policy of supervisor 
discretion with a “standard operating procedure” of “sex discrimination”); Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (recognizing the use of “subjective 
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decision making” as an “employment practic[e]” under disparate impact theory); Watson, 
487 U.S. at 990–91 (“If an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective 
decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible 
intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription against 
discriminatory actions should not apply. In both circumstances, the employer’s practices 
may be said to ‘adversely affect [an individual’s] status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)); E.E.O.C. 
v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 1986) (“The undisputed evidence 
established that Rath’s subjective hiring practices had a disparate impact on women. . . . 
While some subjectivity is inevitable in the hiring process, the total lack of objective 
criteria at Rath ‘could only reinforce the prejudices, unconscious or not, which Congress 
in Title VII sought to eradicate as a basis for employment.’”); Stewart v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1976) (“The process described, while perhaps intended 
only to recognize merit, is highly susceptible to abuse. While some subjectivity is 
inevitable in filling jobs of an executive character, the total lack of objective standards at 
Broadview could only reinforce the prejudices, unconscious or not, which Congress in 
Title VII sought to eradicate as a basis for employment.”); Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
509 F.2d 923, 927–28 (10th Cir. 1975) (“At bar there is the added factor—the lack of 
meaningful standards to guide the promotion decision, whereby there is some assurance 
of objectivity. Such personal and subjective criteria encourage and foster discrimination. 
And where, as here, the results give a strong indication that discrimination is being 
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by citing Watson in its opinion,199 but it took the Watson quotation out of context and 
failed to recognize that Watson stands for the principle that supervisor discretion is an 
employment policy that can cause discrimination.200 Third, the Court re-conceptualized 
the commonality standard for supervisor discretion cases, making it a much more 
difficult standard for plaintiff classes to meet.201 Although a policy of broad supervisor 
discretion has long been sufficient to constitute the one common question required under 
                                                                                                                                                 
practiced, the cases condemn subjective standards which United States Steel had in this 
case.”); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 231 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(“[P]romotion/transfer procedures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective 
evaluation and favorable recommendation of the immediate foreman are a ready 
mechanism for discrimination . . . .”) (quoting Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 
348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
199 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
200 See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 508 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The 
[Dukes] Court reasoned that the exercise of discretion itself is not evidence of any 
discriminatory policy.”) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 
(2011)); see also supra note 198 and accompanying text; cf. Hart, supra note 92, at 783 
(arguing that courts disregard “Watson’s very explicit holding” when they reason that 
“[p]laintiffs do not and cannot allege that subjective decision making itself is a practice 
that discriminates”). 
201 Tippett, supra note 114, at 446–51. 
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Rule 23(a),202 the Dukes majority insisted that plaintiffs must show that that discretion 
was exercised in a uniform manner,203 thereby “lead[ing] the Court to train its attention 
on what distinguishe[d] individual class members, rather than on what unite[d] them.”204 
Although the Court cited Falcon as a source of authority for its reasoning regarding 
commonality,205 its reasoning actually amounted to a significant departure from Falcon: 
Falcon characterized an “entirely subjective decision-making process” as 
an example of a “general policy of discrimination.” Under Falcon, the 
term “policy” encompassed the employer’s actual practices—“it is 
noteworthy that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices, 
not an abstract policy of discrimination.” Not so under Wal-Mart, where 
the term “policy” would appear to refer to the employer’s formalized 
policy, whether implemented or not. The Court found that a general policy 
of discrimination was “entirely absent” since “Wal-Mart’s announced 
policy forbids sex discrimination.”206 
                                                 
202 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
203 Id. at 2554–55 (“Respondents have not identified a common mode of exercising 
discretion that pervades the entire company . . . .”). See also Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 
925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 463–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
204 Id. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
205 Id. at 2545. 
206 Tippett, supra note 114, at 449–51; see also Armin J. Jezari, In Lieu of Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes: A Need to Promulgate A More Reasonable "Significant Proof' Standard for Title 
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Thus, the Dukes majority went to great efforts to re-interpret long-standing precedent 
regarding the status of supervisor discretion as a discriminatory policy and a source of 
class commonality, and it did so without being candid about the vast changes it was 
enacting.  
Although the Dukes opinion purported to address a purely procedural matter, it 
revealed a deep skepticism on the part of the majority regarding the very existence of 
employment discrimination, let alone the possibility that discrimination occurred in the 
case at hand. The court stated that “left to their own devices most managers in any 
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex 
discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and 
promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”207 This statement reveals an 
attitude on the part of at least some of the justices that is shockingly out of step with 
empirical reality. As discussed above in Part I, decades of empirical psychological 
research demonstrate that employment discrimination is a significant problem in society, 
and researchers have identified robust psychological processes and institutional factors 
that lead to employment discrimination.208 This dissertation provides direct evidence that 
supervisor discretion causes FRD by creating conditions under which supervisors’ 
endorsement of the separate spheres ideology translates into discriminatory conduct and 
                                                                                                                                                 
VII Class Certification, 40 S.U. L. REV. 119 (2012) (stating that the Dukes majority 
misapplied the Falcon standard regarding discretionary employment policies). 
207 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
208 See supra Part I.A–B. 
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decision-making.209 Thus, not only did the Court misconstrue its own precedent in order 
to arrive at its holding in Dukes, it also relied on a set of empirical assumptions known by 
social scientists to be false. 
D. SUPERVISOR DISCRETION CLASS ACTIONS AFTER DUKES 
All things considered, Dukes appears to have altered the law in ways that make it 
more difficult for potential classes to bring Title VII sex discrimination claims stemming 
from supervisor discretion policies.210 It is not yet clear what the empirical impact of the 
decision will be in terms of the success rate of Title VII claims.211 However, the 
substantive impact of the case is becoming clear. Dukes represents an increase in federal 
court hostility toward discrimination plaintiffs, a reversal of important Title VII 
protections,212 and increased confusion among federal courts regarding how to treat 
                                                 
209 See supra Part C. 
210 See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (“After [Dukes], federal 
courts reviewing class certification questions have generally denied certification when 
allegedly discriminatory policies are highly discretionary and the plaintiffs do not point to 
‘a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.’). 
211 For an empirical analysis of claims in this area prior to Dukes, see generally Tippett, 
supra note 114.  
212 See Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 118, at 395 (stating 
that Dukes represents a trend in which “longstanding theories of systemic discrimination 
are under attack” and an “individualistic model of organizational wrongdoing . . . has led 
to under-theorizing, even mis-theorizing, of entity responsibility for systemic disparate 
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supervisor discretion under the law. On the surface, it seems that some of the Title VII 
class actions that have been working their way through the courts since Dukes provide 
reason to be optimistic. However, the cases that receive favorable outcomes seem to do 
so only when the courts find significantly less supervisor discretion than there was in 
Dukes. Indeed, it seems that these cases survive in spite of the discretionary aspects of the 
employers’ policies, rather than because of supervisor discretion. 
For example, in Calibuso v. Bank of America, a group of female employees sued 
Bank of America for sex discrimination stemming from subjective employment 
practices.213 Bank of America had a system that compensated financial advisors using a 
                                                                                                                                                 
treatment”); Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can't Get There from Here: 
Implications of the Walmart v. Dukes Decision for Addressing Second-Generation 
Discrimination, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 264 (2014) (“[The Dukes decision] does not 
reflect an awareness of the type of discrimination that is most prevalent today: second-
generation discrimination. It also runs counter to the recent calls for structural change. 
Effectively addressing second generation discrimination requires a change from rules that 
focus on discrete events and actions to an approach that focuses on restructuring the 
entire workplace environment. . . . Dukes continued a long tradition of courts failing to 
provide proper remedies for second generation discrimination.”); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, 
WAL-MART V. DUKES: TAKING THE PROTECTION OUT OF PROTECTED CLASSES 40 (2006) 
(arguing that Dukes represents a “foreshadowing of the undermining of the litigation 
structure of systemic discrimination law”). 
213 Calibuso v. Bank of America Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 374, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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grid, in which compensation was based on the value of their accounts and their “length of 
service” (LOS) in the industry.214 The longer a financial advisor had worked in the 
industry, the more productive he or she needed to be to maintain his or her income.215 
Bank of America allowed individual managers discretion in both the distribution of new 
client accounts (which varied in value and growth potential) and in the calculation of 
LOS, which meant that the variables that went into the calculation of compensation in the 
grid were tainted with subjectivity.216 Thus, although the plaintiffs pointed to 
employment policies that provided a substantial level of discretion to individual 
managers, these policies contained elements of objective calculations as well. The 
plaintiffs provided evidence that managers exercised their discretion on these matters in 
favor of men.217 In a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),218 Bank of America tried to 
argue that these allegations could not support a finding of commonality under Rule 
23(a)(2)219 after Dukes. However, the court distinguished the facts from those of Dukes 
primarily based on the fact that Bank of America’s compensation procedures were 
somewhat less subjective than those of Dukes, which allowed the plaintiffs to identify 
                                                 
214 Id. at 380. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id at 380–81. 
218 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
219 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
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common modes of managers’ exercising their discretion.220 The court declined to dismiss 
the case,221 and it has since settled.222 
Another class action based on supervisor discretion has survived class 
certification post-Dukes. In Ellis v. Costco, a group of female employees sued Costco for 
sex and family responsibilities discrimination in promotion decisions regarding 
management positions.223 Costco employed a promotion system in which only Assistant 
General Managers could be promoted to General Manager, and only Senior Staff 
Managers could be promoted to Assistant General Manager. In contrast to Wal-Mart,224 
Costco’s upper management kept lists of promotable employees for each of these 
positions.225 However, Costco did not use any written selection criteria for promotion to 
                                                 
220 Calibuso, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 389–90 (“Here, plaintiffs do not argue that the discretion 
afforded to individual lower level supervisors, by itself, results in a disparate impact on 
female [financial advisors]. Instead, plaintiffs argue that, because the common 
compensation and account distribution systems rely on criteria that systematically favors 
male FAs, there is a discriminatory impact on women. . . . Thus, although there may be 
some level of discretion afforded to the defendants’ managers and supervisors, such 
discretion does not necessarily preclude plaintiffs’ class claims under Dukes.”). 
221 See id. at 391. 
222 See Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp., 299 F.R.D. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
223 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 492–93 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
224 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 137, 148–49 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
225 Id. at 499. 
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these positions, did not require managers to consider all qualified employees, and did not 
advertise openings for these positions to those who may be qualified; individual 
managers still had broad discretion to award promotions with very few constraints.226 The 
plaintiffs provided statistical evidence that there were significant gender disparities at 
these levels of management,227 as well as evidence of stereotyping and FRD.228 The court 
distinguished the case from Dukes, stating that the plaintiffs had identified a common 
mode by which upper managers had exercised discretion.229 On closer examination, the 
Ellis class made a very similar evidentiary and factual showing as that in Dukes.230 The 
                                                 
226 Id. at 501. 
227 Id. 
228 See, e.g., id. at 499 (discussing Ellis’s failure to be promoted following her transfer to 
Colorado to assist her sick mother, despite repeatedly expressing interest in advancing to 
management and offering to relocate); id. at 499–500 (discussing Horstman’s failure to 
be promoted following scheduling conflicts and her responsibilities as a single mother, 
despite repeatedly expressing interest in management and transferring to a higher-volume 
store to increase her promotability). 
229 Id. at 509 (“Unlike in Dukes, which the Supreme Court concluded merely identified 
the delegation of discretion (i.e., the absence of a policy), here Plaintiffs identify specific 
practices and a common mode of guided discretion directed from the top levels of the 
company.”). 
230 Compare id. at 511 (“First, Plaintiffs produce persuasive evidence of numerous 
common policies and practices under which Costco conducts promotions . . . . Second, 
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primary difference between the two classes appears to be their sizes.231 However, the 
important point is that the court certified the class based on its impression that Costco’s 
practices involved less individual discretion than Wal-Mart’s practices in Dukes.232 
Therefore, it seems that in the wake of Dukes, class actions seem to survive more in spite 
of supervisor discretion than because of it.  
Calibuso and Ellis represent rare examples of class actions that have survived 
post-Dukes. Other plaintiff classes have not been so fortunate. For example, in Tabor v. 
Hilti, a group of female sales representatives sued their employer, a tool manufacturer, 
after being denied promotions to account manager positions.233 Hilti’s policy was to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Plaintiffs similarly demonstrate a pervasive companywide culture that, along with the 
common policies and practices, guide Costco managers’ discretion in making promotion 
decisions. . . . Third, Plaintiffs demonstrate classwide effects purportedly caused by said 
policies and practices affecting all regions.”), with supra notes 178–179, 182–183 and 
accompanying text. 
231 Id. at 509 (“[T]he size of the class at issue is a mere fraction of that in Dukes. 
Although class size has no per se bearing on commonality, when the claims focus in part 
on the exercise of managerial discretion, it is reasonable to suspect that the larger the 
class size, the less plausible it is that a class will be able to demonstrate a common mode 
of exercising discretion.”). 
232 See supra note 229. 
233 Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1206, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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award promotions based on a series of ratings from employees’ supervisors.234 However, 
not only were these ratings highly subjective,235 they were also inconsistently recorded 
and utilized in practice.236 Furthermore, the plaintiffs provided statistical and anecdotal 
evidence of sex and family responsibilities discrimination. For example, Ronica Tabor 
was told during an interview that she should not 
travel as much as the job required because she was a wife and mother. 
[Her interviewer] stated that he would personally not want his wife to hold 
a job that required travel, and he advised Ms. Tabor to ask her husband 
about whether she should pursue this type of work.237 
Despite the significant evidence of Hilti’s failure to adhere to its own promotion policies 
and alarming evidence of sex stereotyping and discrimination on the part of Hilti’s 
supervisors, the court declined to certify the plaintiff class. Citing Dukes, the court stated, 
                                                 
234 Id. at 1212. 
235 Id. at 1212 (stating that employees were rated broadly on promotion-readiness (P), 
willingness to relocate (M), and career goals). 
236 Id. (finding that “282 individuals were promoted between 2005 and 2008, but fewer 
than 24% had been assigned a P rating at the time of promotion; fewer than 37% of 
promoted employees were assigned M ratings; fewer than 8% of individuals who were 
promoted to outside sales positions had actually identified outside sales as a future career 
goal; and more than 64% of employees were missing both P rating and M rating at the 
time of promotion”). 
237 Id. at 1213. 
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“Plaintiffs challenge a highly discretionary policy for granting promotions. They have not 
shown that Hilti maintained ‘a common mode of exercising discretion that pervade[d] the 
entire company.’ To the contrary, the record suggests that Hilti failed to maintain [its 
employee evaluation] system in any uniform manner.”238 In other words, the fact that 
Hilti failed to follow its own procedures for promoting the most qualified employees and 
exercised excessive discretion in a way that systematically harmed women helped it to 
defeat the certification of the plaintiff class.  
Taken together, these cases demonstrate the beginnings of the harmful effects of 
Dukes on class actions based on supervisor discretion. At best, plaintiff classes have 
experienced success when they can convince a court that their employer granted less 
discretion to supervisors than Wal-Mart did. At worst, cases in which there is strong 
evidence that supervisor discretion caused discrimination do not survive past class 
certification.239 While psychological research makes clear that there is a strong 
                                                 
238 Id. at 1229 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554–55 
(2011)). 
239 See, e.g., Ladik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 263, 265 (W.D. Wis. 2013) 
(suggesting that Dukes prevents some plaintiffs from receiving the relief they should 
receive: “In concluding that plaintiffs cannot proceed as a class action, I do not mean to 
question the seriousness of the allegations in the complaint. These allegations paint a 
disturbing picture about defendant’s attitude and treatment of its female employees over 
the course of many years. If true, they demand immediate and comprehensive action by 
defendant to investigate and correct the problems. However, . . . [b]ecause plaintiffs’ 
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relationship between subjectivity and discrimination, post-Dukes courts are rewarding 
employers for engaging in subjective and inconsistent employment practices, even where 
there are documented gender disparities. The Dukes decision has caused significant harm 
in Title VII jurisprudence regarding supervisor discretion, “because the claims Dukes 
asserted are predominantly, and most successfully, asserted on a class basis.”240 Before 
Dukes, class actions based on supervisor discretion policies were more successful than 
individual actions.241 Class actions represent an important tool in discrimination law, 
particularly when it comes to institutional or structural problems like supervisor 
discretion.242 Dukes has rendered this tool unavailable for many victims of sex 
                                                                                                                                                 
complaint does not meet [the Dukes] standard, I must grant defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.”). 
240 Tippett, supra note 114, at 442–43. 
241 Id. at 456. 
242 Hart, supra note 92, at 778 (“Class action lawsuits may provide a solution to some of 
the proof problems presented in individual claims. By targeting workplace policies more 
generally, without reference (at least initially) to the specific merits of each individual 
case, class litigation has the potential to challenge employer policies that permit the 
uncabined exercise of subjective judgment. Class litigation has the added benefit that it 
can go beyond an individual instance of discrimination to challenge the intrusion of both 
conscious and unconscious discrimination into the culture and structure of the 
workplace.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U.L. REV. Colloquy 34, 36–37 (2011) (“For many 
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discrimination. Furthermore, because Dukes re-conceptualized the very nature of 
supervisor discretion policies, and did not simply touch on the procedural aspects of class 
certification,243 the impact of the decision is likely to extend to individual actions as well. 
After scholarly support for structural solutions to employment discrimination under Title 
                                                                                                                                                 
employees and others, a class action is their only meaningful access to the courts. Those 
with small claims and limited resources are unlikely to challenge powerful corporations 
on their own, effectively immunizing companies from complying with the law. . . . Even 
if individuals are able to seek redress for individual harms, they cannot effectively 
challenge widespread misconduct in the absence of collective action. . . . The Dukes class 
certification standard jeopardizes potentially meritorious challenges to systemic 
discrimination. By redefining the class certification requirements for employment 
discrimination cases in two major areas, . . . the Court compromises employees’ access to 
justice.”); Brief for U.S. Women Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 20, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) 
(No. 10-277) (arguing that class actions serve an important role in addressing social 
disparities by “forc[ing] an internal re-examination of executive attitudes and corporate 
culture”). 
243 See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 508 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“The 
[Dukes] Court reasoned that the exercise of discretion itself is not evidence of any 
discriminatory policy.”) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 
(2011)); see also supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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VII gained momentum throughout the 2000s,244 Dukes has undermined these important 
efforts. 
III. MOVING FORWARD 
Given the potentially sweeping effects of the Dukes decision on how supervisor 
discretion is regarded under Title VII, options for increasing relief for plaintiffs are 
limited. As discussed above, the decision not only elevated the Falcon standard for 
commonality in class certification, it also re-conceptualized supervisor discretion as not 
being an employment policy.245 Part A of this section discusses what the legal standard 
would look like in supervisor discretion cases if the law actually reflected empirical 
reality as it has been documented by psychological research. In other words, this section 
presents what supervisor discretion might look like in an ideal world. Part B discusses 
practical options for litigation given the limitations set down by Dukes.  
A. AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO SUPERVISOR DISCRETION UNDER TITLE 
VII 
As discussed above in Part I, psychological evidence has long demonstrated that 
supervisor discretion is a causal factor in employment discrimination.246 Although 
Watson reflected a trend toward a more structural understanding of employment 
                                                 
244 See generally Green, A Structural Approach, supra note 118; Tristan K. Green, Work 
Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005); Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics, supra note 118; Sturm, supra note 118. 
245 See supra Part II.C. 
246 See supra Part I.B. 
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discrimination in federal courts that would be more accommodating to supervisor 
discretion claims, I argue that it did not go far enough. Whereas Watson stated that “an 
employer’s policy of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower 
level supervisors should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct,”247 research 
in psychology suggests that this inference is warranted. The findings of this dissertation 
revealed a causal influence of supervisor discretion on reports of FRD; by experimentally 
manipulating the level of discretion employed by supervisors in their employee 
evaluations, I was able to influence the level of FRD.248 The findings also revealed that 
levels of FRD became substantial where employers in the upper half of the distribution 
on supervisor discretion intersected with supervisors in the upper half of the distribution 
on support for the SSI.249 Furthermore, previous research has demonstrated that the SSI is 
approximately normally distributed in the U.S. population.250 It can therefore be expected 
that most workplaces will contain a number of decision-makers who personally endorse 
the SSI.  
Taking into consideration these findings and those of decades of research in 
psychology,251 it is not unreasonable to say that the causal role of supervisor discretion in 
FRD is known. Employers either know or should know that by implementing a policy of 
                                                 
247 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). 
248 See supra Chapter 3. 
249 See supra Chapter 2. 
250 See Miller & Borgida, supra note 82, at Table 2. 
251 See supra Part I.B. 
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broad supervisor discretion, they increase the risk of FRD in the workplace. Thus, a 
policy of supervisor discretion should create a rebuttable presumption, or at least an 
inference, of discrimination under Title VII. There is no reason why employers should be 
allowed to willfully ignore the high risk of discrimination that they create with policies 
that provide excessive discretion to supervisors. Not only do these policies increase 
discrimination, but they also leave very few employment records behind, thereby making 
discrimination extremely difficult to prove. Several legal scholars have made similar 
suggestions. For example, Michael Selmi points out that “[a]fter all, . . . the person who 
speeds ‘uncontrollably’ (‘I did not know I was going 80 mph’) is not told that slowing 
down is beyond her control, she is told to look at the speedometer.”252 Employers should 
                                                 
252 Selmi, supra note 94, at 1238. See also Green, A Structural Approach, supra note 118, 
at 850 (“Recognizing that Title VII . . . falls short of addressing the problem, legal 
scholars have begun to formulate a new paradigm of regulation that would impose an 
obligation on employers . . . to take structural measures to minimize discriminatory bias 
in workplace decisionmaking.”); Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra 
note 118, at 93 (“I suggest that this conceptualization should take legal form in a 
structural account of disparate treatment theory, an account that holds employers directly 
liable for organizational structures and institutional practices that unreasonably enable the 
operation of discriminatory bias in the workplace.”); Hart, supra note 92, at 787–88 
(“When an employer is, or should be, aware of the demonstrable consequences of 
permitting individual supervisors unguided independence in employment 
decisionmaking, its decision to continue that unguided independence is a company policy 
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similarly be expected to actively examine their own policies and should be held liable for 
creating a risk of discrimination. 
                                                                                                                                                 
that should be subject to challenge, like any other employer policy or practice whose 
consequence is the denial of equal opportunities.”); Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent 
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 969–70 (1993) (“Whenever an employer fails to 
act to prevent discrimination which it knows, or should know, is occurring, which it 
expects to occur, or which it should expect to occur, it should be held negligent. Liability 
should also be recognized when an employer breaches the statutorily established standard 
of care by making employment decisions which have a discriminatory effect, without 
first scrutinizing its processes, searching for less discriminatory alternatives, and 
examining its own motives for evidence of stereotyping.”); Sturm, supra note 118, at 475 
(“An effective system of external accountability, including judicial involvement as a 
catalyst, would encourage organizations to identify and correct these problems without 
creating increased exposure to liability, and to learn from other organizations that have 
engaged in similar efforts.”); 
Williams, supra note 94, at 447–48 (“[D]efendants should have the burden of taking 
effective measures to protect against stereotypes that are entirely predictable. . . . 
[E]mployers should be held accountable if patterns of bias are allowed to continue 
without intervention.”). 
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Under the current approach to Title VII litigation, employers are typically 
incentivized to avoid creating paper trails regarding their employment decisions.253 As 
long as there is no record of the decisions individual supervisors are making (and no 
record of the reasons for those decisions), discrimination is very difficult to prove. 
Consider the hypothetical employer, described above, that uses a “tap on the shoulder” 
method for promotion decisions.254 This employer could fail to promote a female 
employee for years without ever creating records of her performance, of the relative 
qualifications of the employees who were promoted, of the list of employees who were 
qualified for promotions and the list of employees who were actually considered, of the 
reasons other employees were promoted, and of the reasons the female employee was not 
promoted. Without any of this evidence, the woman would find it difficult to prove 
discrimination, particularly as an individual plaintiff. She would most likely need to bring 
evidence of sexist comments that individual supervisors made to her or evidence of 
aggregate patterns of gender disparities across the workforce.255  
                                                 
253 Personal conversation with Jill Gaulding, Co-founder, Gender Justice (Mar. 12, 2015). 
For more information about Gender Justice, see http://genderjustice.us. 
254 See supra Part II.A. 
255 See, e.g., Eldred v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 898 F. Supp. 928, 931–38 
(D. Mass. 1995) (Plaintiff succeeded in her individual supervisor discretion claim under 
Title VII because there was evidence of her superior performance relative to other 
employees, sexist comments from her supervisors, and gender discrimination against the 
only other female supervisor at the company). 
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If, however, employers were held accountable for actively assessing the risk of 
discrimination within their workplaces, they would be incentivized to audit their own 
policies and procedures for risk factors and keep records of their attempts to reduce 
discrimination. Ideally, they would seek out guidance from experts on discrimination, 
attempt to learn from other organizations that have successfully addressed the problem, 
and adopt policies and procedures that represent the best practices in their fields. Several 
scholars who advocate structural approaches to discrimination law articulate the 
importance of incentivizing employers to actively engage in problem-solving to reduce 
discrimination.256  
                                                 
256 Green, Work Culture, supra note 244, at 626–27 (“Effective regulation of 
discriminatory work cultures, I argue, requires that we rely less on courts to articulate and 
enforce specific, across-the-board rules and more on legal incentives that will facilitate 
contextual problem solving by employers. . . . I suggest that these efforts should be aimed 
at altering the organizational structures and policies that influence the shape and 
development of work cultures rather than at regulating social relations themselves.”); 
Sturm, supra note 118, at 475 (“[S]econd generation problems cannot be reduced to a 
fixed code of specific rules or commands that establishes clear boundaries governing 
conduct. Instead, their resolution requires a different process, namely problem solving. 
That process identifies the legal and organizational dimensions of the problem, 
encourages organizations to gather and share relevant information, builds individual and 
institutional capacity to respond, and helps design and evaluate solutions that involve 
employees who participate in the day-to-day patterns that produce bias and exclusion. An 
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An approach to Title VII that held employers accountable for preventing 
discrimination would also come closer to fulfilling the original policy goals of Congress 
when it enacted the statute. The purpose of Title VII is not merely to provide remedies to 
employees who have already been wronged, but to eliminate employment discrimination 
in the U.S.257 Taking the purpose of Title VII into consideration, it is difficult to justify 
an approach to Title VII jurisprudence that does not require employers to actively reduce 
discrimination. 
                                                                                                                                                 
effective system of external accountability, including judicial involvement as a catalyst, 
would encourage organizations to identify and correct these problems without creating 
increased exposure to liability, and to learn from other organizations that have engaged in 
similar efforts.”). 
257 See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999) (“Dissuading 
employers from implementing programs or policies to prevent workplace discrimination 
is directly contrary to Title VII’s prophylactic purposes.”); Ariz. Governing Comm. for 
Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1110 (1983) 
(“[A] central purpose of Title VII is to prevent employers from treating individual 
workers on the basis of sexual or racial group characteristics.”); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (“The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title 
VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
group of white employees over other employees.”). 
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Finally, holding employers accountable for actively reducing discrimination 
would not require us to completely re-think Title VII jurisprudence (although it would 
require the courts to recognize supervisor discretion as a discriminatory policy, in direct 
contrast to Dukes). Most of how federal courts have interpreted Title VII over the past 
few decades would remain intact. The remainder of this section describes how this 
approach to supervisor discretion claims would function under Title VII. I argue that Title 
VII is already equipped to hold employers accountable for reducing discrimination by 
limiting supervisor discretion. 
1. Individual Claims 
As mentioned above, individual plaintiffs who bring discrimination cases under 
Title VII (as well as some state discrimination statutes258) must prove their cases using 
either direct evidence of discrimination or indirect evidence of discrimination under the 
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework.259 Because direct evidence of 
discrimination is rare, most cases are analyzed under McDonnell-Douglas.260 This 
framework involves three stages of analysis. First, plaintiffs must make a prima facie 
case of discrimination by showing that: 1) they are members of a protected class under 
                                                 
258 See, e.g., Carter v. Dayton Rogers Mfg. Co., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (D. Minn. 
2008) (applying the McDonnell-Douglas framework to both Title VII and Minnesota 
Human Rights Act claims). 
259 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973); Hart, supra 
note 92, at 751–53. 
260 Hart, supra note 92, at 751. 
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Title VII; 2) they met the employer’s legitimate expectations for job performance; 3) they 
suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) the circumstances give rise to an 
inference of discrimination based on the protected class status, such as sex.261 If a 
plaintiff successfully makes a prima facie case in the first stage, the second stage places 
the burden on the defendant employer to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for the adverse actions that it took against the employee.262 If the employer satisfies this 
burden, the third stage shifts the burden back to the employee to demonstrate that the 
non-discriminatory reason offered by the employer was mere pretext for 
discrimination.263 At this point, the first two stages of the analysis are effectively swept 
aside, and the primary consideration is whether the adverse action was “because of” 
sex.264  
The first two stages of the McDonnell-Douglas analysis are relatively easy for the 
parties to satisfy.265 As a result, most of the legal battle takes place in the third stage of 
analysis, in which the plaintiff must show that the employer’s reasons for taking the 
adverse action are mere pretext for discrimination.266 This might involve evidence that 
the supervisor made prejudicial statements about the protected class, evidence that the 
                                                 
261 See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 804. 
264 See Hart, supra note 92, at 753. 
265 Id. at 752–53. 
266 Id. at 753. 
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employer’s reasons for the adverse action are contradicted by records of the plaintiff’s 
strong performance, or evidence that other members of the same protected class also face 
disparities in the workplace. Often, multiple forms of evidence are needed to convince 
the fact-finder that the adverse action was taken “because of” sex under Title VII.267  
In a system in which employers were held accountable for actively reducing 
discrimination in the workplace by limiting supervisor discretion, the McDonnell-
Douglas framework would remain largely intact. The plaintiff would make his or her 
prima facie case in the traditional way. For example, the female employee in our 
hypothetical workplace example could show that each time she was not selected for a 
promotion, a man without children was selected instead. In the second stage of the 
analysis, the employer would offer a non-discriminatory reason for taking its adverse 
action against the plaintiff; this stage of the analysis would also go unchanged.  
Finally, in the third stage, the plaintiff would be required to show that the 
employer’s reason for the adverse action was mere pretext for discrimination. The fact 
that the employer had a policy of unchecked supervisor discretion would raise an 
inference of discrimination that the employer would have to rebut. If the employer had 
taken active steps to reduce discrimination or limit supervisor discretion, it could offer 
documentation of these practices in its defense. For example, evidence that open 
                                                 
267 See, e.g., Eldred v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 898 F. Supp. 928, 931–38 
(D. Mass. 1995) (Plaintiff presented evidence of her superior performance relative to 
other employees, sexist comments from her supervisors, and gender discrimination 
against the only other female supervisor at the company). 
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positions were advertised to all employees, that all qualified employees were considered 
for promotions, that employees were evaluated using objective standards, and that 
decision-makers were required to document the reasons for their promotion decisions 
would all help the employer demonstrate that its decisions were not discriminatory. In the 
absence of any evidence of active anti-discrimination practices, the plaintiff’s showing of 
excessive supervisor discretion and adverse actions toward women in the workplace 
could be enough to infer discrimination (subject to the fact-finder’s weighting of the 
evidence and findings of credibility).  
This approach would align Title VII litigation with empirical knowledge 
regarding the nature of supervisor discretion by recognizing that where employers allow 
for excessive supervisor discretion, the risk of discrimination is known to be substantial. 
It would hold employers who knowingly implement these harmful practices liable for the 
risk of discrimination that they create. It would also reward employers who had taken 
appropriate, evidence-based steps to reduce discrimination by allowing them to use these 
practices in their defense. In the end, this approach would tip the scales somewhat so that 
plaintiffs would not face the excessive level of hostility that they face in federal courts 
today.268 Furthermore, it would accomplish this without significantly altering the nature 
of the McDonnell-Douglas framework or the legal reasoning employed by the courts. 
2. Class Certification 
Class actions based on supervisor discretion claims have typically been more 
successful than individual claims and represent a more effective tool to fight this form of 
                                                 
268 See supra note 113. 
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discrimination.269 In an ideal world, class actions would still be available to plaintiffs 
bringing claims of excessive supervisor discretion. In order to be certified as a class, a 
group of plaintiffs must first show: 1) that the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable; 2) that there are common questions of law or fact; 3) that the 
representative parties' claims or defenses are typical of the class claims or defenses; and 
4) that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the class interests.270 In 
supervisor discretion cases, commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) tends to be the primary 
issue at the class certification stage.271 
In a system in which employers were held accountable for actively taking steps to 
prevent discrimination in the workplace, the law would regard supervisor discretion as an 
employment policy that can cause discrimination (in contrast to the perspective employed 
by the Supreme Court in Dukes272). Therefore, class certification would proceed much as 
it did in the Dukes case in the District Court.273 As discussed above, the District Court’s 
certification of the Dukes class was largely unremarkable; the legal reasoning that the 
court employed was consistent with how many courts had treated supervisor 
                                                 
269 Tippett, supra note 114, at 457 (finding that between 2005 and 2011, “class actions 
[based on claims of subjective employment practices] had a success rate of 27–29%” and 
“individual claims had a success rate of 2–5%”) 
270 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
271 See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
272 See supra Part II.C. 
273 See supra Part II.C. 
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discrimination claims in the post-Watson period.274 Therefore, a system that held 
employers accountable for adopting policies of supervisor discretion would not require a 
fundamental change in class certification under Title VII; it would simply require a 
reversal of the sweeping changes that the Supreme Court undertook in Dukes. A showing 
of a policy of supervisor discretion, combined with statistical evidence of disparities, 
would satisfy the requirements for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).275 After all of the 
elements of Rule 23 were met and the class was certified, the case would proceed to the 
merits phase of the case.  
3. Class Pattern-or-Practice Claims 
Pattern-or-practice claims are the class action version of a claim under disparate 
treatment theory.276 In a class pattern-or-practice claim, the plaintiff class must show that 
the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, or that discrimination is 
the “company’s standard operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual 
practice.”277 A plaintiff class can meet this burden using statistical evidence of disparities 
between the employer’s workforce and the relevant pool of available workers.278 The 
class can also supplement this evidence with anecdotal evidence of stereotyping or with 
                                                 
274 See id. 
275 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
276 See Tippett, supra note 114, at 434. 
277 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) 
278 Hart, supra note 92, at 784. 
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expert testimony regarding the employer’s policies.279 Once the plaintiff class has made 
its prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination, the defendant can challenge 
the validity of the statistical evidence.280 If the defendant is unsuccessful, the plaintiff has 
established a presumption that each employment decision regarding each class member 
was discriminatory.281 During the damages phase, the employer can rebut the 
presumption of discrimination for particular employees by showing that the actions taken 
against certain employees were not discriminatory.282 
In a system that held employers accountable for enacting policies of supervisor 
discretion, the analytical process for a pattern-or-practice class action would not 
fundamentally change. Evidence of a policy of excessive supervisor discretion, combined 
with a showing of adverse employment actions, would satisfy the plaintiff’s burden to 
make a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination. In order to rebut this 
prima facie case, the employer would need to show that it in fact took actions to limit 
supervisor discretion, and that the plaintiffs’ evidence of adverse actions or disparities 
was invalid. In any event, the liability stage of the analysis would look much like it does 
under the current system, except that evidence of supervisor discretion would itself be 
evidence of discrimination. During the damages phase, the employer would be able to 
rebut the presumption of discrimination against individual plaintiffs by offering evidence 
                                                 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 785. 
281 Id.  
282 Id.  
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that the actions taken against those individuals was based on objective employment 
policies. During this phase, employers who had actively taken steps to use objective 
standards and keep clear records regarding employees would be rewarded by being able 
to use this evidence in their defense. Employers who had failed to curb supervisor 
discretion and document objective employment practices could be held liable for 
discrimination. 
As with individual claims, this approach would reflect our scientific knowledge 
regarding supervisor discretion by allowing evidence of excessive discretion to form the 
basis of a plaintiff class’s prima facie case. It would hold employers liable for 
implementing policies of excessive discretion and would reward employers who took 
steps to reduce discrimination by limiting supervisor discretion. These employers would 
be better able to defend themselves both in the liability phase, by showing that they had 
actively worked to prevent discrimination, and in the damages phase, because they would 
have documented objective measures each employee’s performance. This approach 
would accomplish these goals without significantly altering the legal analysis underlying 
pattern-or-practice claims. 
4. Class Disparate Impact Claims 
In a class disparate impact claim, the plaintiff class must show that the employer 
adopted a facially neutral policy that had a disproportionate impact on a protected 
class.283 The plaintiff class must offer evidence of the policy in question, as well as 
                                                 
283 Hart, supra note 92, at 781. 
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statistical evidence of the adverse effect of the policy on the protected group.284 Once the 
plaintiff class has made its prima facie case, the employer can either attack the validity of 
the statistical evidence285 or offer evidence that the policy in question is “job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”286 If the employer 
succeeds in showing business necessity, the plaintiff class must show that the employer 
failed to adopt an alternative policy that would be effective for the employer’s business 
purpose while making a lesser impact on the protected class.287 
In a system that held employers accountable for giving supervisors excessive 
discretion, the analytical process for a disparate impact class action would not 
fundamentally change. Evidence of a policy of excessive supervisor discretion, combined 
with evidence of disparities within the employer’s workforce, would make the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case. In order to rebut this prima facie case, the employer would need to show 
that it could not have implemented more objective employment policies (i.e., that the 
high level of supervisor discretion was a business necessity).  
Because disparate impact theory was designed for the particular situation in which 
a facially neutral policy causes discrimination, it is particularly fitting for supervisor 
discretion claims,288 and it is perfectly equipped to handle a legal approach that requires 
                                                 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
287 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); see also Hart, supra note 92, at 782. 
288 Hart, supra note 92, at 782. 
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employers to adopt policies that prevent discrimination. However, because the federal 
courts have displayed significant hostility toward these types of claims in recent years, 
not many plaintiff classes have brought claims exclusively under a disparate impact 
theory.289 A system that regarded supervisor discretion policies with the level of 
suspicion that empirical research suggests is appropriate would solve this problem. This 
approach would reflect our scientific understanding of the role of supervisor discretion in 
employment discrimination. It would hold employers liable for implementing policies of 
excessive discretion and would reward employers who took steps to reduce 
discrimination by limiting supervisor discretion. It would also allow for some flexibility 
in case there are certain businesses that really do require more subjective employment 
practices. This approach would accomplish these goals without significantly altering the 
legal analysis underlying disparate impact claims. It would simply require that courts 
adhere to the holding in Watson and regard supervisor discretion as appropriate for 
disparate impact claims. 
                                                 
289 Hart, supra note 92, at 783 (“The judicially imposed standards for prevailing in a 
disparate impact case have become so onerous that plaintiffs may be making the 
extremely sensible judgment that they will be unable to prevail on these claims.”); 
Tippett, supra note 114, at 435 (“An average employer’s litigation risk in connection 
with such claims was so vanishingly small during the 2005-2011 time frame that [likely] 
few employers adopted measures or altered their behavior to address this litigation 
risk.”). 
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In sum, it seems that Title VII is perfectly equipped to accommodate a legal 
standard that requires employers to take active steps to reduce discrimination by limiting 
supervisor discretion. This type of policy would be simple to implement; it would not 
fundamentally alter the legal analysis underlying any type of Title VII claim. It would 
also serve the original purpose of Title VII by incentivizing employers to actively address 
discrimination, rather than incentivizing employers to avoid creating paper trails and 
willfully ignore discrimination.290 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes 
makes this approach unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, 
the next section discusses some possible solutions post-Dukes. 
B. SUPERVISOR DISCRETION CLAIMS IN A POST-DUKES REALITY 
Because the Supreme Court has declared that supervisor discretion is not an 
employment policy that can cause discrimination for the purposes of class certification,291 
                                                 
290 Even the Dukes majority recognized the perverse incentives inherent in its treatment 
of supervisor discretion, but the Court seemed not to be bothered by this problem. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (stating that the plaintiffs’ 
theory of discrimination was inconsistent with a finding of a biased testing procedure 
because ‘‘[t]he whole point of permitting discretionary decisionmaking is to avoid 
evaluating employees under a common standard’’).  
291 Specifically, the Court stated that it is not enough for plaintiffs to demonstrate a policy 
of excessive discretion; they must show that the discretion was exercised in a common 
and discriminatory way. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (2011); see also Kassman v. 
KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 463–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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options for potential plaintiffs are limited. One relatively immediate solution might be to 
make supervisor discretion claims a priority for the Equal Employment Opportunity 
commission (EEOC). Unlike standard plaintiff classes, the EEOC is not required to 
undergo class certification in order to bring Title VII claims on behalf of groups of 
employees.292 Thus, the EEOC could bring a supervisor discretion claim on behalf of a 
group of employees against their employer and proceed directly to the merits phase of the 
case. In federal courts that are relatively more open to the notion of supervisor discretion 
as an employment policy that can cause discrimination, group of plaintiffs represented by 
the EEOC might succeed. However, a recent study revealed that between 2005 and 2011, 
the EEOC brought or intervened in 1,461 Title VII lawsuits and only four were claims 
based on subjective employment practices.293 Prior to Dukes, therefore, the EEOC did not 
make these types of claims a priority. I argue that the EEOC should prioritize supervisor 
discretion claims in the wake of Dukes,294 now that standard class actions are 
substantially unavailable to plaintiffs.  
                                                 
292 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(6)(a). 
293 Tippett, supra note 114, at 457. The four cases that the EEOC brought had a higher 
rate of success than other class actions and individual claims during that period. Id. 
294 For discussions of the potential role of the EEOC, see generally Stephanie Bornstein, 
Rights in Recession: Toward Administrative Antidiscrimination Law, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y 
REV. 119 (2014); Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice after Wal-Mart: 
The EEOC As Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2013). 
   195 
 
Another potential solution may be for plaintiffs to bring cases as individuals or in 
groups of plaintiffs through joinder.295 Although the Supreme Court stated in Dukes that 
supervisor discretion is not an employment policy, it made this statement in the context 
of class certification. It is not yet clear how many lower federal courts will follow the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in deciding the merits of individual claims. Just as some 
courts disregarded Watson’s holding that supervisor discretion could form the basis of a 
disparate impact claim,296 some courts may continue to regard supervisor discretion as an 
employment policy after Dukes. The success of these claims may depend on how 
plaintiff’s lawyers conceptualize the practice of supervisor discretion in pleadings. Joan 
Williams, the leading legal scholar on FRD jurisprudence, has stated that one problem 
with these claims is that “the EEOC and plaintiffs’ employment lawyers regularly turn 
                                                 
295 See FED. R. CIV. P. 18; FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). 
296 See Hart, supra note 92, at 783 (“Another possible explanation for the near absence of 
suits alleging exclusively disparate impact may be that despite Watson’s very explicit 
holding, lower courts have resisted applying impact analysis to claims of excessive 
subjectivity. A number of courts, appearing to disregard Watson, have concluded that 
‘[p]laintiffs do not and cannot allege that subjective decision making itself is a practice 
that discriminates. Rather, they can only allege that it allows a situation to exist in which 
several different managers are able to discriminate intentionally.’ Employing this 
reasoning, courts have berated plaintiffs for bringing ‘disparate treatment claims parading 
under the guise of a disparate impact label.’”). 
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away plaintiffs with legitimate [FRD] claims.”297 This might explain why even before 
Dukes, FRD and other sex discrimination claims based on subjective employment 
practices were not numerous.298 If those advocating for employees have a hard time 
recognizing FRD as sex discrimination under Title VII, then there is little hope for 
plaintiffs in courts that are also hostile to FRD claims based on supervisor discretion. 
Thus, an important step will be to increase awareness of these issues among plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.299 
Finally, one potential solution to the Dukes problem—and the broader 
inconsistencies involved in the treatment of supervisor discretion under Title VII—would 
be for Congress to amend Title VII. The statute could explicitly state that excessive 
supervisor discretion is an employment policy for the purposes of Title VII. This would 
not be the first time that Congress amended Title VII in response to a court decision. For 
example, after Watson shifted the burden of proof regarding business necessity to the 
plaintiff employee,300 Congress amended Title VII to shift this burden back to the 
                                                 
297 Williams, supra note 94, at 448–49. 
298 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
299 Of course, many plaintiffs’ lawyers are already working hard to advocate for plaintiffs 
in these types of cases, and their work should not be overlooked. See, e.g., Center for 
WorkLife Law, http://worklifelaw.org; Gender Justice, http://genderjustice.us. 
300 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997–99 (1988). 
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employer.301 After the Supreme Court held that pregnancy discrimination was not a form 
of sex discrimination in General Electric Company v. Gilbert,302 Congress enacted the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act to reverse this holding.303 Thus, although a legislative 
solution may not be likely in the current legal and political landscape, it represents one 
potential solution. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, these potential solutions are merely attempts to minimize the 
damage caused by Dukes, and they fall short of solving the underlying problem. 
Psychological research makes clear that excessive supervisor discretion in the workplace 
can lead to discrimination on the basis of sex and family responsibilities. When 
employers adopt policies that grant broad discretion to individual supervisors, they know 
or should know that these policies increase the risk of discrimination. Because courts 
have treated supervisor discretion inconsistently under Title VII, many employers are 
incentivized to avoid adopting objective employment practices and avoid creating paper 
trails of their employment decisions. However, several courts have demonstrated that 
Title VII is already perfectly equipped to conceptualize supervisor discretion as an 
employment policy that leads to discrimination.  
                                                 
301 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)); see also Sturm, supra note 118, at 486. 
302 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976). 
303 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
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I argue that in contrast to the legal reasoning adopted by the Dukes majority,304 
the law should not only regard supervisor discretion as an employment policy, but it 
should also hold employers accountable for actively taking steps to reduce discrimination 
by limiting supervisor discretion. To borrow language from Watson, leaving employment 
decisions “to the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors” should raise an 
“inference of discriminatory conduct.”305 Allowing employers to turn a blind eye to 
discrimination that they knowingly create defies the purpose of Title VII and undermines 
federal anti-discrimination efforts more broadly.  
                                                 
304 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011). 
305 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). 
